

Intercultural Trends and Social Change in the Euro-Mediterranean region

The Anna Lindh Report **2018**



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

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Federica Mogherini

High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

There is one challenge that is equally perceived on both shores of the Mediterranean – in Europe, in the Middle East and in North Africa. Too many of our young people feel that their voice is not heard, and they cannot make a real difference in their countries' public lives. Governments and institutions are too often perceived as remote, sometimes inaccessible. Youth unemployment is too high in most of our countries. The lack of opportunities has fostered different kinds of protest, but it has also fostered a growing sense of disillusion and despair.

The new edition of the Anna Lindh Foundation's Intercultural Trends Report shows that a large majority of people in our region – from North to South, from East to West – understand the need for greater participation of our young people in public life. They ask for better opportunities for our youth: opportunities to get the education they need to find a good job; opportunities to express their potential; opportunities to impact on the public debate and on policy making.

This research confirms the direction of the work we have done so far together with the Anna Lindh Foundation – investing particularly in education and intercultural learning, and promoting youth-led dialogues and virtual exchanges.


Since the beginning of our common work, one of our main goals has been to create new channels for young people to engage in public life and policy making. This is the idea that, almost two years ago, led us to establishing, together with the Anna Lindh Foundation and the European Youth Forum, “Young Mediterranean Voices plus”, an initiative for young people from both shores of the Mediterranean to engage with European policy-makers.

Since then, we have created similar initiatives with young people from all parts of Europe, from Asia, from the Sahel and from the whole of Africa. I had the chance to meet some amazing young people – working in civil society organisations, with the leading degrees and academic background, with great talent and entrepreneurial spirit. They have so much to bring into the decision making process.

Listening to their voice and their proposals is not a favour we are doing them. It is a favour we are doing our societies. If we want our policies to deliver, our societies to grow and be resilient, we need our young people's engagement and advice.

This Report shows there is a strong case for scaling-up these kind of initiatives – involving a much greater number of young people from different countries and different backgrounds, but also a greater number of governments and organisations.

And experience tells me that there is a strong demand coming from youth all across our region. True, there is growing frustration and even resentment among young people. But I also see incredible energy and passion: a desire to commit, to do something good for themselves and for their communities. Answering to this call is an opportunity we cannot miss, and a test we cannot fail.



Ahmed ABOUL GHEIT

Secretary General of the League of Arab States

I would like to congratulate the Anna Lindh Foundation on the publication of this very significant Report on Intercultural Trends in the Euro-Mediterranean Region. The Report, based on the results of an expansive survey of public opinion in 13 countries, represents, in this third edition, a comprehensive compendium of intercultural trends and social developments across Europe and the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region.

The analytical research contained in the Report, which was commissioned by the Anna Lindh Foundation and conducted by Ipsos, examines a number of important dimensions of cross-cultural encounters and methods of interaction across the Euro-Mediterranean region, including in the four Arab countries where the research was carried out, namely Algeria, Jordan, Palestine, and Tunisia.

The results of the survey highlight the perception, priorities and aspirations of a wide segment of the populations from both sides of the Mediterranean, including vis-à-vis key issues such as shared values, cultural identity, migration, media reporting, cross-cultural dialogue, and cultural and religious diversity.

The Report also contains important data reflecting the level of tolerance exhibited by respondents towards people from different cultural backgrounds, which remains highly positive when addressing issues such as affording people from other cultural and religious backgrounds equal rights and opportunities, and accepting that cultural and religious diversity was important for the prosperity of their societies.

It also underscores the importance of education and youth programmes in preventing and addressing conflicts and radicalization in the Euro-Mediterranean Region, which undoubtedly remain pressing challenges for governments on both sides of the Mediterranean.

And perhaps most important of all, the Report illustrates that a majority of those surveyed continue to believe in the importance of reinforcing cooperation among both country groups and that there are mutual benefits that can be accrued across the Mediterranean, especially in the fields of new opportunities, education, training, entrepreneurship, innovation and youth employment.

The Anna Lindh Report, and its key findings, will undoubtedly serve as an important reference for politicians, decision makers and scholars alike. The League of Arab States remains for its part fully committed to further advancing its multi-dimensional partnership with the European Union, its institutions and member states, and I am confident that this Report and its important findings will continue to afford us with invaluable analytical analyses that will enable us to pursue our common goals.



Miroslav LAJČÁK

*President of the 72nd United Nations General Assembly
and Chair of the OSCE Mediterranean Contact Group*

I sincerely welcome the Anna Lindh Intercultural Trends Report, as it presents the results of the extensive field work and research of the Foundation, tested in the laboratory of the Mediterranean region.

Historically, the Mediterranean has always been the region with best case scenarios as well as worst case scenarios. Virtually all possible methods of dominance have been tested here. And it is fair to say they all failed in the long-term. In 2018, I am confident to say that the only successful modus operandi in this region is cooperation. In past centuries or even millennia, wars have not led to sustainable solutions. We can only prosper when we respect each other over the Mediterranean Sea and cooperate. For that, we need to utilize multilateral platforms, and especially the United Nations.

But to develop our dialogue and move it forward, we need facts. We need to know the situation on the ground. Which is exactly what this Report is bringing. An evidence-base, so needed for our understanding and policy-making. While compiling and tabulating data from the Report opinion polling, the Report begs vital questions about States, multilateralism, inter-governmentalism and governance. The socio-cultural trends exposed have global relevance for developing policies and strategies in domains from security and conflict prevention to migration and social cohesion.


The Report findings are forward looking and offer an encouraging green light for the new policies of the United Nations on Youth and Conflict Prevention. I especially welcome the contributions of the Report to these agendas, as the Conflict Prevention and Youth Dialogue were the priorities of the 72nd UN General Assembly.

There is a growing call from young people around the world to be included, to transform their voice to agency and leadership. And their voices are heard at the United Nations. In December 2015, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security, the first resolution fully dedicated to the important and positive role young women and men play in the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security.

It is timely that the Report survey has been carried out in parallel to the Foundation's work with the UN on the first global study on Youth, Peace and Security mandated by this Resolution, and that the Report provides further evidence-base to the UN's new long-term action plan for investment in youth-led initiatives.

This Report represents an immensely valuable contribution to our strides to give voice to all, to open doors and address globally the violence of exclusion. It provides us with further evidence-base, useful reflections and long-term strategy for investment in youth-led dialogue and conflict prevention. And it very suitably focused on the Mediterranean - home to many young populations.

I highly welcome the dedicated work of all who contributed to this Report and wish that its findings inform our work on youth leadership going forward.



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
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OVERVIEW

New approach for regional cooperation

Élisabeth GUIGOU - President of the Anna Lindh Foundation
Nabil AL SHARIF - Executive Director of the Foundation

We are facing a historical era of growing mistrust and polarisation across and within our societies. Many of the old certainties concerning governance and the respective roles of states, intergovernmental organisations and civil society have been eroded and undermined by unrest and the violence of exclusion in our communities. Increased hate speech in certain media and the multiplication of electoral shifts towards populist parties testify to this disaffection.

The chains of trust between people, particularly young people, and traditional institutions and governments have been loosened. In efforts to regain that trust we cannot afford to lose a generation. The problem is not whether we leave our young people behind but rather if they leave us behind. Youth voice remains the missing link in that chain.

“There is strong support among the people of the region for a bottom-up, youth-led cross-cultural dialogue, a move away from top-down visions and supply driven initiatives to more demand driven ones”

How should we respond to this sense of drift and disillusion among the young women and men of our region? By inclusion, by investment in their voice, agency and leadership, by giving them a sense of ownership in policies that affect their lives and livelihoods.

The new edition of the Anna Lindh Foundation's Intercultural Trends Report provides ample data to support the above, as well as an evidence-base for the required new thinking on how regional cooperation and global relations are constructed. There is strong support for a bottom-up, youth led cross-cultural dialogue, a move away from supply driven initiatives to more demand driven ones.

The Report's findings offer further validation to the new programming and strategy co-created with our Member States, Advisory Council and Civil Society Networks. They include: investment in education and intercultural learning; promotion of youth-led dialogue and virtual exchange; working with cities and associated global partnerships to develop circles of trust; and the establishment of a first media platform on cross-cultural trends.

In its 15-year life the Foundation has weathered many storms, reinvented itself, expanded its networks and sectors of interest. This it has done while always maintaining the principles and values that underpinned the ethos of its establishment by the European Commission President Romano Prodi. The maturation process sees the Foundation now coming of age as our shared central institution and reference for youth and intercultural dialogue.

Through our work in the field we have tried and tested practices across the Mediterranean that are today receiving increasing global recognition: our youth-led dialogue programming developed in Maghreb/Mashraq and now spreading across countries in the EU, have also led to pioneering exercises in the Sahel, Western and Southern Africa; our intercultural and public opinion polling, based on methodologies developed with leading social research organisations, is contributing to international policy making with the United Nations and World Bank; and our deepening partnership with Member States on Agenda 2030 is contributing to a holistic approach in the use of resources, instruments and partners in transformation policies.

The Intercultural Trends Report, a decade on from its creation, reflects this perspective of reaffirming the Mediterranean and its Millennial generation to the centre of the international agenda, replicating globally transformative methodologies tested in the laboratory of one of the world's most challenging and evolving regions. The Report also provides the strategy and blueprint for a paradigm shift from investing in hard security based on risk to investing in civil society and youth-led dialogue based on resilience.

Analysing the Intercultural Survey Data for Long-Term Programming

Eleonora INSALACO - Head of Intercultural Research and Programming at the Anna Lindh Foundation

The 2018 edition of the Intercultural Trends Report carried out by Ipsos for the Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF) comes at a very opportune time both for the ALF and the region. For the Foundation it provides concrete and evidence based elements on which their programmes and activities for the next phase will be based as they reflect the expectations of large segments of the societies of the region. More broadly, it arrives at a time when several countries and institutions, as well as governments, are trying to find the best solutions to a variety of challenges facing their countries and populations.

This edition provides important data that have been complemented with a large number of studies and comments from experts from countries around the region in an attempt to give a meaning to the results we show and an immediate understanding of the figures presented in the Report. Nevertheless, the richness of the data allows for multiple interpretations and continuous analysis and debate.

Five of these analyses make us dive into the data gathered in countries that have been polled twice since 2009. Tajnja Abdel Baghy, exploring French respondents' attitudes to diversity, discovers a population who believes in the meaning of the *vivre ensemble*, the importance of tolerance and meritocracy, and looks at their youth as the resource for the future as well as to the potential of regional cooperation.

From Khalid Chaouki's analysis of Italians' response to the increased migratory wave, it appears a Mediterranean strongly associated to the value of hospitality and solidarity. This trend is counterbalanced by a perception of increased instability and turmoil which requires a coordinated approach by the international community.

Mustapha Tabba and Nedal Masri present us Jordan as a country that has welcomed more and more refugees and displaced people from neighbouring countries in the past few years, exposing the local population to the cultures and norms of the new residents. The Survey results show the strong belief in diversity as a source of social prosperity but they also show the concerns of Jordanians in a society where young people find it more challenging to find job opportunities.

Konrad Pędziwiatr conveys the image of a Polish society which is more satisfied with the opportunities offered by the country and register a much lower rate of people who would be ready to move to other European countries compared to 2012. His analysis also finds a society with little exposure to people from Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries and with relatively lower levels of tolerance compared to other European countries.

Among the surveyed populations, Dalenda Larguèche highlights that Tunisians are the least inclined to leave their country to start a life elsewhere. A population that, despite the decline in opportunities for intercultural interactions mainly due to the drop in tourism, shows a high propensity to the acceptance of diversity and of the respect for other cultures to their children while nurturing traditional values of religiosity.

Through the other thematic articles in the Report, experts from 15 different countries of the region contribute to the identification of priority areas of work for the promotion of intercultural dialogue, and for the Anna Lindh Foundation, by contextualising the reactions of respondents to the Intercultural Trends Survey.

We receive a clear picture of the main value trends within and among societies and the authors help us identify similarities and differences which go beyond the traditional North-South, East-West dichotomies. Mohamed Tozy shows us the shared positive vision that 'Mediterraneans' have of the space they belong to: a space of hospitality, specific lifestyle and food and common cultural heritage, and not nearly defined as a space characterised by conflict and insecurity as in 2010. He also presents an analysis of priority values in the upbringing of children and how countries as close and as diverse as Palestine, Austria, Israel and Finland can be, as an example, quite close in their appreciation of independence and curiosity.

Through Inès Safi's lenses we understand people's perception on women's expected role in society and how Europeans and SEM respondents' views are quite aligned in relation to an increased role of women in the economic sphere, and different when looking at the quite higher percentage of SEM respondents wishing for a

bigger role of women in the social and cultural sphere. Conversely a higher percentage of SEM respondents wish to see a reduced role for women in the political sphere. Safi invites to offer women the possibility to freely choose their path of development beyond fixed schemes of empowerment.

The analysis of Shana Cohen allows us to go beyond preconceived ideas on the impact of people's religiosity to their attitudes towards people of other faiths and cultures, explaining the minimal differences that exist among religious and non-religious people, especially in Europe. She refers to a desire for a more coherent narrative of public responsibility in a diverse society and in public policies that encourage citizens across faiths and beliefs to interact in the spheres of education, workplace and neighbourhood.

The authors identify clear priority areas of intervention for dialogue on the basis of people's opinions and suggestions. Nayla Tabbara, by analysing the different value sets of societies on the two shores of the Mediterranean and their perception of diversity, underlines the importance of investing in intercultural education. Tabbara sees the need to base this education on the universality of human rights principles and their related values as a priority; to rethink intercultural education at the time of refugee crisis; to promote inclusive citizenship as a model and to promote collaboration between educational and religious education policy makers.

Acknowledging the pressures radicalisation imposes on multi-cultural societies and the relevance of engaging people into an anti-radicalisation strategy, Alpaslan Özerdem analyses people's perceptions of the efficiency of dialogue measures to deal with such threats. The author concludes that although there is a general agreement on the efficiency of the measures suggested by the Survey, there is a need to tailor-make these measures to fit the specific realities, conditions and perceptions of communities directly affected by radicalisation.

On the same topic, Abdelrahman Aldaqa emphasises the importance of investing in the development and empowerment of young people as the group considered to be the most susceptible to becoming attracted to extremism. Education is a key factor of change and Aldaqa underlines that it is young people themselves, and at a higher degree those from SEM, who recognise the efficacy of education and youth programmes to prevent and tackle radicalisation. Young people also consider that Euro-Mediterranean cooperation can contribute to supporting such measures.

Nabil Fahmi and Emilia Valsta try to assess the complex reasons that might lead to transformation from ideological polarisation to radicalisation or violent extremism. Pivoting upon the findings of the Anna Lindh/Ipsos

Survey the authors argue that interventions are needed in the areas of media literacy, education and youth-led dialogue to enhance critical and creative thinking, the ability to challenge stereotypes and extremist narratives and to facilitate intercultural interactions.

On the topic of mobility in the region two authors offer two different perspectives. Ayman Zohry underlines that migration issues have become central to the public discourse, and large proportions of respondents regard the Mediterranean region as being strongly characterised by migration issues. On the basis of the Survey, he also rectifies the misconception that a large number of SEM citizens would be ready to migrate and highlights that cross-cultural encounters have a stronger positive impact on the views of SEM people even if their exposure is lower than Europeans.

Bernard Abrignani focuses on the importance of exchanges, especially among young people, for mutual and intercultural understanding, language development, establishment of long-lasting relations and the development of active participation skills. Abrignani discusses how the ALF/Ipsos Survey respondents think of cultural differences and stereotypes as barriers towards cross-cultural encounters and how they believe in dialogue programmes focusing on youth as an efficient way to live better in a multi-cultural society.

Teresa Bean and Alexandra Buchler shed light on the importance of the cultural sphere for the promotion of intercultural dialogue. Buchler, analysing the trends of the mutual interest across the region, the patterns of intercultural encounters and the mounting centrality of digital media in the cultural realm, highlights the need to invest in the translation of cultural works, the need to diversify translation policies in the region and putting youth and new media to the centre of the process. She emphasises the need to devise new tools and narratives that can elicit empathy and provide a better understanding of the question of co-existence. Bean illustrates how creative social enterprise can 'provide innovative solutions to social issues' and 'an effective pathway to promote intercultural dialogue, shared values and cultural awareness'. Indeed, the Survey data shows that the majority of citizens in the region are in general agreement that cultural and religious diversity is important for the prosperity of society and that multi-cultural events, cultural and artistic initiatives are effective in dealing with radicalisation and a vehicle for the promotion of intercultural awareness.

Media is recognised as another important factor in cross-cultural relations as highlighted by Rima Marrouch and Paul Gillespie. Gillespie explains that the media attention, especially in Europe, on dramatic events related to refugees and migrants in addition to terrorist atrocities contributes to attitudes of closure. He pledges for the

creation of a Media Observatory mechanism which can involve practicing journalists, editors and publishers in discussing issues of intercultural relations together with analysts and civil society representatives. Marrouch spots the importance of cultural and lifestyle stories as mediator between the two shores of the Mediterranean. However, tracking the impact of the stories led the author to argue that media might not always play a positive role, and hence, despite the survival of TV as a dominant source of information on both shores, social media is gaining wider roles in shaping perceptions, especially among the youth.

Finally, Aiki Moschi-Gauguet and Ricard Zapata offer us a model for the current and future intercultural cities as real laboratories for dialogue in the region. Moschi-Gauguet argues that with the increased number of migrants and refugees exposed to cultural and religious diversity, if correctly managed, could be seen as a competitive advantage for Euro-Mediterranean cities. To encourage cities in their intercultural policies she advocates for the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Capital of Dialogue Award. Zapata explains the theoretical framework of the Intercultural paradigm which views diversity as an advantage and a resource and is characterised by its efficacy at the city-level, its pragmatism and promotion of face to face relations. Through an analysis of the Survey results Zapata shows the positive correlation between the way and place in which people interact with the other, the importance they place on the values of socialisation and their propensity to positively change their views about the other and appreciate diversity.

The data and evidence of the Intercultural Trends survey has been central to the Anna Lindh Foundation's newly established long-term programming adopted by its 42-country Board of Governors, that aims at strengthening the Foundation as the reference point for the promotion of intercultural dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean region by working through partnerships in the priority areas identified. At the heart of this expanding programming is the strategic and operational focus to put citizens, young voices and the region's civil societies in the driving seat of the next generation of Mediterranean dialogue. In this perspective, the Anna Lindh Report provides a blueprint for collective action.

Inside the Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey

Femke DE KEULENAER - Research Director at Ipsos' International Social Research Institute
Sofie PAUWELS - Senior Research Executive within Ipsos' Social Research Institute (Brussels office)

The Intercultural Trends Report of the Anna Lindh Foundation, established in 2010, represents a landmark study in cross-cultural trends and social change across Europe and the southern and eastern Mediterranean region. The Report, entering its third edition in 2018, is based on a unique public opinion survey carried out with citizens across the Mediterranean as an instrument for measuring trends in cultural relations and triggering action for change at the policy level of regional cooperation.

The Intercultural Trends Survey, commissioned by the Anna Lindh Foundation and carried out by Ipsos, was conducted in eight European countries (Austria, Croatia, Finland, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal and the Netherlands) and five Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries/territories (Algeria, Israel, Jordan, Palestine and Tunisia); the target population consisted of all individuals aged 15 or older and resident in the country/territory. Fieldwork took place between 19 September 2016 and 8 November 2016 and during that period 1,000 interviews were completed in each of the countries/territories covered. In most countries a CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing) methodology was implemented. In Israel and Palestine, on the other hand, face-to-face interviewing was applied.

This initial analytical report summarises some important findings observed in the survey. The results of the survey are analysed at overall level for both country groups –


European countries and countries of the SEM, and at country level. For some questions, differences between responses based on socio-demographic characteristics are also analysed. All findings presented in this report are based on weighted data. A post-stratification weight was calculated that corrects for imbalances in the samples with respect to gender, age and activity status.

Characteristics of the Mediterranean region

At the start of the interview, respondents were presented with several associations that people may have when thinking about the Mediterranean region. The largest share of respondents in the European countries surveyed (61%) thought that the region was *strongly characterised* by a Mediterranean way of life and food. As in previous waves, respondents in SEM countries were more likely to associate the region with hospitality, followed by a common cultural heritage and history (65% and 59% of 'strongly characterise' responses respectively).

Although respondents from both country groups tended to choose positive associations over negative ones, the exception was the association with 'migration issues'. In the European countries, a minority of respondents answered that the Mediterranean region was *strongly characterised* by a resistance to change, as a source of conflict, or by issues of instability and insecurity (between 22% and

Chart 1.1
 Characteristics of the Mediterranean region




Survey question: Different people have different thoughts about what the Mediterranean region represents. I will read out a set of ideas and images; please tell me if you think these characterise the Mediterranean region strongly, somewhat or not at all. **Base:** all respondents (%), by region.

26% of 'strongly characterise' responses); however, when asked whether the Mediterranean region was *strongly characterised* by migration issues, 44% answered affirmative. Negative associations were somewhat more common in SEM countries than in European countries (between 36% and 39% of 'strongly characterise' responses for 'resistance to change', 'source of conflict', and 'instability and insecurity'), and 60% of respondents in SEM countries answered that the region was *strongly characterised* by migration issues (chart 1.1).

Chart 1.2 shows that there is a large variation across countries in the proportion of respondents who answered that the Mediterranean region was *strongly characterised* by migration issues. In two SEM countries and one European country, a majority of respondents shared the view that the Mediterranean region was *strongly*

Chart 1.2
Is the Mediterranean region characterised by migration issues?



Survey question: Different people have different thoughts about what the Mediterranean region represents. I will read out a set of ideas and images; please tell me if you think these characterise the Mediterranean region strongly, somewhat or not at all.
Base: all respondents (%), by country (©Anna Lindh/Ipsos 2016).

characterised by migration issues: Tunisia (70%), Algeria (66%) and Italy (59%). Although Jordan hosts a large number of refugees, respondents in the country were less likely to *strongly* associate the Mediterranean region with migration issues; the results for Jordan were very similar to those of some of the European countries, such as Austria and the Netherlands. Respondents in France were overall the least likely to think about migration issues as *strongly* characterising the Mediterranean region.


The media in Europe frequently report on the migration and refugee crisis, and this may have influenced the associations that respondents make when thinking about the Mediterranean region. In the survey, respondents were asked whether they had seen or heard anything in the media that had influenced their views about people in SEM countries. Among European respondents who had seen or heard something in the media about SEM countries, 47% said the Mediterranean region was *strongly characterised* by migration issues. However, among respondents who had not been exposed to media coverage about the SEM region, just 33% shared the view that the Mediterranean region was *strongly characterised* by migration issues.

Attractiveness of Europe and the SEM countries as places to live

In order to find out more about the attractiveness of Europe and the SEM countries as places to live, respondents were asked which country in the world they would choose to start a new life. Two-thirds of respondents in the European countries surveyed said they would stay in Europe if they had a free choice (among these respondents, a majority answered they would simply start a new life in their own country). However, in the SEM countries included in this study, many more respondents than in the European countries replied that, if given a choice, they would start a new life in their current country of residence (60% in SEM countries vs. 36% in European countries).


Looking at the individual country results, it can be seen that respondents in the Netherlands were overall the least likely to respond that they would start a new life in the Netherlands (12% would start again in the Netherlands, compared to 43% who would prefer to start a new life in another European country, 15% in North America and 15% in Australia or Oceania). Palestine was also found at the bottom of the country ranking with only 24% of respondents who would stay in Palestine if given a choice (roughly equal shares of respondents in Palestine would prefer to start a new life in another SEM country – 16%, in a Gulf country – 17%, or in Europe – 21%). In Algeria and Israel, on the other hand, close to two-thirds of respondents indicated that their country of residence would be their preferred place to start a new life (65% and 66% respectively). A somewhat lower, but still relatively high proportion was also observed in Tunisia (59%) (chart 1.3).

Chart 1.3
Country of residence as preferred place to start a new life



In both country groups, young people were less likely to state that they would start a new life in their country of residence. In the European countries, this response was selected by 40% of respondents aged 30 or higher, compared to 17% of under 30 year-olds. In the SEM countries, this difference was 65% vs. 50% (see Chart 1.4).

Chart 1.4
Preferred countries to start a new life for respondents in SEM countries



Focussing solely on respondents in SEM countries who replied they would prefer to start a new life in a country other than their country of residence (see the bottom chart of Chart 1.4), it can be seen that respondents under 30 years-of-age were more oriented towards Europe than respondents aged 30 or higher (44% vs. 36%). Compared to young people, over 29 year-olds more frequently selected another SEM country (22% vs. 17% for under 30 year-olds) or a Gulf country (18% vs. 12%).


Cross-cultural media reporting: Interest in news and information

Similar proportions of respondents in European and SEM countries surveyed indicated being *very interested* in news and information about the other countries' cultural life and lifestyle, political situation and economic conditions. For example, roughly 3 in 10 respondents in both country groups answered that they were *very interested* in news and information about cultural life and lifestyle in the other country group. Looking at the overall level of interest (i.e. summing 'very' and 'somewhat interested' responses), however, a clear difference emerges between the European and SEM countries. In the European countries, respondents were more likely to respond being 'somewhat interested' in news and information, while fewer respondents replied not being interested. For example, 28% of respondents in the European countries said they were *very interested* in news and information about the political situation in SEM countries, and 45% reported being somewhat interested, compared to 26% who were not interested. In the SEM countries, on the other hand, 41% of respondents reported not being interested in news and information about the political situation in Europe (chart 1.5).

Although a majority of respondents in both country groups were at least *somewhat interested* in news and information about the other countries' cultural life and lifestyle, political situation and economic conditions, the level of interest in news and information about religious beliefs and practices tended to be lower.

Chart 1.5

Interest in news and information from SEM/European countries



Survey question: Thinking about the countries bordering the southern and eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea (asked in European countries)/European countries (asked in SEM countries), how much interest would you say you personally have in news and information about their [TOPICS A-E]? **Base:** all respondents (%), by region (©Anna Lindh/Ipsos 2016).

Some of the highest levels of interest in news and information were observed among European respondents with friends or relatives in SEM countries. By way of example, 34% of respondents in Europe who indicated having friends or relatives in a country of the SEM were also *very interested* in news and information about the political situation in SEM countries. Among respondents without friends or relatives in SEM countries, just 25% reported being very interested in news and information about this topic.

In the European countries, respondents were the least likely to report being interested in news and information about sports activities in the countries of the SEM; for this item, a slim majority (53%) selected the 'not interested' response. In the SEM countries, on the other hand, the proportion expressing an interest in news and information about sports activities in Europe (32% 'very interested' and 29% 'somewhat interested' responses) is similar to the proportions observed for some of the other

topics, such as cultural life and lifestyle, political situation and economic conditions.


Most trusted media sources for news and information about the other country group

In both country groups, television was the most used and most trusted source for information about the other country group. In the European countries, television (mentioned by 45%) was followed by print media (40%) and films/documentaries (32%). In the SEM countries, television was selected by 58% of respondents, while all other sources were listed by considerably smaller proportions of respondents, such as 32% for online media and 27% for social media. (Chart 1.6)

Although print media was an important information source for respondents in Europe, this source was selected by just 15% of respondents in SEM countries. Social media, on the other hand, were an important and trusted source for information about European countries for respondents in


Chart 1.6

Most trusted media sources for information about SEM/European countries



Survey question: Which of the following sources do you trust most for information about countries bordering the southern and eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea (asked in European countries)/European countries (asked in SEM countries)? **Base:** all respondents (%), by region (©Anna Lindh/Ipsos 2016).

Chart 1.7 Most trusted media sources for information about SEM/European countries, by age group



SEM countries, while they were less frequently mentioned by respondents in European countries as a source of information about SEM countries. In the SEM countries, respondents in Jordan were the most likely to rely on social media (mentioned by 46% of respondents as one of the most trusted information sources), followed by respondents in Tunisia, Palestine and Israel (between 29% and 33%).

In both country groups, television was a more important information source for respondents aged 30 or over than for respondents between 15 and 29 years-of-age; the largest difference was observed in the SEM countries, where 64% of respondents aged 30 or over selected television as a trusted media source for information about Europe, compared to 48% of respondents younger than 30. Online media and social media, on the other hand, were more popular and more trusted information sources for young people in both country groups. Notwithstanding, even when focussing solely on young people's use of media, the observation that social media was a more important source for information in SEM countries remains valid (37% of under 30 year-olds in SEM countries selected social media, compared to 29% in European countries) (chart 1.7).

Impact of media reporting on mutual perceptions

While 81% of respondents in European countries reported having seen, heard or read something in the media about people living in SEM countries, this figure was lower in SEM countries where 59% had seen, heard or read something about people living in Europe. Another important difference in the results of the two country groups relates to the impact of media in shaping perceptions. A slim majority (55%) of respondents in European countries reported that their views had remained unchanged, compared to 26% who reported a


change in their perceptions (8% 'positive' vs. 18% 'negative'). In SEM countries, just 12% reported no change in their views, compared to 21% who said their views had changed in a positive direction and 26% in a negative direction. It is interesting to note that this difference in the media's role in shaping perceptions was also observed in the 2009 survey, when a large majority of respondents in Europe said that the media in their countries did not encourage a more positive image of people in countries bordering the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea (Chart 1.8).

Across almost all countries surveyed, respondents who said that media stories had changed their views in a negative way outnumbered those reporting a positive impact. For example, in the Netherlands, 30% of respondents now had a more negative image about people in SEM countries, while 8% has changed their views in a positive way. In Israel and Palestine, on the other hand, positive responses outnumbered negatives ones (30% 'positive change' vs. 22% 'negative change' in Israel, 39% vs. 15% in Palestine).

The impact of media in shaping perceptions not only varied across countries, but also across socio-demographic groups. For example, in both country groups, more highly-educated respondents were more likely to have seen, heard or read something in the media about people living in the other country group. In European countries, higher educated respondents were more likely to state that there had been no change in their views due to these media stories (61% vs. 40% for the least educated respondents), and there was also a small difference in the proportions reporting a positive change (19% vs. 16% respectively). In the SEM countries, on the other hand, respondents with a university degree most frequently reported that media stories had changed their views about Europeans in a negative way (32% vs. 21% for the least educated respondents).

Chart 1.8

Media role in shaping perceptions about people in SEM/European countries



Dialogue and method of interaction

Looking at the possibilities for dialogue between the regions, the Survey found that interactions are most common in some of the European countries surveyed. On average, 53% of respondents in the European countries replied that, in the past 12 months, they had talked to or met someone from a SEM country. In the SEM countries, 35% of respondents had talked to, or met with someone from a European country in the same time frame.

In France, the Netherlands, Italy and Austria, between 60% and 66% of respondents answered that, in the past 12 months, they had talked to or met someone from a SEM country. A different picture emerged in Portugal, Croatia and Poland, where less than 3 in 10 respondents reported having talked to or met someone from a SEM country (between 18% and 29%). In the SEM countries, in line with the findings from the previous survey, cross-cultural interactions occurred less frequently than in some of the European countries: between 26% and 46% of respondents in the SEM countries had talked to or met with some Europeans in the past 12 months (Chart 1.9).

Not only the frequency of interactions differs across countries, but also the method of interaction. In the European countries, 39% of respondents who had talked to or met someone from a SEM country in the past 12 months said they had met these people in the street or at a public place, and an additional 26% answered that people from SEM countries lived in their neighbourhood. In the SEM countries, on the other hand, more casual encounters in the street or neighbourhood occurred less frequently while the main methods of interaction were social media, chatting on the internet (mentioned by 25% of respondents who had talked to or met someone from a European country) and meeting Europeans via tourism (mentioned by 24%). Once again, as in the previous wave of the survey, the study confirms the importance of

the Internet in the SEM countries, not only as a source for information, but also as a means of communication.

Chart 1.9

Encounters with people from SEM/European countries




Chart 1.10 Cross-cultural encounters: method of interaction




Chart 1.10 illustrated that interactions via social media (e.g. chatting on the Internet, following posts on Twitter etc.) were the most important type of cross-cultural interactions for young people in the SEM countries, but were not important for young people in the European countries (32% vs. 7% respectively). Another important difference between young people in the two country groups is linked to education; while 30% of under 30 year-olds in the European countries who had talked to or met someone from a SEM country in the past 12 months said they had met them at school, the corresponding figure for under 30 year-olds in the SEM countries was just 7% (Chart 1.11).

Impact of cross-cultural encounters on respondents' views

It was noted above that cross-cultural encounters in European countries tended to be more casual than in SEM countries (i.e. more interactions happened in the street, in a public place etc.). This difference in method of interaction may also help to explain some other findings of the survey. Respondents who had talked to or met with someone from the other country group in the past 12 months were asked whether these encounters

had changed their views. In the European countries, where a larger share of interactions happened in public spaces, 55% of respondents stated that their encounters with people from SEM countries had not had any impact on their views about people from these countries, while 29% said that these encounters had changed their views in a positive way. The results for SEM respondents are almost a mirror image with 48% of respondents stating that, due to meeting people from European countries, their views about Europeans had changed in a positive way and 33% answering that there had been no impact on their views (Chart 1.12).

In line with the results of differential impact of media across socio-demographic groups, the impact of cross-cultural encounters on someone's perceptions also depends on characteristics of the respondent. For example, in the European countries surveyed, respondents who tended to be more tolerant towards other cultures not only more frequently reported having talked to or met someone from a SEM country in the

Chart 1.11 Method of interaction in cross-cultural encounters, by age group





Chart 1.12

Impact of cross-cultural encounters on perceptions about people from SEM/European countries



past 12 months, but they also more frequently reported that these encounters had changed their view in a positive way (31% vs. 23% for respondents with a low level of tolerance towards other cultures); a similar pattern was also observed in the SEM countries.

Barriers to encounters

In the European countries, language problems were identified as the most important barriers to cross-cultural encounters (selected by 57% of respondents). Although language barriers were also ranked highest in the SEM countries (selected by 39%), the picture that emerged is quite different. Cross-cultural encounters tended to occur less frequently in SEM countries, but the type of interactions tended to be less casual (e.g. chatting over the internet can help to maintain regular contact with one's social network). This difference in the type of cross-cultural encounters probably offers a partial explanation for the fact that more respondents in the SEM countries thought there were in fact no

barriers to cross-cultural encounters (23% vs. 5% in Europe) (Chart 1.13).

Key values when bringing up children

As in previous waves, one of the aims of the survey was to find out whether values were shared or differed between respondents from European and SEM countries. In order to find out more about respondents' key values, a question was included that asked respondents to identify the two main values (out of a list of six values) that were the most important for them personally when raising children.


Respondents in the European countries selected respect for other cultures (63%) and family solidarity (49%) as the most important values for them personally when raising children. In Austria, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal, respect for other cultures was the highest ranked value (mentioned by between 64% and 71% of respondents as the first or second

Chart 1.13

Cross-cultural encounters: method of interaction



Chart 1.14
Key values when raising children



most important value), while in Poland, Croatia and Finland, family solidarity (mentioned by between 57% and 62%) ranked higher than respect for other cultures. Religious beliefs and practices ranked lowest across all European countries surveyed.


In the SEM countries, on the other hand, religious beliefs and practices were the most important value when raising children: 61% of respondents selected this value as the most or second most important value. Obedience and family solidarity were selected by, respectively, 43% and 39% of respondents. The importance of religious beliefs and practices was observed across all age groups and was chosen as most important or second most important value when raising children: 61% of 15-29 year-olds, 63% of 30-49 year-olds and 60% of 50+ year-olds (Chart 1.14).

A more detailed look at the results for the European countries shows that respondents who described themselves as 'very religious' (a score of 8 or higher on a scale from 0 to 10) were less likely to focus on curiosity (20% vs. 41% for non-religious respondents in

European countries) and independence (19% vs. 33%), but more frequently referred to family solidarity (53% vs. 40%) and religious beliefs and practices (23% vs. 2%). Nonetheless, both for very religious respondents and non-religious respondents in the European countries, respect for other cultures was by far the most important value (selected by, respectively, 61% and 65% of respondents). Although religious beliefs and practices were mentioned by 23% of very religious respondents in the European countries surveyed, this remains in sharp contrast to the 61% of respondents in the SEM countries who placed this value first.


Respondents were also asked which values they thought were central to people from their country group and to those from the other group. Respondents in European countries not only expected that the values

Chart 1.15
Perceptions about key values for parents raising children in SEM/European countries



most important to them personally (i.e. respect for other cultures and family solidarity) would also be the most important values for other European parents, but they also thought that these same values would be important for parents raising children in SEM countries (45% selected family solidarity and 43% respect for other cultures as most important values for parents in SEM countries). This also means that respondents in Europe strongly underestimated the importance of religious beliefs for parents raising children in SEM countries (selected by 35%, compared to the 61% observed in the SEM countries – see right-hand chart in Chart 1.15). In turn, respondents in the SEM countries overestimated the importance of religious beliefs for parents in European countries (selected by 25%, compared to 9% observed in the European countries – see left-hand chart in Chart 1.15), but also

Chart 1.16
Agreement with the statement: 'People from different cultural and religious backgrounds should have the same rights and opportunities'



Survey question: How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? **Base:** all respondents (%), by country (©Anna Lindh/Ipsos 2016).

the importance of independence (mentioned by 40%, compared to 30% observed in the European countries).

Perceptions about Cultural and religious diversity

It was noted in the previous section that respect for other cultures was the highest ranked value for respondents in the European countries surveyed. The importance of this value can also be observed when looking at the level of agreement with the statement that 'people from different cultural and religious backgrounds should have the same rights and opportunities'. On average, 91% of respondents in the European countries *strongly or somewhat agreed* when presented with this statement, compared to just 8% who disagreed with the statement. In the SEM countries, 79% of respondents *strongly or somewhat agreed*, that people from different cultural and religious backgrounds should have the same rights and opportunities. One in six respondents in the SEM countries disagreed with this proposition.


Chart 1.16 illustrates that, in four countries, 5% or less of respondents expressed doubts that all people should have the same rights and opportunities: Portugal, Croatia, the Netherlands and Finland. In the latter country, 71% of respondents *somewhat or strongly disagreed* that cultural and religious diversity constitutes a threat to the stability of society. In the Netherlands, Portugal and Croatia, however, a larger share of respondents than in Finland thought that there could be a threat from diversity (between 45% and 53% *somewhat or strongly agreed*). In Tunisia, Algeria and Palestine, respondents were overall the most likely to accept the statement that diversity constitutes a threat to stability (between 54% and 63% *somewhat or strongly agreed*).

Jordan ranked closest to the European countries in terms of disagreeing with the statement that diversity constitutes a threat (62% *somewhat or strongly disagreed*). Moreover, respondents in Jordan were overall the most likely to *strongly or somewhat agree* that cultural and religious diversity was important for the prosperity of their society (89%). Respondents in Poland were divided in their perception whether cultural and religious diversity would constitute a threat to stability (45% agreed and 53% disagreed).

Respondents' level of tolerance towards other cultures

The next question tried to assess respondents' level of tolerance towards people from different cultural backgrounds. Most respondents in the European countries indicated that they would *not mind at all* having a person from a different cultural background as work colleague (82%) or as neighbour (78%), or that their children were to go to school with children from a different cultural background (81%). When asked whether

Chart 1.17 Tolerance towards people with a different cultural background



respondents would mind that a close relative were to marry someone from a different cultural background, in the European countries, just 65% replied that they would not mind at all, while the remaining respondents selected a response between ‘not mind too much’ and ‘mind a lot’.


In the SEM countries, three-quarters of respondents replied that that would *not mind at all* having a person from a different cultural background as work colleague (75%) or as neighbour (74%), but fewer respondents said the same when asked whether they would mind that their children went to school with children from a different cultural background (64% ‘would not mind at all’) (Chart 1.17).

The level of tolerance towards people from different cultural backgrounds was highest among respondents who had talked to or met someone from the other country group in the past 12 months, and who indicated that these encounters had been positive. Respondents who had not been in contact with people from the other country group, or who had been in contact, but described these encounters as negative, on the other hand, were more likely to express a level of intolerance towards groups with a different cultural background. For example, while 87% of European respondents who had had positive encounters with people from SEM countries answered that they would *not mind at all* having a person from a different cultural background as a neighbour; this figure decreased to 73% for those who had not been in contact with people from SEM countries and 72% for those who described their encounters with people from SEM countries as negative. The corresponding proportions in SEM countries were 77%, compared to 74% and 65%, respectively.

Living together in multi-cultural environments

In the European countries, 89% of respondents thought that ensuring that schools are places where children learn how to live in diversity would be an efficient

Chart 1.18 Living better together in multicultural environments: schools as places where children learn to live in diversity



measure in order to help people live better together in a multi-cultural environment; the corresponding figure in the SEM countries was 82%.

Chart 1.18 presents the variation across countries in the proportion of respondents who thought that this measure would be *very efficient* in order to help people live better together in a multi-cultural environment. In Finland and France, 56% and 50% respectively, of respondents thought that ensuring that schools are places where children learn how to live in diversity would be a *very efficient* measure in order to help people live better together in a multi-cultural environment. Overall the highest level of support for this measure was observed in Portugal (79% ‘very efficient’ responses). In just four countries, less than half of respondents selected the ‘very efficient’ response: Palestine (32%), Jordan (36%), Poland (37%) and Israel (43%).

Respondents were also asked whether they thought that promoting the organisation of multi-cultural events would be efficient in helping people live better together in a multi-cultural environment. The proportion of ‘very efficient’ responses for this measure, however, was lower across all countries surveyed. In the Netherlands, for example, 72% of respondents thought that helping people live better together could be *very efficiently* done via ensuring that schools are places where children learn how to live in diversity, but just 29% thought that promoting multi-cultural events would be very efficient.


Respondents with a high level of tolerance towards people from different cultural backgrounds, compared

to those with lower levels of tolerance, were more likely to believe that ensuring that schools are places where children learn how to live in diversity and promoting the organisation of multi-cultural events would be efficient measures to help people live better together. Moreover, respondents who tended to be more tolerant towards other cultures were also more likely to think that the expression of cultural diversity should be enabled at the work place and at public spaces. For example, in the European countries surveyed, two-thirds of respondents with a high level of tolerance answered that it was easier for people from different cultures to live together if the expression of cultural diversity was allowed at the workplace (67% ‘very efficient’ and ‘somewhat efficient’ responses); however, among those with a low level of tolerance just 41% shared this view. The level of tolerance of respondents is a summary measure combining responses to the questions whether respondents would mind having a person from a different cultural background as work colleague or as neighbour, whether they would mind that their children were to go to school with children from a different cultural background or that a close relative would marry someone from a different cultural background.

Tackling radicalisation through dialogue

When asked to evaluate the efficiency of various mechanisms to prevent and deal with conflicts and radicalisation in the Euro-Mediterranean Region, 81% of respondents in the European countries thought that education and youth programmes that foster youth-led dialogue initiatives would be ‘very efficient’


Chart 1.19 Efficiency of mechanisms to prevent and deal with conflicts and radicalisation



or 'somewhat efficient'. Similarly, 80% believed that supporting youth participation in public life would be at least somewhat efficient. The remaining measures were considered efficient by smaller shares of respondents in Europe.

More than 80% of respondents in the SEM countries thought that education and youth programmes that foster youth-led dialogue initiatives and supporting youth participation in public life would be an effective measure

Chart 1.20
Tackling radicalisation through dialogue



to deal with conflicts and radicalisation. (Chart 1.19) The results for the SEM countries show that respondents in these countries appeared to be more likely than respondents in European countries to believe that each of the mechanisms presented to them would be 'very efficient' or 'somewhat efficient'. It should, however, be noted that this higher level of support was mainly observed in Algeria, Jordan and Tunisia (Chart 1.20).

Comparing the results across the different mechanisms presented to respondents, one observation could be made across almost all countries surveyed: the proportions of 'very efficient' responses were highest for the mechanisms focusing on youth. A similar observation could also be made when looking at the findings by age group. Not only respondents under 30 years-old, but also respondents across all other age groups, were most likely to think that mechanisms focusing on youth would be very efficient in preventing and dealing with conflicts and radicalisation.

The efficiency of the various mechanisms was not evaluated in a uniform way, and respondents' evaluation depended on their experiences and interests. For example, in the European countries, respondents who reported being interested in news and information about SEM countries displayed a stronger belief in the efficiency of various dialogue mechanisms. Across both country groups, respondents with a high level of tolerance toward other cultures were the strongest supporters of dialogue mechanisms.

Gains from ENP

For all potential gains of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation presented to respondents, the majority view in both country groups was that there *might be* gains from reinforcing cooperation, while a minority of respondents did not expect to see any gains for their society. In the SEM countries, 88% of respondents said there could be gains for their society in terms of new opportunities for education and training and the same proportion also saw opportunities in relation to opportunities for entrepreneurship, innovation and youth employment. In the European countries, 84% expected potential gains in the area of education and training and 82% in the area of entrepreneurship, innovation and youth employment.

In the European countries, the largest proportion of 'no gain' responses was measured for the item 'a fair response to the refugee crisis' (22%). In SEM countries, 26% of respondents thought there would be no gains in terms of gender equality and 22% said the same for a fair response to the refugee crisis and support for NGOs and civil society organisations (Chart 1.20).

We started this report with the observation that there is a large variation across countries in the proportion

Chart 1.21
Potential gains from Euro-Mediterranean cooperation






Chart 1.22
Potential gains from Euro-Mediterranean cooperation: A fair response to the refugee crisis



of respondents who answered that the Mediterranean region was *strongly characterised* by migration issues. Chart 1.21 illustrates that there is also a large variation among the people in the different countries surveyed in the perception of the expected gains from a reinforced cooperation in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy in relation to a fair response to the refugee crisis. While less than 3 in 10 respondents in Poland (20%), Israel (23%) and Croatia (27%) replied there would definitely a gain in this area, this view was shared by twice as many respondents in the Netherlands (53%) and Italy (54%).



EUROMED INTERCULTURAL TRENDS ANALYSIS

Mediterranean, between the achievable and the desired

Mohamed TOZY

In this article, Mohamed Tozy shows us the shared positive vision that 'Mediterraneans' have of the space they belong to: a space of hospitality, specific lifestyle and food and common cultural heritage, and not nearly defined as a space characterised by conflict and insecurity as in 2010. The author presents an analysis of priority values in the upbringing of children and how countries as diverse as Palestine, Austria, Israel and Finland can be, as an example, quite close in their appreciation of independence and curiosity.

The presentation of the results of the three waves of the poll carried out since 2010, country by country, for the Anna Lindh Report, have put into perspective the arbitrariness of the categories considered in the EU/SEM countries. It frees the analyst's imagination and allows a clearer view of the paradoxes.

From the point of view of the historical sociology of the politics whose themes I support in my work, the trap of an immediate commentary can only be avoided by first of all taking into account the duration and the long term. Hence the possibility of using this type of survey to raise questions rather than to provide answers. And secondly, to give a full role to the context in its multiple dimensions: political, economic and psychological, when the questions are conceived, administered, and analysed.

When we refer to the context to report on the trends of representations, we can only do so in a non-exhaustive way. The markers for this third campaign are no longer events such as the 11th September or the Arab Spring, but a groundswell that touches demographics and political variables. This context, marked by an almost unprecedented movement of populations between the two shores, a strengthening of far-right movements and identity tension in the EU countries, and a failure of models of democratic transition combined with the return to favour of iron-fisted regimes, be they in the South or in their Northern partners, indicates the possibility of historical bifurcation. This combination lends to the status of a 'epistemological break', as were the Battle of Lepanto for the historians of the Mediterranean or the reign of Felipe II for Braudel.

The preparation of the 2018 Report took place between two terrorist attacks, one in Nice on 14 July 2016 and the one in Barcelona in August 2017. The sequence draws a macabre grammar of violence that should normally put light years between any positive commentaries on a shared horizon. Yet, results of the Survey contradict

this accepted hypothesis, and this in an increasing trend since the first survey of 2010.

The Mediterranean area is mainly associated with positive values: hospitality (56% compared with 50.5% in 2013), food and lifestyle (56.5% compared with 56.4% in 2013) and a common history (52% compared with 49.5% in 2013). The percentages are all higher than in 2010. At the same time, the Mediterranean region is still a source of anxiety and even dread. It is considered a source of insecurity and unrest, even if paradoxically and in spite of the context, this judgement has been declining since 2010. 26% of respondents in the North and 38% of those in the SEM countries believe that the *Mare Nostrum* represents a source of conflict.


A mobility endured rather than desired

Looking at IOM statistics, it can be seen that the extent of mobility in the Mediterranean area is unprecedented, but even more so is the relative reluctance for the dream of living elsewhere shown by the Southern populations compared to those of the EU that is noticeable in the ALF/IPOS Survey.

Admittedly, from 1st January to 20 August 2016, and from 1st January to 20 August 2017, the figures are vertiginous. Italy recorded 97,931 arrivals and 2,244 victims at sea in 2017, compared with 103,691 arrivals and 2,725 victims in 2016. Greece recorded only 13,320 in 2017 compared with 162,015 migrants and asylum seekers in 2016. Morocco and Spain deplored the loss of 121 victims in 2017, compared with 108 in 2016, and recorded the arrival on the northern shore of 8,385 up until July 2017, compared with 3,805 in 2016 – an increase of more than 100%.

The map of mobility at the global level puts the size of these statistics into perspective and makes it possible to highlight the exceptional character of this migratory flow from the South, which can be linked mainly to the

Chart 2.1
Referred countries to start a new life, by country



colonial past (Maghreb and West Africa) or recent events such as the civil war in Syria.

To illustrate this, I will give some statistics from the IOM dynamic map of population movements (IOM, 2017). Nearly 2 million, almost 3% of the French population are expatriates, a designation less stigmatising than migrants. France admits 7.7 million, the majority of whom come from neighbouring countries – except the special case of the Maghreb (mainly Algerians: 1.9 million); 713,158 Portuguese, 367,593 Italians, 304,422 Spanish, and 233,627 Germans.

The situation in Poland is just as interesting; the country has admitted 619,403 immigrants while 4,444,978 Poles have emigrated, almost 2 million to Germany and 703,000 to the UK.

In the Survey the section on interaction between EU citizens and those of Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries offers nothing new compared to previous campaigns. Over the twelve months before the questionnaire was administered, there had been massive contacts between citizens from the North and South of the Mediterranean region; the former through tourism and business, the latter thanks to the virtual world and the spread of broadband. Because of this, the resulting links are just as fleeting as they are superficial. Consequently, the result is a stereotypical conception of the ‘Other’.

In contrast, a key lesson to be learned from this third campaign is the choice of country when planning for a possible new start in life.

The overall results are very informative. 60% of respondents from the SEM countries would like to start


a new life in their own country, compared with 36% of Europeans (Chart 2.1). Country by country, the results are even more surprising. The Dutch are the ones who most think of the world as the ‘horizon’, only 12% of them consider starting a new life at home, while 43% prefer other European countries as a destination, compared with 13% of Algerians. At the other end of the spectrum, 66% of Israelis have no desire to start a new life elsewhere. Unexpectedly, to say the least, is the attitude of Algerians (65%), Tunisians (59%), and especially the Portuguese (48%), traditionally a people of migration.

The processing of data on inter-Mediterranean mobility requires a lot of tact and caution because any partial commentaries tend to reactivate fear-mongering and accentuate prejudices. There is no point hiding the fact that the Mediterranean region has never been subjected to as much pressure than as today. What must be noted, and what the bottom line of the results of preferred destination for starting a new life tells us, is that the phenomenon seen today is temporary, and resettlements are more endured than desired.

Beyond an expected dichotomy between progressive and traditional values

Needless to say the predefined categories with which we work, give the expected results, be they those of EU or SEM countries or those of the values proposed to the respondents, pre-classified in progressive values (independence, curiosity, respect of other peoples’ cultures), and in conservative values (religion, obedience, family solidarity). The decrease in religious practice in the North is rather correlated to the respect for other cultures; placing religion as a core value in the education

Chart 2.2 Key values when raising children, by country



Survey question: In bringing up their children, parents in different countries may place different emphasis on different values. Assuming that we limit ourselves to six values only, I'd like to know which one of these is most important, to you personally, when raising children? And the second most important? **Base:** all respondents (% 'most important' and 'second most important'), by country (©Anna Lindh/Ipsos 2016).

of children in SEM countries goes along with the condemning of curiosity and celebrating obedience as a central value. Only family solidarity causes a problem and makes it impossible to provide a disconcerting typology of 'clarity' which is so predictable when we choose to settle for average values from a positivist perspective that favours a linear reading of history.

The database offers other possibilities that I do not have the time to fully explore here. What is certain is that the question of values continues to draw multiple borders between the North and the South, the countries of the Eastern and Western Mediterranean, between countries of Catholic tradition and those of Protestant, Muslim and Jewish ones, countries with a French colonial past and


those with a British colonial past. But these borders shift and are largely impacted by current events.

When we refer back to the level of each country a certain discrepancy is noticeable in the perceptions and judgements about each other, according to their conception of the preponderant values in the 'Other'. There is a resurgence of confrontation between countries that have a common history or an ongoing common experience, including territorial conflict, tourism or emigration. This confrontation creates an attraction-repulsion effect, but hints at a certain amount of similarity.

It seems to me that mutual perceptions tend to match. The difference is not in the order of priorities but in their intensity.

Chart 2.3

Perceptions about women's roles in society, by country (% 'greater role')



It can be noted that some paradoxes disrupt the order of the pre-established categories. The Portuguese respondents, although coming from a country reputedly of strong Catholic tradition, nurtured by a Messianic 'sebastianist' memory, but also troubled by a 'painful' experience of migration and decolonisation, at the same time prefer, in a significant proportion, to teach values of respect for other cultures (71%) and family solidarity (67%), while refusing by a significant majority to teach religious culture (6%) – the same proportion as in France, an aggressively secular country, known for its anticlerical tradition. Algeria offers another illustration of the importance of a historical trajectory of a sensitive state/nation and society, that, after more than a century of French colonisation – which gave an illusion of intra-Mediterranean territorial continuity – has reinvented an Arab-Islamic identity. Algerian respondents are by far the most numerous to prioritise the teaching of the culture and values of religion (71%) and obedience (51%) and are suspicious of the values of independence (9%) and curiosity (2%). The Palestinian respondents, who in theory have a certain admiration for the history of Algeria, give closer results regarding the values of obedience and religion (44%) but are nevertheless 17 points below the average of SEM countries. On many issues, their results are moving away, getting closer to their Israeli neighbours when it comes to the importance they place on the values of independence (34%), where they are in third place behind Israel and Finland with 47% and 41% respectively. Concerning the value of curiosity, they come joint second with Israel (34%), just behind Austria (36%) with 8 points more than the European average and 26 points more than the SEM country average (Chart 2.2).

Hope for an increased role for women

I cannot conclude this overview without confessing a feeling of perplexity on account of the frequent paradoxes that blur our firmest certainties. That is why I want to refer back to the respondents' assessment of women's role in society. The answers allow high hopes for the convergence of certain values in spite of the delay by Muslim exegetes in producing a more enlightened interpretation on the status of women. Social dynamics are influencing representations; the academic achievements of girls are cracking patriarchal ideology. In the three fields addressed – economics, politics, and social and cultural life – only the idea of a more important political role for women comes up against a great deal of reluctance. In the last four places are countries where religion plays an important role in shaping identities (Poland, Israel, Jordan and Palestine) (Chart 2.3).

The acceptance by the respondents in SEM countries for a prominent role for women in social and cultural fields corresponds to a traditional representation of the gender division of labour (65% for SEM countries compared with 47% for the EU countries). Yet when Tunisians come first on the list with 65% in favour of an increased role for women in economic fields and Algerians are ahead of the Dutch (57% compared with 55%), we are obliged to take seriously the Tunisian government's desire to change the inheritance laws and to entertain some hope of a possible questioning of the frame of reference on the Mediterranean woman bequeathed by Germaine Tillion.

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Understanding and engagement to overcome polarisation

Nabil FAHMY and Emilia VALSTA

Trying to explore ways to face radicalisation in the region, Nabil Fahmy and Emilia Valsta started their article by assessing the complex reasons that might lead to the transformation of passive polarisation into active radicalisation. Referring to the findings of the Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey, the authors argue that interventions are needed in three areas – media, education and youth – each requiring reforms that allow for the induction of critical and creative thinking, narratives challenging misperception, and youth enabling environments.

In the current socio-political atmosphere that is persistently polarizing political discourse and dividing societies throughout the world, fostering dialogue and understanding of the 'other' within and between countries appears ever more urgent. As globalization gradually interweaves the world together, it increases complex interdependence, moving information rapidly and exposing individuals and communities to new information, which itself challenges the prevailing understandings of the world.

The exposure can also quickly become a source of anxiety and be viewed as an encroachment on one's distinct way of life, as cultures become increasingly homogenized across borders. Cultural assimilation can be regarded as a threat to existing values and norms, precipitating a conservative counter-revolution aiming to protect the local customs and values.

The vicious cycle of growing anxiety towards the 'other' and their values has become permeated and exacerbated by the internet and information technology that disseminate information regardless of whether it is based on fact or not. Online news sites and the social media give a voice to anyone with an agenda, be it malignant or not, and empower the most outrageous agitators with their tirades. Finding most unbiased information from the endless pool of news and articles can be overwhelming and even impossible without some guidance. Moreover, the polarization of opinions can exacerbate human tendency to search for and interpret information in accordance with our pre-existing beliefs about the world around us.

Despite increased diversity in many countries, many of us continue to live in homogeneous environments – liberal urbanites surround themselves with like-minded individuals and rarely interact with the often more conservative rural population. Of course the ideological delineation is not this black and white but in fact much


more complex. The widening ideological gap then results in different normative visions for the future. Increased interaction is thus not only necessary between different countries and cultures but fostering dialogue between the liberal and conservative population within each country is equally important.

Luckily, ideological polarization does not automatically lead to radicalization or violent extremism. The reasons behind someone becoming radicalized and adopting violent extremism are complex and vary from one individual to another. Globalization, frustration, poverty or feelings of being marginalized do not in themselves explain radicalization. Often radicalization is a combination of individual traits, as well as feelings of isolation and frustration stemming from larger socio-political processes. More dangerous than individual radicalization is how these outlier individuals perpetrating violent acts start to characterize entire communities. Islamophobia has spread rapidly throughout western countries as many associate terrorism and violent extremism to all Muslims. Likewise, perceiving every European as an intolerant Islamophobic exacerbates polarization and further consolidates flawed stereotypes and enables them being used in the promotion of certain political agendas. Combatting misperceptions and the tendency to label entire groups on the basis of individual actions requires not only better critical thinking but also meaningful dialogue and better understanding of the other through interaction.

Which misperceptions persists?

The Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey offers some clues as to how can we fight socio-political polarization and the need to revert back to homogeneity, as well as misperceptions that at times lead to individual radicalization, be it nationalist or religious fundamentalist radicalization. Three themes stand out from the Survey that could be seen as opportune areas for cooperation in order

Chart 3.1 Perceptions about key values for parents raising children in SEM countries



Survey question: In bringing up their children, parents in different countries may place different emphasis on different values. Assuming that we limit ourselves to six values only, I'd like to know which one of these is most important, to you personally, when raising children? And the second most important? And which one of these six do you think is most important to parents raising children in countries bordering the southern and eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea? And the second most important?
Base: all respondents (%), by region (©Anna Lindh/Ipsos 2016).

to foster more meaningful intercultural interaction and ensure a better understanding of the 'other' on both sides of the Mediterranean: increasing media literacy, promoting tolerance and understanding of cultural differences in educational systems and supporting youth programmes and initiatives promoting youth-led dialogue.


As the Survey data show, misperceptions on both sides of the Mediterranean about the other are ubiquitous. Europeans perceive family solidarity and respect for other cultures to be more important key values than religious beliefs and practices and obedience for parents raising children in the SEM countries. However, respondents from the SEM countries rated religious beliefs and practices and obedience higher than family

solidarity and respect for other cultures when raising children in their respective countries. Europeans perceive religion playing a far lesser role than it actually does (Chart 3.1 and 3.2).

On the other hand, SEM residents believe independence is an important value when raising children in Europe and see the value of family solidarity emphasized less in a child's upbringing. Interestingly however, Europeans overwhelmingly see the respect for other cultures and family solidarity as the two most important values – independence being accepted as an important value by only 30% of those surveyed.


The danger of merely exposing Europeans and SEM citizens to news about the other side without focusing

Chart 3.2 Perceptions about key values for parents raising children in Europe



Survey question: In bringing up their children, parents in different countries may place different emphasis on different values. Assuming that we limit ourselves to six values only, I'd like to know which one of these is most important, to you personally, when raising children? And the second most important? And which one of these six do you think is most important to parents raising children in Europe? And the second most important? **Base:** all respondents (%), by region (©Anna Lindh/Ipsos 2016).

Chart 3.3 Media role in shaping perceptions about people in SEM/European countries



on actual understanding is reflected in the Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey as well. When asking respondents whether media changed their views about people from the other region, 26% responded ‘yes, in a negative way’ compared to the 21% who replied ‘yes, in a positive way’. To be fair, 38% had not seen, read or heard anything about the other in the media. Among Europeans, 55% were far less likely to change their views about the other group as a result of being exposed to any news about SEM, compared to 12% in SEM countries (Chart 3.3).

This could reflect many things, including that media literacy is more entrenched in European educational systems thus enabling respondents to better critically analyse the news they consume. Another explanation could be the independence of media in Europe and its role as a servant of the civil society rather than promoting government agenda (although currently alt-right and alt-left news outlets that are publishing articles are threatening the objectivity of media based on flawed information). Exposing the public, and especially students, to other reliable news outlets outside Europe would offer them an alternative lens to look at the world we live in and push them to see issues from various perspectives.

Education and media to challenge prevailing narratives

Promoting media literacy to train people to spot flawed information and offering people views that challenge the prevalent narratives, coupled with fostering dialogue about the way of life and beliefs of each side on both sides of the Mediterranean, could not only be an efficient way of deterring fake news from having an impact on people’s view of the ‘other’ but could also help challenge the prevailing narrative often promoted by the media. Moreover, investing in media literacy would promote

critical thinking which is often a shortcoming, especially in the educational systems throughout SEM countries.

This also requires a large-scale educational reform in SEM countries, one that would better promote understanding of the nuances of social and political life in the complex world we live in. In fact, a recent article published in the Jordan Times by Professors Allison Hodgkins and Ted Purinton of the American University in Cairo argues for investing in liberal arts education. They argue that instead of promoting science based thinking and ‘handing down a series of formulae to be applied when specific problems arise, a liberal arts education encourages students to investigate the causes to those problems, and to devise creative, independent solutions’ (The Jordan Times, 2016). They continue pointing out that there is a huge oversupply of doctors, pharmacists and engineers in the Middle East but a limited capacity to absorb these graduates. The youth is well educated but is facing a saturated job market, which also implies the need for educational reform and deeper economic restructuring.

Linked to the aforementioned point about media literacy, perhaps surprisingly the Survey results also point out that TV remains the most trusted media outlet for cross-cultural reporting for Europeans as well as citizens of SEM countries – 45% and 58% respectively ranked TV as number one outlet for news consumption. Social media is a more trusted source in SEM countries, 27%, compared to European countries, 18%. Trust in the print media in the SEM countries was distinctly lower, 15%, than surveyed in the European countries, 40%). Further research should be conducted on the types of TV programmes, accuracy of the information it conveys and the quality of news people consume in both regions in order to find out how TV affects people’s perceptions.

Despite the misperceptions, interaction between citizens of the two regions on average seems to result in a positive change of views about the other, offering some evidence in support of the claim that increasing meaningful interaction is the right way forward. Most likely due to more opportunities to travel and due to immigration from SEM countries, Europeans were more likely to have interacted with someone from a SEM country over the past 12 months (53% compared to 35% of respondents in SEM countries). Even though 65% of SEM respondents had not talked or met someone from Europe, 17% of those who had interacted with a European reported that meeting someone changed their views about Europeans in a positive way with 12% of respondents acknowledging that their views had remained unchanged. Only 2% in both regions admitted that their views had been negatively impacted by an encounter with someone from the other region.

However, some caution should be exercised when promoting intercultural exchanges and exposing Europeans and SEM citizens to each other's views and values. Differing views in certain areas such as women's role in society or perception of diversity and social stability among other variables surveyed have the potential for misunderstanding.

Supporting dialogue and identity building

When it comes to perceptions about radicalization, 81% of Europeans and 85% of SEM respondents thought that education and youth programmes and initiatives fostering youth-led dialogue were considered an effective means to tackle radicalization. 85% of SEM respondents also think that an important mechanism would be to support youth participation in public life. Exchange programmes (81%), cultural and artistic initiatives (82%), inter-religious dialogue (76%) as well as media training for cross-cultural reporting (80%) were also considered as effective means to curtail radicalization according to SEM respondents.

Many of the perceived ways to reduce the allure of extremism require domestic reforms and a change in the political paradigm. The push towards reforming education, offering better participation in the public sphere and ensuring job opportunities must be done on the macro level. What foundations like the Anna Lindh can do, however, is to promote media literacy as well as invest in youth-led dialogue initiatives on both sides of the Mediterranean.

There is always a possibility that encounter and dialogue could exacerbate the perceived differences rather than promote understanding and acceptance. Dialogue does not magically translate into understanding but instead has to be accompanied by rigorous efforts to shape exclusive, rigid social and political identities on

both sides of the Mediterranean. One might also further ask whether intercultural encounters ought to initially be promoted among certain sectors of society, such as university students or those politically aware or maybe among even younger children?

However before we draw grand conclusions, it is important not to generalize too much. Perceptions may differ between the urban and rural population (as rural populations may tend to be more conservative in both regions). Moreover, country specific answers could in fact differ greatly within the SEM countries as those countries surveyed often have subtle nuances in their worldviews due to their respective socio-political and economic circumstances as well as the class structure and differing levels of inequality – for example, Palestinian and Tunisian respondents were often found on the opposite sides of the scale in terms of answers. The Israeli-Palestine conflict most likely framed many responses from Palestinians and Israelis in a way that did not frame those of other nationalities. Moreover, the results could have been swayed if Egypt or Libya were included. We are assisting to change in many political systems, which require us to take into consideration how the larger socio-political developments will affect the answers in the future. Nevertheless, despite the problems with polling, they should not deter organization and foundations like the Anna Lindh from compiling rigorous polls and reports. They are essential, not only for our understanding of the larger on-going social developments, but also for us to be able to find ways to constantly come up with better and more effective policy.

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Tackling radicalisation through dialogue

Alpaslan ÖZERDEM

Acknowledging the pressures radicalisation imposes on multi-cultural societies and the relevance of engaging people into an anti-radicalisation strategy, Alpaslan Özerdem analyses people's perceptions of the efficiency of dialogue measures to deal with such threats. The author concludes that although there is a general agreement on the efficiency of the measures suggested by the Survey, there is a need to tailor-make these measures to fit the specific realities, conditions and perceptions of communities directly affected by radicalisation.

Living together in multi-cultural environments is a major challenge faced by many societies across the world. The 13 countries included in the Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey are not an exception in this regard. In such environments, the horizontal trust relations between different community groups and the vertical trust relations between those communities and the state are often quite fragile and can be easily damaged by threats and acts of radicalisation, extremism and terrorism. Therefore, the radicalisation of youth and their participation in violent extremism is not only a concern for politicians, policymakers and security apparatuses, but for all segments of society. Radicalisation poses a serious challenge and direct risk for people's wellbeing, societal trust and community cohesion.

To tackle the challenge of radicalisation, a number of approaches and tools based on dialogue, exchange, education and training programmes have been developed and applied by policymakers and practitioners with varying degrees of success in terms of responding to a short- to long-term perspective. With this in mind, the results of the Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey provides us with an excellent insight into the way such programmes are perceived by ordinary people who live in multi-cultural environments. Their understanding and perception is important as ultimately the success of the programmes will depend on whether community members will take ownership of these measures. If this is not the case, such interventions will remain as external, top-down initiatives with little real impact on the ground.

In the Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey, respondents were presented with seven dialogue measures to prevent and deal with conflict and radicalisation; for each measure, respondents were asked whether they thought it would be an efficient measure or not. The following seven measures were included in the Survey: (1) Education and youth programmes to foster youth-led dialogue

initiatives; (2) Support of youth participation in public life; (3) Exchange programmes involving people across the Mediterranean; (4) Cultural and artistic initiatives; (5) Interreligious dialogue; (6) Trainings in diversity management and radicalisation prevention; and (7) Media training for cross-cultural reporting.


Measures to prevent and deal with conflict and radicalisation

The first observation that can be made from the Survey is that SEM countries appear to show a higher level of belief in the value and use of the different measures listed in the Survey (as can be seen from the higher percentages of 'very efficient' responses). On the other hand, looking at the sum of 'very efficient' and 'somewhat efficient' responses, both regions show a more similar level of belief in the value and use of the different measures in preventing and dealing with conflict and radicalisation. This first observation might be the result of a greater level of exposure to radicalisation in SEM countries than in the European countries included in this Survey, but overall and in line with the second observation, it can be concluded that the type of measures proposed in the Survey receive a positive evaluation from respondents in both regions.

In SEM countries, there is a clear desire for supporting youth in public life and for developing specific education and youth programmes to foster youth-led dialogue initiatives. These two measures receive the highest 'very efficient' ratings in SEM countries (64% and 63% respectively), which are characterised by a high percentage of young people in the population ('youth bulge') and where youth radicalisation is of a greater concern than in European countries. Nonetheless, in the European countries, the two measures focusing on young people rank highest (44% 'very efficient' responses for education and youth programmes and 41% for support of youth participation); as such, it can be

Chart 4.1

Efficiency of dialogue: youth-focussed actions and exchange programmes



concluded that respondents in both regions would like to see the youth as the primary target group of measures to prevent and deal with conflict and radicalisation.

Some of the results may also be an indicator of specific needs in each region, such as differences in the need for independent/objective media reporting. In European countries, media training for cross-cultural reporting is ranked lowest of all the measures included in the Survey (30% 'very efficient' responses), while in SEM countries, 54% of respondents answered that this would be a very efficient measure. It is also important to note that there seems to be less confidence in inter-religious dialogue programmes in Europe, where 30% of respondents think this measure would be 'not efficient' or 'not at all efficient', while this percentage is just 21% in SEM countries. Although the difference is not very large, it could be an interesting indicator to analyse further in light of other survey results with respect to the general environment of intercultural dialogue in Europe.

Variation across countries

Moving from the more general Survey findings to perceptions of respondents on the efficiency of the measures to prevent and deal with conflict and radicalisation in a national context, the Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey also provides a set of interesting results; in the following paragraphs, the analysis focuses on the sum of 'very efficient' and 'somewhat efficient' responses. Starting with the measures of (1) education and youth programmes to foster youth-led dialogue initiatives, (2) support of youth participation in public life,

and (3) exchange programmes involving people across the Mediterranean, there does not seem to be a clear tendency for rating this type of programmes as either high or low across SEM and European countries, as all three measures receive both high and low ratings from the countries in both regions.

Algeria and Tunisia, among the SEM countries, and Italy and Croatia, among the European countries, seem to be the most enthusiastic about youth-focussed actions and exchange programmes. However, it is also important to note that Israel and Palestine score lower than other SEM countries, while Poland and France score lower than the European average. The recent terrorist attacks in France may be considered as a possible reason for this score, but a similar reasoning cannot be made for Poland (Chart 4.1). Finally, the overall conclusions for these three types of programmes are that the lowest ratings for all of the three programmes is in the mid-60s, and this is an overall positive indicator for how such programmes are perceived by ordinary people across all countries included in the Survey.

As it was the case for the previous three types of programmes, Poland and France score lower than other European countries on the four remaining measures, while Tunisia, Algeria, Italy and Croatia continue to have the highest ratings. Respondents in Israel consider cultural and artistic initiatives more beneficial than respondents in Palestine, but both countries scored the same for inter-religious dialogue. It is also interesting to note that the Netherlands, which is traditionally known

for its openness to different cultures, scores only just under or above the European average for most of the programmes concerned. Finland seems to score differently on the types of programmes with a high level of enthusiasm for diversity management training (79%) and inter-religious dialogue (78%), while the rating of cultural and artistic initiatives was much lower (61%).

Support for dialogue measures across all layers of society

With the age factor in mind and looking at the sum of 'very efficient' and 'somewhat efficient' responses, it can be concluded that there is not much difference between the age groups in both European and SEM countries across all dialogue measures, not even for the measures focusing on young people (education and youth programmes to foster youth-led dialogue initiatives, and support of youth participation in public life). For both of these measures, the older the respondents were in Europe, the more likely they were to think that these measures would be 'very efficient', while this level of belief in the value and use of the measures was more evenly distributed across age groups in SEM countries (Chart 4.2).

While the age factor does not seem to play a role, someone's level of interest in news and information from the other region does make a difference. Although SEM respondents score the measures higher at all levels of interest, the margins are much narrower between the country groups at the 'high' level of interest and much wider at the 'low' level of interest. For example, among European respondents with a 'high' interest in news

and information from SEM countries, 48% think that media training programmes are 'very efficient'; among SEM respondents with a 'high' interest in news and information from European countries, this percentage is 57% – a difference of 9 points. In the 'low' level interest group, however, respondents in SEM countries are more than twice as likely than those in European countries to think that media training programmes are 'very efficient' (54% vs. 21% respectively). In Europe, someone's level of interest plays an important role in shaping their belief in the value and use of the different measures, while in SEM countries, the scores are very similar, regardless of someone's level of interest in news and information from European countries.

When it comes to individuals' level of tolerance towards people from a different cultural background (to assess respondents' level of tolerance, a measure was created combining responses to the questions of whether respondents would mind having a person from a different cultural background as a work colleague or as neighbour, that their children were to go to school with children from a different cultural background or that a close relative would marry someone from a different cultural background), respondents in SEM countries with a high level of tolerance have a much stronger belief in the efficiency of the different dialogue measures than respondents in European countries with a similar level of tolerance. For example, this group's ratings in the SEM countries is 67% for exchange programmes and 63% for inter-religious dialogue programmes, while their ratings in European countries was 39% and 36% respectively. Even for respondents in the 'low' category of level of tolerance, the ratings are higher in SEM countries than

Chart 4.2
Efficiency of dialogue: results by age group





Chart 4.3
Efficiency of dialogue: results by individuals' level of tolerance



in European countries. Interestingly, for those with 'medium' or 'low' levels of tolerance in SEM countries, the belief in the efficiency of these programmes is still high (e.g. 38% 'very efficient' responses for exchange programmes and 41% for inter-religious dialogue). In contrast, in the European countries, between 33% and 47% of respondents with a 'low' level of tolerance scored the different measures 'not very efficient' or 'not at all efficient' in terms of preventing and dealing with conflict and radicalisation (Chart 4.3).

Need to tailor-make initiatives

To conclude, respondents' perceptions about the effectiveness of various anti-radicalisation programmes are positive in both regions, but respondents in SEM countries tended to be somewhat more positive about their value in dealing with conflict and radicalisation. There are also important conclusions to be drawn from the Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey in terms of the specific type of measures to be implemented. In both regions, the two measures focusing on young people ranked highest, but it was noted, for example, that in the European countries, media training for cross-cultural reporting ranked lowest, while in SEM countries trainings in diversity management and radicalisation prevention was in last position.

However, it is also important to note the variations across the countries within each region that make drawing general conclusions at the overall regional level difficult. For example, Finnish respondents tended to be positive about most measures, while their rating of cultural and artistic initiatives was much lower; the latter measure was scored high by respondents in Jordan, who in turn believe less in the value of exchange programmes. Moreover, there are also differences within each community that need to be considered.

Although perceptions about the effectiveness of anti-radicalisation measures are positive across most groups in society, in the European countries, in the group with a 'low' level of tolerance towards people from a different cultural background, between a third and half of respondents did not believe in the measures' efficiency in preventing and dealing with conflict and radicalisation. Although the Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey suggests that there is significant value in undertaking the type of anti-radicalisation measures identified in the Survey, in both SEM and European countries, these measures will need to be tailor-made to the specific realities, conditions and perceptions of communities directly affected by radicalisation.

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The city of the 21st century will be intercultural or it will not be*

Aliki MOSCHIS-GAUGUET

Euro-Mediterranean cities have always been spaces for intercultural interaction. Aliki Moschis-Gauguet argues that the current outflow of immigrants, cultural and religious diversity in the region, if correctly managed, could be seen as a competitive advantage. The author maintains that exchanges among cities facing common challenges should be supported and that the connection should be made across crucial areas for social development including education, art and creativity, civil society and the management of migrant populations and refugees.

In the Euro-Mediterranean region intercultural interactions have historically happened principally at the local level – cities have always been spaces of encounter for people with a variety of cultural backgrounds, particularly around the shores of the Mediterranean. Globalization and the rising of human movements in the region have accelerated this process. In an increasingly urbanized Euro-Mediterranean zone, cities offer opportunities for positive intercultural dialogue but also carry challenges and threats.

In 2015 alone, more than a million migrants and refugees crossed into Europe, sparking a crisis as countries struggled to cope with an unprecedented influx of peoples from different ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious backgrounds seeking a better future. The conflict in Syria continues to be by far the biggest driver of migration, creating among other things a division in the EU over how best to deal with resettling people. Europe was totally unprepared to handle the overwhelming situation with disproportionate burden being borne primarily by the ‘gate’ countries – Greece,


Spain, Italy – already highly affected by their own economic crises. This explosive mixture of economic recession and refugees feeds xenophobia and racism leading to the rise of nationalism and extremist parties.

In this dramatically challenging environment the Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF), as the leading institution in the Euro-Mediterranean region for the promotion of intercultural dialogue and understanding, has a major role to assume in accelerating and scaling-up actions in support of intercultural cities.

Cities as laboratories for cross-cultural fertilization

According to the Anna Lindh/Ipsos Intercultural Trends Survey’s findings, a large majority of citizens both in Europe and in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries (SEM), consider cultural and religious diversity as an important asset for their society and, if correctly managed, a source of prosperity and a competitive advantage: 71% of the Survey respondents in Europe and

Chart 5.1 Perceptions about religious and cultural diversity



72% of them in the SEM agree that cultural and religious diversity is important for the prosperity of the society.


At the same time they recognize that, if unmanaged, diversity may constitute a threat to the stability and social cohesion of the community. A polarized society with racism and xenophobia paralyses its vital forces, suffocates its potential and dynamics and damages its economic and cultural performances.

Recognizing the merits of diversity, citizens from both sides of the Mediterranean seek in a large majority equal opportunities and rights for people from different cultural and religious backgrounds (91% of respondents in Europe and 80% in SEM) (Chart 5.1). This requires all stakeholders (city authorities, educational institutions, private sector and civil society) to ensure equal access to services and goods and to increase opportunities for interaction between diverse groups of the population.

Cities are traditionally ideal laboratories for cross-cultural fertilization. As demonstrated by the answers to the Survey, in Europe, people from different social and religious backgrounds interact primarily in the public space, their neighborhood, at work (39% of the European respondents have met people from SEM in the street/public spaces, 33% at work, and 26% in the residential neighborhoods), while for SEM countries the internet is one of the most mentioned method for intercultural interaction (25% of the respondents Chart 5.2). At the same time, the Survey also underlines the importance attributed to art and creativity by a large majority of people as the universal language capable of transcending cultural, religious and language barriers. Art provides the seeds of a genuine understanding of the other, which is a precondition to any peaceful coexistence (82% among both the European and the SEM respondents think that the promotion of organisation of multi-cultural events is an efficient action for helping people to live better in a multi-cultural environment)..

The Survey's findings in relation to the public space as privileged space for cross-cultural encounters, and to art as a major tool for intercultural dialogue lead to the conclusion that municipalities, by combining those two elements, – public space and art – have an excellent tool to bridge social, cultural and ethnic gaps. Therefore they are encouraged to create public spaces that are open and attractive for all citizens including those from diverse cultural background and to facilitate interaction and common projects. Local authorities are urged to use culture as an immediate tool to raise awareness and interest of large audiences towards other communities in the region and to offer concrete examples of dialogue through artistic expressions. Examples can range from, among others, inviting schools and associations of different backgrounds to 'adopt' a public park, artists of

Chart 5.2 Cross-cultural encounters, method of interaction



minority groups to perform in a historic site or to decorate a public square with joint art work. Municipalities may establish the month of diversity with all communities presenting their culture and traditions and interacting. Finally, decision makers should acknowledge the role of the artistic community as essential in reinforcing and enlarging the sense of belonging to a common region.

These measures, some of which are also included in the Council of Europe/European Commission Intercultural Cities programme (ICC), are only a small sample of a large range of actions to be adopted by local authorities desiring to 'bond' their diverse populations, and transform them into cohesive societies equipped to successfully respond to multiple challenges and obstacles..

In light of the Survey's findings regarding the importance of urban environment in cross-cultural interaction, the ALF should intensify its action in favor of intercultural cities by: encouraging the twinning of intercultural cities facing common challenges; multiplying exchanges, transnational cooperation and intercultural encounters in all sectors and activities of the involved cities; supporting capacity building and the transfer of know-how between local and regional bodies of the different countries of

the Mediterranean; intensifying networking among intercultural cities of the Euro-Mediterranean region; working in close cooperation with all international and regional organisations and networks already active in the field of intercultural cities in order to avoid overlapping actions; establishing a prestigious Euro-Mediterranean Capital of Dialogue Award.

Education, creativity, civil society and diversity management are the key

The connection among intercultural cities should be made across crucial areas for social development including education, art and creativity, civil society and management of migrant populations and refugees.

Education at all levels has the privileged position to ‘cultivate’ cross-cultural understanding, solidarity and respect of the other. As demonstrated by the results of the Survey, there is a high degree of tolerance in schools for children from a different cultural and religious background – both in European and SEM countries. The Survey equally underlines that respect to diversity is mostly efficient if taught in schools from an early age and that young people appear as most eager to connect and communicate beyond borders. Taking into consideration the above findings, it is strongly recommended to encourage the extension of the Erasmus programme to the Euro-Mediterranean region to support student exchanges. It is also important to encourage school twinning and common educational projects related to mutual perceptions, shared history, collective memory, basic understanding of other religions from the two shores of the Mediterranean.


For civil society, it is recommended to pioneer a Social Erasmus programme, taking the positive experience of the Erasmus programme to the civil society and

facilitating exchanges among all actors of civil society, internships and volunteer work (for 73% of European and 81% of SEM respondents, exchange programmes involving people from across the Mediterranean can be an efficient way to tackle conflict and radicalization in the region). It is equally important to ensure access to intercultural opportunities for people not usually exposed to the cross-cultural encounter such as in rural areas.

In the field of art and creativity, it is crucial to work towards increasing artistic mobility both for artists and artworks and to enhance diversity in the cultural offer in cities through transnational cooperation. It is equally important to transfer knowhow and to widen access to and participation in intercultural projects. Finally art and creativity can be used to facilitate integration, acceptance of the difference, and healing of post-war trauma for refugees and immigrants (77% of Europeans and 81% of SEM consider the enabling the cultural expression of diversity in public spaces can contribute to better living in multi-cultural societies) (Chart 5.3).

On migration, taking into consideration throughout the questions of the Survey the number of people who confirmed having links in other countries of the region, it is obvious that the ‘human dimension’ must be at the core of Euro-Mediterranean relations (28% of the European respondents have relatives or friends in the SEM countries, while 72% of the SEM respondents have relatives or friends in the European countries). As such, it is important to acknowledge immigrants as a ‘cultural bridge’ – as agents of dialogue, raising cultural awareness between communities around the Mediterranean and enhancing knowledge of the migrant communities about their countries of origin and their capacity to share information with the rest of society. It is equally important to exchange good practices in public

Chart 5.3 Actions that can help people live better together in multicultural environments



services dealing with minorities groups, for example dealing with Roma community or with refugees, especially in cities facing major problems due to the influx of refugees such as small insular cities as in case of Mytilene in the island of Lesbos, Kos or Lampedusa.

Euro-Mediterranean Capital of Dialogue Award

Multicultural cities, with successful intercultural policies, should be acknowledged for their contribution, praised for their achievements, used as a reference to others, and rewarded adequately. This is precisely the purpose of the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Capital of Dialogue Award (EMCD).

In a most turbulent period for humanity, driven by a clash of 'ignorances', the title must be conceived as the ultimate acknowledgement from leading international institutions to a city's efforts to value diversity and promote cross-cultural understanding in compliance with human rights and international conventions. Inspired by the European Capital of Culture, the EMCD award, while crowning a city for its achievements and long term strategy on diversity, it will also stimulate, motivate and urge other cities to adopt similar policies and a common vision for a future of shared stability, growth and social cohesion in the region.

For the elaboration of the EMCD award, the Anna Lindh Foundation should establish cooperation with other international institutions with long established experience in the support of intercultural cities such as the European Commission, the Council of Europe and UNESCO.

A proposal for the setting up of the award could be developed along the following lines: the title of the Euro-Mediterranean Capital of Dialogue could be awarded every two years to four cities of the 42 ALF member states (North Europe, South Europe, Middle East, North Africa). Through this title the Anna Lindh Foundation aims to: ensure the direct involvement of local/regional authorities in the implementation of intercultural policies based on human rights and shared values as defined by ALF, the UN and the Council of Europe; mobilize and optimize all possible local and regional human and material resources including media and press; engage and unite citizens together including minority groups and refugees taking pride of their city as a Capital of Dialogue; promote networking among the awarded cities and activate exchanges and twinning therefore encouraging mobility of people, transfer of good practices and capacity building; achieve wide dissemination and visibility of all the core messages and values of the ALF in all Mediterranean societies and increase outreach and impact in the fields of strategic importance for the Foundation.

In the coming years the ALF should intensify its efforts to support intercultural cities and help them to build upon their diversity, realize their potential, fuel their creativity and generate new models of economic development therefore designing a future of stability and shared prosperity for the region.

Cities naturally provide the environment for cross-cultural fertilization, contributing to the emergence of a shared Mediterranean identity and to the awakening of the Mediterranean soul. Intercultural cities have been the power and pride of Mediterranean's past – they should be the beacon of its future.

*The title of this article paraphrases the sentence attributed to André Malraux: "The 21st century will be spiritual or it will not be"

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From multi-culturalism to interculturalism: data confirms the change

Ricard ZAPATA - BARRERO

As an alternative for the multi-cultural policy narrative that has been dominant throughout the last two decades, Ricard Zapata-Barrero argues that the intercultural policy paradigm is an opportunity for integration and socio-economic improvement. Characterised by its efficacy at the city-level and at multi-levels, its proximity and pragmatism, as well as its non-ideological nature, the author explains that the main target of the intercultural policy paradigm is to encourage contact among people, viewing diversity as an advantage and a resource.

The multi-cultural narrative policy has been dominant throughout the last two decades promoting the inclusion of immigrants into the mainstream by respecting their differences and recognizing their cultural practices, religions and languages and focussing on their economic and political participation (Kymlicka, 2010). All the intents to map multi-culturalism in terms of indicators (S. Vertovec, 2010; Banting and Kymlicka, 2013) provide us with at least three kind of information. Firstly, multi-culturalism has deployed most of its tools in terms of rights protection, as a container of exceptionalities. Secondly, it has legitimated specific structures and institutional arrangement, specific policies in terms of funding and affirmative action to ensure the non-alienation of specific groups. Third and finally, a certain group-based approach has been dominant in the application of the equality principle. It has in this way always been presented as part of a historical wave of democratization, liberalization and human rights protection (Kymlicka, 2015).

In migration studies, the diagnosis of the current situation is that after some decades of application, the multi-cultural policy has not clearly shown to be a factor on integration and of socio-economic improvement of immigrants. We register a lack of references for diversity management and an increase in the support for xenophobic political parties, most of whom are also Euro-sceptics, with populist narratives against migrants (Chopin, 2015). This, together with the associated increase in competition for resources between host and migrant communities, is reducing solidarity (Kymlicka, 2016).

It is in this context that I would like to place the emerging intercultural policy paradigm and focus on one of its pillars – the view of diversity as an advantage and a resource, and opportunity for community building.

Promoting contacts within diverse societies


One of the distinctive features of the intercultural policy paradigm is its specific view of diversity as an advantage.

This normative driver is paramount to understanding intercultural policy strategies. We can say that interculturalism is a technique of promoting dialogue, contact and interactions between individuals from different backgrounds, including nationals. It sees contact-promotion as a way to avoid the confinement and segregation of people, which has as a last resort become an explanatory variable of social exclusion and social inequalities. This descriptive definition of interculturalism must be perceived in gradual terms, from circumstantial and sporadic communication in the marketplace, to inter-personal dialogue and interaction which implies the sharing of a common project; or even inter-dependence, which involves that in order to reach a purpose, people also need others' actions.

From the Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey data carried out in 2016 we can also draw a correlation between the level of people's appreciation of diversity and the kind of intercultural interaction they have experienced. In particular, we register among European respondents that interactions happening through online chatting and within the schools are more likely to produce a positive change of view about the 'other' (37% and 32% respectively) and propensity of people to see diversity as a source of prosperity for society (74% and 78.5% respectively) and refuse the idea of it as a potential threat (74% and 80.5% respectively). Among SEM respondents we register a similar level of positive change of view about Europeans when the interaction has taken place in the school, in the neighbourhood or in the public space (57%, 57% and 60% respectively) (Chart 6.1). However, views about diversity as a source of prosperity for society are mainly registered among those having been exposed to interactions via business and tourism (78%). Business contacts are also those that impact the most in diffusing the belief that diversity is a threat for the stability of society (42%) (Chart 6.2).

Chart 6.1

Agreement with statements on cultural and religious diversity, by method of cross-cultural encounters



Diversity as an advantage in the city management


The first promoters of interculturalism as a policy and social practice bring with them a different concept of diversity that was not considered by multi-culturalists – the concept of ‘diversity advantage’. This notion highlights diversity as a potential resource and source of opportunities that needs to be managed to make the most of its advantages and is rather ground breaking in current debates. The intercultural policy paradigm in Europe takes this particular conception of diversity as potential benefit for the society and it is interpreted as a policy strategy to promote these advantages.

From urban studies, this approach emphasises the view that diversity is a community asset and a collective resource since it is assumed that optimising diversity increases social and political benefits (Ph. Wood and Ch. Landry, 2008). An immigrant has several added competences and skills in terms of social and cultural capital, such as language, cultural differentiated registers, cultural particular worldviews and knowledge.

At this individual level, we also know that interculturalism is seen as a most appropriate tool to promote in society creativity, trust, mutual-knowledge, and prejudice reduction (J. W. Berry 2013). Applied to society, this basically means that diversity can be seen as a driver to social and economic development.

As a result, re-designing institutions and policies in all fields to treat diversity as a potential resource for public benefit needs to be distributed, not as a nuisance that needs to be contained. In practice, this diversity advantage management is great in terms of providing equal opportunities for education, employment, entrepreneurship, holding civil office, etc. (Wood & Landry 2008). It is seen as the basic strategy to foster intercultural citizenship (R. Zapata-Barrero, 2016a), and the basic driver of integration (I. Guidikova, 2015). Namely, a successful integration can be done not only through group recognition of cultural differences and diversity management (as was the focus of multi-culturalism) but through the promotion of contacts and as a strategy that aims to socialize people into a public culture of diversity (Zapata-Barrero, 2015).

Chart 6.2
Impact of cross-cultural encounters, by type of encounter



This is why the results provided by the Anna Lindh Foundation/Ipsos Survey are so illustrative. They give more ground to fuel the importance of intercultural values in raising children in the respect for other cultures, family solidarity and recognition for religious beliefs and practices. This socialization approach of interculturalism is then a key strategy to reducing prejudices and stereotypes around diversity, increasing knowledge and awareness of diversity as a new public culture to ensure social cohesion.

For instance, from data we can observe that among the European respondents those who believe respecting other cultures is a key value for raising their children are more likely to positively change their views about the 'other' when they are part of a direct encounter (32.3%) compared to those who raise their children on obedience (18%). Also, SEM respondents placing a higher level of importance to the values of respect of other cultures, family solidarity and religious beliefs in raising their children showed to be more positively affected in their views of people from Europe when talking to them, with an average of 50% of positive change registered (vs 36% of those valuing independence). A direct correlation


can also be drawn between the importance of nurturing curiosity and openness to the encounter (Chart 6.3).

Interculturalism vis-à-vis multi-culturalism

Another source of the intercultural policy paradigm is probably less constructivist and much more social and cosmopolitan. That is, diversity without policy intervention can be the source of conflict and can increase the socio-economic disadvantages of diverse people. The notion of diversity-related conflict has to be understood in a broad sense encompassing racism, poverty and social exclusion (Cantle 2012, p. 102). T. Cantle has been responsible for a report surrounding the British government's concern for local social disturbances in northern towns in 2001. These events directly linked social conflicts with the failure of British multi-cultural policy. His book *Community Cohesion* (2008) directly articulated these ideas against the multi-cultural policy paradigm, accused of promoting 'parallel lives' between communities that had little in common and had no contact with each other.

The central claim of the intercultural policy paradigm here is that there is a need to go beyond the 'ethnicisation' of politics, and the very concrete concept of culture related

Chart 6.3
Impact of cross-cultural encounters, by respondents' key values when raising children



to national identity and race. This post-national and post-racial view of culture is certainly a direct critique to the multi-cultural policy paradigm's core assumptions and allows us to centre the policy to the common bonds that must prevail upon differences as a premise to formulate policies. The interculturalists are fully aware that common practices and relations can be constrained by inequality, asymmetrical power relations, and lack of a minimal common public culture. It is probably at this point that interculturalism shows its most demanding side, requiring appropriate conditions for inter-personal relations, reducing the possibilities that contact zones become conflict zones, particularly in vulnerable areas where the tension among communities prevail.

Managing the advantages of diversity in the cities

What can these normative parameters of the intercultural policy paradigm tell us? First, by its origin, the European view of interculturalism is some sort of 'policy rebellion of cities' against the state policy domination (R. Zapata-Barrero, 2017). The multi-cultural policy approach has basically been thought at the state level and has rarely considered the multi-level perspective in implementing policies. This local approach provides interculturalism with two main strengths: proximity, which allows to promote face to face relations and to develop policies at the micro-level spaces (R. Zapata-Barrero, 2015; 187) in public spaces (Wood, 2015; Cattle, 2016) and *pragmatism*, both because action and practice prevail over whatever preconception of justice or ideal of equality, but also to the extent that less emphasis is placed on culture, and more on the citizen that acts and therefore interacts. Interculturalism's primary concerns are not such abstract and universal notions of justice related to rights in context of diversity, but about a society that takes advantage of diversity as a resource, at the same time ensuring community cohesion. Interculturalism is also non-ideological meaning that when it is incorporated at the city level for managing diversity, the intercultural policy 'resists' ideological variations in political governments and is colour-blind from an ideological point of view. This is the case for most intercultural cities participating in the Council of Europe Intercultural Cities programme (ICC) and has been the case in analysing the intercultural governance of the Spanish network of intercultural cities, RECI (Zapata-Barrero, 2016). Launched in 2011, RECI can certainly be considered a good practice of cities working together, exchanging methodologies, instruments, ideas and good/bad practices in trying to promote contacts, interactions and joint-projects.

New directions in the intercultural policy research agenda

Today, migration and human mobility have become representative of globalisation with the inherent lack of

control over boundaries and the impact on the economy and welfare. With our current interpretative frameworks, it is therefore usually seen as opposed to both because of the diversity it brings and because it falls prey to the nationalist agenda. In this context, interculturalism can help generate some answers where a boundless multi-culturalism may have difficulties. This is probably one reason why the intercultural policy paradigm can be seen as being a challenge. Rootless cosmopolitan global citizens are as much despised by nationalists as by the rigid multi-culturalists. The post-multi-cultural period where the diversity policy debate lies, illustrates that European societies have fallen to some sort of vicious cycle. In the age of populism, multi-cultural master narratives nurture anti-immigrant arguments and feelings, or even radical views of national civic integration, ranking duties as a condition *sine qua non* of rights. The contacts-based approach of the intercultural policy paradigm can thus be seen as an opportunity to break this vicious cycle.

Multi-culturalism's concern about equality and power sharing is contributing in the last resort to the promotion of encounters, but this does not necessarily entail that it will happen. Consequently, there is a need for a policy whose main target is to encourage contact among people. It is here that we can find the main space for the legitimatisation of interculturalism. This is why we can also celebrate the fact that the Anna Lindh Foundation's 10-year strategy 'Working Together Towards 2025' (Anna Lindh Foundation, 2015) adhere to this intercultural wave as an alternative to the extremist narrative that hits the reality of many societies in the Mediterranean today.

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Intercultural education between local values and universal principles

Nayla TABBARA

Nayla Tabbara addresses the tensions arising in intercultural education between universal principles and cultural diversity. Analysing the ALF/Ipsos Survey responses to what key values parents on both sides of the Mediterranean promote, the author points to three kinds of fears currently influencing the perception of universal principles: the fear of influence on culture and religion, the fear on economic and political stability, and the fear of diversity in the public sphere. Making direct comparisons to European and SEM responses with her own observations, Tabbara concludes by making recommendations for practitioners and education policy makers.

In the name of respect of diversity of cultures, should intercultural education focus solely on building capacity for acceptance of diversity, empathy and mutual understanding or should it concentrate on fostering universal principles and public life values? The UNESCO guidelines on intercultural education assert that: 'One significant tension arises from the nature of Intercultural Education itself, which accommodates both universalism and cultural pluralism. This is particularly evident in the need to emphasize the universality of human rights, whilst maintaining cultural difference which may challenge aspects of these rights' (UNESCO, 2007:10).

Through the Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey, we can infer some guidelines for this problematic tension within intercultural education and propose some recommendations.

Frames of reference across the region


In answering the question of what key values parents on both sides of the Mediterranean put emphasis on,

a sticking difference is apparent between European countries and SEM countries (Chart 7.1).

61% in SEM countries put the emphasis on religious beliefs and practices as most important or second most important, i.e. their primordial reference is the religious frame of reference, whereas such frame of reference represents only 9% in European countries. On the other hand, 63% in European countries put the emphasis on respecting diversity, having as primordial or second top value one from a secular frame of reference rooted in political philosophy and the right to difference. In SEM countries only 28% of the individuals surveyed put emphasis on respect of diversity.

It therefore appears that there is a need to take into consideration the cultural gap between both secular and religious frames of reference and between a focus on society as a whole and on values of public life (respect of diversity) on the one hand, and a focus on the communal identity and its preservation, as well as safeguarding its values, on the other hand.

Chart 7.1
Key values when raising children, by region



Furthermore, the study of the emphasis on values shows the difference around the two shores of the Mediterranean between post-modern and traditional values. Obedience, a traditional value, is seen of utmost or second utmost importance in 43% of cases in SEM countries, whereas it is seen of utmost/second utmost importance in 20% of cases in European countries. Independence, a modern value, on the other hand, is seen of utmost/second utmost importance in 30% of cases in Europe and 16% in SEM countries. Yet it is quite interesting to note that family solidarity, considered among traditional values, is seen more important in Europe (49%) than in SEM countries (39%).

The influence of fears on universal principles

Yet what I find the most alarming is the answer concerning the affirmation – ‘people from different cultural and religious backgrounds should have the same rights and opportunities’ (Chart 7.2). Although this answer belongs to a set of questions related to perception of diversity, I read it in relation to fundamental principles, and find it worrying that in Europe 7% disagree and think that people from different cultural and religious backgrounds should not have the same rights and opportunities, and that 23% ‘somewhat agree’, meaning that they do not see access to equal rights and opportunities for all people regardless of their religious and cultural belonging as a fundamental inalienable human right. In SEM countries, 17% disagree and 22% somewhat agree, which is even more alarming.

Thus, even in Europe where one would expect a deeply rooted culture of human rights going hand in hand with a secular frame of reference and the primacy of common good for all constituents of society, there is no unanimous agreement on equality as a fundamental human right.

This calls practitioners and policy makers in education not only to focus on this in educational policies and programmes but also to have a closer look at the drivers of this regression vis-a-vis human rights principles and at the fears behind these positions.

The answers pertaining to xenophobia or fear of difference in Chart 7.2 show more of it in SEM countries: 13% mind having a person from a different cultural background as a work colleague versus 6% in Europe; and 15% mind having a person from a different cultural background as a neighbour as opposed to 8% in Europe. Numbers get higher when it comes to children: 25% in SEM countries mind having their children go to school with children from other backgrounds versus 7% in Europe. And when it comes to having someone from a different background entering the ‘inner group’ for life as in the case of marriage, Europe and SEM countries show similar numbers of fear of the stranger entering the inner group – 27% in SEM countries and 21% in Europe mind if close relatives marry someone from a different background.

At a time of a crisis of refugees and of fear of migrants in Europe and of heightened far right movements, it is important to stop at the fact that people in the SEM region show higher numbers in xenophobia and fear of diversity. One reason could be religious, if we connect this answer to the answer in Chart 6.1 concerning the primordial values – the fear of having someone of a different cultural background as a classmate to one’s children could be a fear that the other influences the child’s beliefs and set of values. In Europe, this fear would be the fear that the stranger would not uphold the cultural values of the host country.

Chart 7.2
Tolerance towards people with a different cultural background





Chart 7.3 Impact of cross-cultural encounters on perceptions about people from SEM/European countries



In the Chart 7.2, on the affirmation 'cultural and religious diversity is important for the prosperity of your society', 27% in Europe and 24 % in the SEM disagree. A quarter of the population therefore sees the other as a threat to economy, and I believe this to be linked to the refugee crisis. Likewise, this is linked to a threat on political stability: to the affirmation 'cultural and religious diversity constitutes a threat to the stability of society', 36% in Europe agree and 54% in SEM countries agree.

Most people in Europe and the SEM region are with including intercultural education in schools – 89% in Europe and 82% in SEM countries agree on ensuring 'that schools are places where children learn how to live in diversity' (Chart 7.3). Both sides of the Mediterranean also equally agree (82%) that promoting the organisation of multi-cultural events helps people live better together.

Yet, concerning enabling expression of diversity in public spaces 67% in Europe are with, while 30% think it is not efficient. In SEM countries 80% are with and 15% think it is not efficient. We find similar positions concerning the incorporation of the expression of diversity in the work place.

The answers show more ease in having diversity displayed in public spaces in SEM countries than in Europe, yet to the question of restricting cultural practices to the private sphere 40% in Europe are with and 53% are against, whereas in SEM countries 68% are with and 33% are against.

Although these answers seem to contradict the above answers and the impression that SEM countries are more at ease with diversity in the public sphere, this last answer could also show that the SEM countries suffer from too much religion in the public sphere, and from the

fact that it is always the religion of the majority that is most prevalent with its symbols whereas other religions composing the social fabric tend to be rendered invisible.

Recommendations for intercultural education

Clearly respond to the challenge of the primacy of fundamental human rights and their values. Intercultural education cannot, in the name of equality and respect of local cultures, resign from playing the role that is incumbent on it, namely 'to emphasize the universality of human rights, whilst maintaining cultural difference which may challenge aspects of these rights' (UNESCO, 2007:10). Thus, the policy recommendation number one is not letting respect to diversity and to local cultures lead to a contextualization of principles and of rights, either in Europe or in the SEM region, but to have as a number one priority in intercultural education the universality of human rights principles and their related values.

I would therefore suggest a rephrasing of the principles of intercultural education by UNESCO to be 'transformative, enabling learners to transform themselves and society' and 'value based, promoting universally shared values such as non-discrimination, equality, respect and dialogue' (UNESCO 2017). This would allow us to move from cultural/religious supremacy to supremacy of values of public life and common good and would mean including, in the outcomes of intercultural education – besides the appreciation of diversity and of the richness that each culture brings to humanity – a common sense of purpose for humanity.

The principles of human rights are universal in the sense that not only do they apply to all but that they ought to be considered as stemming from all humanity and not only from the Western world. Once we are confident of that,

we would stop fearing to integrate them in objectives of education in the non-Western world.

The Beirut Declaration on Educational Reform for Preventing Violent Extremism in Arab Societies, published by Adyan Foundation and the Arab Thought Forum in 2016 by 50 educational policy makers from Arab countries, takes up this challenge by recommending to: (1) Work on establishing an educational system that promotes the values of citizenship that is inclusive of all forms of diversity and that affirms the principles of non-discrimination and acceptance of difference. (6) Promote schools as an open space to consolidate democratic concepts and human rights values (Adyan Foundation, 2016).

Rethink intercultural education at the time of refugee crisis. Intercultural education cannot be the same in 2017 as it was in 2011 before the changes that have shaken many of the SEM countries and the wave of refugees seeking asylum and safety in countries around them and in Europe.

It is imperative today to include in intercultural education the current world situation that explains why refugees are fleeing their homes, as well as accurate numbers about the impact of refugees and immigrants on local stability, economy and culture, including the fact checking speeches of demagogues who tend to falsify numbers and stories aiming to increase xenophobia, victimization and sectarianism or far right extremism. Including figures from this survey and other surveys and educating the youth on analysing them is also a tool to let them reflect on their own positions and perceptions.

Promote inclusive citizenship as a model. A new and nuanced concept of citizenship needs to be integrated in intercultural education. This concept of citizenship needs to take into consideration the fact that citizens have multiple cultural, ethnic, and religious belongings or philosophical positions, and that they have the right to express these belongings in the public sphere. It allows the recognition of diversity and its expression in the public sphere, without allowing the monopoly of one religion on the public domain. It therefore upholds both the principle of diversity and the fundamental human rights principles and related values, and it allows citizens from different background to participate in public life while upholding their differences, enriching the public domain instead of threatening it (Tabbara, 2015).

Such a model of citizenship inclusive of cultural and religious diversity, that promotes a positive management of diversity in the public sphere, can bridge both frames of reference – the religious and the secular – around values of public life and coexistence. Education on inclusive citizenship and shared public life values is therefore a must 'in both secular and faith-based approaches.'

This coherence between religious education and formal education enables the nurturing of a 'harmony between citizenship and religious identities, and foster common civic engagement as a way to transform society and to contribute in making inclusive citizenship a reality for all' (Adyan/UCL 2017).

Promote collaboration between educational policy makers and religious education policy makers. In recent years, a renewed religious discourse in Islam is being developed in accordance with human rights and with inclusive citizenship. Such examples are the *Azhar Declarations on Fundamental Freedoms* (2012) on *Confronting Extremism and Terrorism* (2014) and on *Citizenship and Coexistence* (2017) that clearly opt for national states and not religious states, and call for equal citizenship and for religious freedom. *The Marrakesh Declaration* (2016) also calls for citizenship inclusive of diversity.

Intercultural education needs to foster the reach of these new documents to both sides of the Mediterranean, for on the one hand they nuance the perception about Islam's positions regarding the 'other' and regarding public life issues, and on the other they present to Muslims a new religious discourse, other than the one they are used to.

A collaboration between educational policy makers and religious educational policy makers could thus be a key to advancing this renewed discourse as well as the principles of human rights and of inclusive citizenship in formal and religious education.

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Convergences independently from religiosity level

Shana COHEN

The Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey has generated data correlating Euro-Mediterranean populations' level of religiosity and religious affiliations with attitudes towards people of other faiths and cultures at a moment of political volatility and increasing public suspicion of diversity. Through this article, Shana Cohen explores the relation between religiosity and openness to diversity on both sides of the Mediterranean. Through Survey responses, the author noticed a strong association of improving interfaith relations with the state and concludes by making recommendations of actions towards such improvements.

The Anna Lindh/Ipsos Intercultural Trends Survey, commissioned by the Anna Lindh Foundation and carried out by Ipsos, has generated data correlating Euro-Mediterranean populations' level of religiosity and religious affiliations with attitudes towards people of other faiths and cultures at a moment of political volatility and increasingly public suspicion of immigrants and religious diversity.

The European Survey data challenges this anxiety, as religious and very religious respondents often demonstrate the same positive attitude towards intercultural encounters as their non-religious counterparts (religiosity was measured using an 11-point scale, ranging from 0 'Not at all religious' to 10 'Very religious'). For analysis purposes, respondents were grouped in three categories: 'very religious' (scores 8 to 10), 'somewhat religious' (scores 3 to 7) and 'non-religious' (scores 0 to 2). Though southern and eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries are for the most part much less diverse than their European counterparts, respondents in the SEM appear to share comparable appreciation of tolerance and inclusion as social values. They also agree largely on the interventions necessary for fostering tolerance, namely through education and the public sphere rather than restricting expression of diversity to the private sphere.

Beyond public discourse and political views, the data also contradicts policy analyses of integration in Europe that have conveyed alarm concerning continued segregation between communities and the lack of social cohesion. Though the UK is not included in the Survey, the Casey Review (2016) on factors for failed integration in the UK attributes a lack of social cohesion to 'high levels of social and economic isolation in some places and cultural and religious practices in communities that are not only holding some of our citizens back but run contrary to British values and sometimes our laws' (Casey, 2016). Yet, despite the alarm about segregation, the Survey data suggests that the majority of European

and SEM citizens value cultural and religious diversity, with 71% of European respondents and 72% of SEM respondents strongly agreeing or somewhat agreeing with the statement that diversity is important for prosperity. Conversely, 62% of respondents in Europe disagreed with the statement that diversity constitutes a threat to stability. Amongst SEM countries, those with an experience of conflict between populations of different religions perhaps predictably viewed diversity as more of a threat.


In general, the responses indicate a desire for a more coherent narrative of public good in a diverse society and public policies that encourage citizens across faiths and beliefs to interact. The responses thus support the argument of influential cultural theorists and philosophers that multi-culturalism has become too simplified as a policy framework. Rather than equate multi-culturalism primarily with freedom of expression, or more banally, the capacity for cultural traditions to exist alongside each other, the concept represents the engagement of citizens of diverse backgrounds with the same political processes, rights and institutions. Criticizing arguments that multi-culturalism has spurred segregation and division, the philosopher Will Kymlicka writes, 'The key to citizenisation is not to suppress these differential claims but to filter and frame them through the language of human rights, civil liberties and democratic accountability. This is what multi-culturalist movements have aimed to do' (Kymlicka, 2012). His statement corresponds with the Survey data, in that across belief and faith, respondents pointed toward institutions and organisations that implement rights and reflect political values as critical influences on attitudes and behaviour toward others.

Supporting diversity in Europe

In Europe, the shared emphasis on public institutions and public life contrasts with distinctive views on personal relations, such as intermarriage, having neighbours of other faiths, or children having friendships

Chart 8.1

Europeans' views about actions that can help people live better together in multi-cultural environments



with other children of different faiths. In response to promoting attitudes of tolerance, 79% of European respondents who are very religious and 88% of non-religious respondents answered they would not mind at all if their children attended school with someone of a different cultural background.

Moreover, 86% of non-religious respondents in Europe do not mind at all having a neighbour of another faith, whereas 75% of the very religious respondents do not mind at all. Perhaps more importantly, regarding both questions about personal relations and public life, the somewhat religious respondents appeared to offer the weakest affirmation of diversity. For instance, 74% of the somewhat religious respondents did not mind at all a neighbour of a different faith. The figures were lower than the other two categories, even if not by much, for intermarriage and school friendships as well (Chart 8.1).

In general, the Survey data indicates high levels of support amongst the very religious, somewhat religious and non-religious respondents for interventions aimed at integrating diversity within public life and institutions. Amongst European respondents, the most widely supported intervention across religious and non-religious groups is in education.

When asked about various interventions to support a multi-cultural environment, very religious and non-religious respondents believed ensuring learning about cultural diversity within schools was the most effective method. Amongst European respondents declaring themselves very religious, 57% said it was a very


effective method, more than for other interventions, such as cultural diversity in the workplace or in public spaces. At the same time, 62% of non-religious respondents viewed school as a very effective site for intervention, again, more than for other interventions. A smaller percentage of very religious respondents, 46%, felt that education could also prevent radicalization but the percentage was still greater than for other interventions, such as artistic and cultural initiatives, which addressed challenges like conflict (38%).

Beyond education, youth participation in public life was also considered amongst all respondents, regardless of religiosity, to be a very effective method of preventing radicalization. Among non-religious respondents in Europe, 42% regarded youth participation as very effective, and amongst very religious respondents, 44% (Chart 8.2).

The minimal difference between respondents who declare themselves non-religious versus somewhat religious or very religious, evokes a larger argument in Europe, namely that belief itself has less influence than citizenship on the understanding of public good and state responsibility regarding the development of a cohesive, integrated society. The percentage of very religious in Europe supporting education was almost the same as those who were not religious, or 46%. In another example, 46% of non-religious respondents, 43% of somewhat religious respondents, and 46% of very religious respondents agreed that education and youth programmes to foster dialogue were very effective in discouraging radicalization and other challenges.

Chart 8.2

Europeans' views about efficiency of mechanisms to prevent and deal with conflicts and radicalisation



Religiosity and diversity in SEM countries

In some SEM countries, negligible differences in views between religious and non-religious respondents may reflect the substantial influence of religion and related cultural and social values in the public sphere and the level of diversity itself on how diversity is perceived. In contrast, in the SEM countries such as Israel and Palestine, the level of religiosity amongst respondents appeared to have a clearer impact on perceptions of intercultural encounters (Chart 8.3). This may indicate the tensions the political influence religion has in these countries and likewise, the politicization of secularism. For instance, in Algeria, there was no difference between non-religious and very religious respondents (both 73%) who stated they did not mind 'at all' their children attending school with someone of a different background. On the other hand in Israel, non-religious respondents (45%) were far more tolerant of their children attending a mixed school than very religious respondents (14%).

The varied importance of religious and secular beliefs in the different SEM countries to public life appears to be reflected in how respondents in these countries viewed the effectiveness of different interventions to


foster a multi-cultural environment. In Algeria again, non-religious and religious respondents (72% and 75%) expressed similar views as to the effectiveness of interventions like education and interfaith dialogue. In contrast, in Israel, 48% of non-religious respondents deemed education to be 'very efficient' in the prevention of radicalisation whereas only 26% of very religious respondents held this view. At the same time, the substantial difference between Algeria and Tunisia on the one hand, and Israel and Palestine on the other, in their overall support for initiatives to counter radicalisation indicates a potentially more profound distinction. Perhaps unsurprisingly, because of the conflict, there was significantly more confidence amongst North African respondents in the potential of education and dialogue to counter radicalisation than amongst respondents in the Middle East.

Assigning the state responsibility for social harmony

Across both SEM and European countries, respondents expressed a preference for education, workplace and neighbourhood as sites for intercultural and interfaith interaction rather than more directed settings, or interfaith dialogue, media training, artistic and cultural

Chart 8.3

Tolerance towards groups with a different cultural background and level of religiosity in SEM countries



initiatives, and exchange programmes. The latter methods still receive support, but not as much as the others, indicating again the role citizens, regardless of belief or even nationality, feel public institutions and governments should assume in developing better relations between diverse groups. For example, 81% of respondents in Europe and 86% of respondents in SEM countries deemed education to be 'very efficient' or 'somewhat efficient' as a preventative measure to tackle conflict and radicalisation, and 80% of European respondents and 85% of SEM respondents viewed youth participation in public life as 'very efficient' or 'somewhat efficient'.

Inversely, respondents expressed the most reservation about restricting cultural practices to the private sphere in order to help people live together better in a multi-cultural environment. In both European countries and SEM countries, far fewer respondents regarded this option as efficient in comparison to other interventions. SEM respondents in general were more favourable to training, cultural and artistic initiatives and inter-religious dialogue than their European counterparts, but across both groups of countries, these interventions scored less well than those explicitly associated with public institutions and public life. For instance, 66% of European respondents and 75% of SEM respondents felt training in diversity management and radicalisation prevention would be 'very efficient' or 'somewhat efficient'. Though still high, these percentages indicate a stronger association of improving interfaith relations with the state.

Actions beyond interfaith dialogue

What can be concluded from the data that can inform future policy directions address cultural and religious diversity and practical initiatives to overcome tensions and promote greater understanding? Perhaps one of the most telling patterns in the data is the stronger response to the question about tolerance towards other cultures, with the exception of marrying someone of another faith, than to the questions about preventing challenges or helping people live together in a multi-cultural environment. In both European and SEM countries, and across non-religious and religious populations, respondents appeared to react most favourably to relational rather than preventative or policy-oriented language. The support for intervention into public life also suggests a desire for a framework for improved social relations.

For policymakers, the implications are that investment in learning about diversity, public programmes to bring youth of different backgrounds together, greater public discussion of religion and belief, and enforcement of equal rights within public institutions will increase opportunities for constructive interaction and ideally encourage a sense of belonging and collectiveness across different ethnic and religious groups. In terms of practical initiatives, investment in more specific programmes, such as interfaith dialogue, may be less productive, even for those who are religious. Respondents in Europe who were very religious did agree that interfaith dialogue was very effective by 13 percentage points more than non-religious respondents but the percentage was still noticeably lower than for education and youth-led dialogue (41% and 46%, respectively).

Whether in the countries included in the Survey or beyond, interfaith dialogue is conventionally and unsurprisingly led by religious leaders and institutions, such as the Catholic Church. It is therefore often limited in its reach, or to members of a particular religious institution or those who are religious. To bring together citizens across faiths and beliefs, the Survey data suggests that programmes oriented towards youth and the general public, such as multi-cultural events, may yield more significant results for fostering tolerance and respect for diversity. This finding, and the data more generally, means that it is up to governments to become more thoughtful about the relations they want to foster between individuals and groups of different faiths and beliefs, how public institutions should cultivate tolerance and better relations, and the effect participation in public life should ideally have on individual and collective behaviour and values.

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Media challenged to match the public's interest in better coverage

Paul GILLESPIE

Paul Gillespie analyses the information of the Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey and relates it to significant trends in media behaviour and practice emerging in the region. He explores public interest in news and information between European and SEM countries, how media shape public opinion and attitudes in the region, and the most trusted media sources for cross-cultural reporting. The author concludes by illustrating the elements of a future observatory and recommends more involvement of the media in the intercultural debates.

Media plays a central role in the countries bordering the Mediterranean and in relations between them. The Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey on Intercultural Trends in the Euro-Mediterranean Region documents that role. It explores public interest in news and information between European and South and Eastern Mediterranean countries (SEM), how media shape public opinion and attitudes in the region, the most trusted media sources for cross-cultural reporting in that space and related socio-demographic characteristics of the populations involved, including gender, age and education.

This chapter assesses and analyses the Survey's information and relates it to significant trends in media behaviour and practice emerging in the region. The surveys are snapshots at a particular time, in selected countries, which should be related to recent events and wider changes. But they reveal important variations between the most trusted media north and south of the Mediterranean, notably between print (more trusted in the North), and online and social media (more so in the South). Common to both sides of the Mediterranean Sea is the importance of television broadcasting – a reality that those concerned with media performance and practice must take properly into account.

The chapter goes on to examine how these findings can be used to develop a more informed and evidence-based approach to intercultural dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean region over the next three years before the fourth Anna Lindh Report is published. The media's wider societal and cultural role can be observed, analysed and discussed by journalists, editors, media analysts, citizens, civil society organisations and policy-makers, all of whom seek to use and influence their communication power and influence. Mapping and understanding media more effectively are priorities for the Anna Lindh Foundation's work in this period across all its intercultural activities. This Survey's findings provide a benchmark for that work.


How media shapes perceptions

The Survey asks respondents how interested they are personally in news and information about European and SEM countries classified under five headings: cultural life and lifestyle, political situation, economic conditions, religious beliefs and practices, and sports activities. The findings reveal somewhat different rankings on both sides of the Mediterranean. The Europeans are generally more interested in each of the categories than SEM respondents, combining very interested and *somewhat interested* answers. Religious beliefs and practices in Europe are markedly less interesting for the SEM countries than the other way (46% to 59%). But sports activities are of much greater interest from the South to the North, reversing that pattern (61% to 46%). People in the North with friends or relatives in the SEM countries are more interested in its news.

These findings are worth exploring further by journalists involved in cross-cultural reporting as a guide to public interest in their work. Analyses by individual country, by age, gender and education show varying potential demand for coverage. Whether that demand is being effectively met is a larger question that can be answered only by observing and mapping actual media content. The patterns of indifference shown here show that reporting across the Mediterranean is probably not a media priority on either side.

Content analysis is also likely to show a heavy media concentration on certain aspects of the relationship. The overview chapter discusses how media framing of the migration and refugee crisis in 2015-17 affected European public perceptions of the Mediterranean region. Those exposed to media coverage of the South were significantly more likely to say it has to do with migration issues than those who were not. This is a good example of how the Survey can be used to analyse issues more deeply.

Chart 9.1
Impact of media coverage on views about the Mediterranean region




Direct evidence of the media's role in shaping public perception comes from the question which asked whether respondents had, during the previous 12 months, 'seen, read or heard anything in the media that has influenced your view of people' in European or SEM countries. Responses were prompted in a five-point scale ranging from yes in a positive or negative way, through having seen something but leaving views unchanged, to not seeing anything, to not knowing. There is a marked difference between the European side where 55% said they encountered something but their views remained unchanged and the 12% who said this in the South. Twice as many in the SEM countries had not encountered anything compared to the North (38% to 17%); but the South had more than twice the proportion of positive experiences (21% to 8%) and somewhat larger negative ones (26% to 18%) (Chart 9.1).

Interpretation of these results must take account of the dramatic events concerning refugees and migrants over those 12 months as well as the recurrent terrorist atrocities in European cities – some involving young individuals from immigrant communities originating in North African and Middle Eastern countries motivated by Islamic fundamentalism. Such extremist violence captured media headlines, while negative images of the Syrian war, fleeing refugees and brutal Jihadis dominated coverage, crowding out alternatively the common interests and cultural interaction between the North and the South amply confirmed in the Survey. Such impressions of media coverage need to be deepened by research and their findings debated by journalists and editors; but their effect on public perceptions is readily seen. They display a greater closure of attitudes in Europe than in the SEM countries and an awareness of that relative closure in the South. Some similar patterns were found in the 2009 Report, which asked the same question. Then, as now,

the more educated were more likely to say they had encountered news about the others, but they are less inclined to say it was positive.


A new question this time probed which media sources are most trusted for cross-cultural reporting. It found a clear predominance of television on both sides (45% in the North, 58% in South); print is much more trusted in Europe (40% to 15%); online and social media are relatively much more so in the South than the North (32%/27% to 28%/18%) and books, films and documentaries are much more trusted in Europe. Age and education levels affect these results (Chart 9.2 and 9.3).

Chart 9.2
Most trusted media sources for information about SEM/European countries



There is a gap between the levels of interest expressed in receiving more news and information about the different countries and cultures involved in the region and perceptions of how media report. The high numbers in the SEM countries who have not seen, read or heard anything in the media influencing their views of Europeans and of Europeans whose views remained unchanged even

Chart 9.3 Most trusted media sources for cross-cultural reporting, by country



though they have encountered such news tells that story. The additional question on most trusted media for that information is revealing because it clarifies what people use as well as what they find most reliable. They were not asked explicitly about media credibility or whether they are satisfied with what media tell them about Europeans or SEM countries. Such conclusions must be inferred from this data and other research. But given the levels of mutual interest expressed, put alongside mutual misunderstandings of the other side's values shown best in the Survey's findings about raising children, there is scope for more engaged and positive media work in this sphere. Analysis by individual countries within the groups and by socio-demographic characteristics bears this out.

There is a lot of variation within the European and SEM groups as well as between them.

Other questions asked in the Survey show efforts to meet and understand people from the other side of the Mediterranean encountering difficulties quite aside from dissatisfaction with media accounts. Meeting people in person or online opens up those opportunities; but it is notable that twice as many Europeans found their views unchanged as changed positively, while in the South there was more openness to such meetings. Asked about barriers to cross-cultural encounters, language, culture and stereotypes loomed large on both sides. Media were not mentioned explicitly in these listings, but they play into each aspect.

Stereotypes are especially – though not only – media creations and require much more attention from practitioners and researchers. That makes the findings on tolerance and living together in multi-cultural environments reported here really significant for journalists and editors. There is both a convergence of values and a greater commitment in the SEM countries to realise multi-cultural living opportunities than in Europe. Much the same pattern emerges from the measures listed to prevent and deal with conflicts and radicalisation. On both sides there is a commitment to educational, youth, exchange, cultural, religious and training initiatives, but with a greater emphasis on them from the South. Media training for cross-cultural reporting is higher on the southern list than on the north's.

Media observatory, research and dialogue

The media is relevant to most of the fields of work of the Anna Lindh Foundation, whether to communicate and report on the initiatives themselves at various levels, or to analyse relevant societal developments bearing on them.

An observatory on how media cover issues of intercultural relations and to provide evidence-based resources for journalists could be developed by the Anna Lindh Foundation and a consortium of partners, including the European Broadcasting Union and the Euro-Med Media Network. The concept originates in the foundational constitution of the Anna Lindh Foundation in 2003 and its recent mapping of media initiatives. It would bring together media analysts, journalists and civil society representatives to map and assess media coverage of intercultural relations, using these survey results as a benchmark. It would highlight good practices and gaps in coverage and leverage this research with senior media executives and owners, practicing journalists and policy-makers between this Survey and the next one. Media dialogues each year would discuss these issues and propose ways to tackle them more effectively, taking account of the most trusted media sectors identified here. In line with the Anna Lindh Foundation's strategic planning a number of 'hot issues' would be included in the research and dialogue, among them migration, cultural stereotyping, mobility, shrinking space for civil society, media freedoms and professionalism, social and online media, terrorism and radicalisation. The region's journalism schools would be fully engaged in the work, particularly its research aspect.

It is proposed to develop a rapid response mechanism for media on the basis of this observatory and using its networks of expertise. Reacting to headline news with a cultural dimension, it could provide a link between practicing journalists and regional experts with access to the database and mapping exercises. They could be its spokespeople, providing analysis on such subjects as migration, social cohesion, media freedoms, religious affinities and radicalisation.

More involvement of the media in the debate

Approaches to the media's involvement in the Euro-Mediterranean region's intercultural affairs vary from the prescriptive to the engaged. NGOs and policy-makers have tended to be prescriptive about the media's role while criticising their actual performance. They often demand coverage of formal positions rather than facilitating access to allow more vivid, sympathetic or personalised reporting. Journalists resist such dirigisme but get defensive when accused of violating ethical norms of balance, fairness, evidence and sourcing inscribed in their ethical codes. They point out that publishers and owners often have different values than the journalists who work for them and that disputed coverage can be contested and criticised from within as well as from outside.

This chapter has argued that a more engaged approach which involves practicing journalists, editors and publishers in discussing and acting on these issues is better for all concerned. That is the spirit in which should animate media dialogue, research and analysis in the proposed observatory. There is more chance of engaging the media if they participate in the discussion, including in their own self-criticism and how they respond to criticism from NGOs and others about their coverage. The values of evidence-based argument and debate, the expressed desire of publics north and south for greater intercultural engagement, as well as the intensification of 'hot topics' in the region create a real opportunity for media coverage in the coming period. If these arguments are best resolved through a cooperative process there is a rich menu arising for it through this third Anna Lindh Report on Intercultural Trends in the Euro-Mediterranean Region.

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Social media in shaping perceptions: human curiosity as mediator

Rima MARROUCH


Discussing the findings of the ALF/Ipsos Survey concerning the role of media in shaping perceptions in the region, Rima Marrouch identifies the importance of cultural and lifestyle stories. However, tracking the impact of the stories leads the author to argue that media might not always play that positive role, and hence, despite the survival of TV as a dominant source of information on both shores, social media is gaining a wider role in shaping perceptions – especially among the youth.

In Polish primary schools students are taught early on that the basis of European civilisation and their own Polish culture was laid in ancient Greece and Rome. Greek myths and Rome’s history constitute an important element in the primary school curriculum. Myths about Sisyphus, Persephone and Antigone were some of the first stories I was introduced to when I moved at the age of 11 from Syria to Poland.

In Syrian primary schools, students do not learn about the whimsicality of Greek gods or the heroism of Roman heroes. Greek mythology is not included in the curriculum. Most young Syrians experience the Hellenistic and Roman culture first-hand on school trips to ancient sites like Apamea to see the Great Colonnade, one of the longest colonnades in the Roman Empire and its theatre, one of the largest surviving Roman theatres with an estimated seating capacity of 20,000 people.

Maybe because of the Polish curriculum and the Syrian school trips from my past, but mostly because of my current work as a journalist, the Anna Lindh/Ipsos Intercultural Trends Survey was interesting for me for several reasons: firstly, to better understand what type of news stories about SEM countries are of interest to people in the European countries included in the Survey (Austria, Croatia, Finland, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal and the Netherlands) and, vice versa, what stories about European countries are of interest to people in the SEM countries covered by the Survey (Algeria, Israel, Jordan, Palestine and Tunisia). Secondly, the Survey also looks into the media’s role in shaping public perception about people from the other shores of the Mediterranean and finds that it is not always a positive role. Finally, the Survey produces interesting findings with respect to which media are perceived by people in European and SEM countries as the most trustworthy for cross-cultural reporting.

Chart 10.1 Interest in news and information about SEM/European countries



Human curiosity about people's lives on the other shores of the Mediterranean

I tried to look into some of the produced video content on the BBC Arabic Facebook page and analyse it through the results of the Anna Lindh/Ipsos Intercultural Trends Survey. I looked at what type of video stories were mostly shared and viewed on BBC Arabic social media platforms and tried to see if the stories follow a similar trend as observed in the Survey. Why video? Cisco, a networking company, predicts that over 78% of the world's mobile traffic will be video by 2021.

One of the most viewed videos on the BBC Arabic Facebook page in May 2017 was about a young man producing small cars in Egypt. By 15 May 2017 the video was viewed 9,530 times (not a very large number but it was nonetheless one of the 'top' videos). According to the Survey, this type of cultural and lifestyle stories generates a large amount of interest in both European and SEM countries. In European countries, 28% of respondents answered that they were very interested in cultural and lifestyle stories from the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean and an additional 53% reported being somewhat interested. In SEM countries, 30% of respondents were very interested, and 35% somewhat interested, in cultural and lifestyle stories from Europe. For me, this proves an endemic and human curiosity about other people's lives on the other shores of the Mediterranean.

In SEM countries, sports stories generate an equally high level of interest as cultural and lifestyle stories:

32% of respondents in SEM countries were very interested in this type of stories from Europe; in European countries, on the other hand, only 12% were very interested in sport stories from SEM countries (Chart 10.1). Many Arabic-speakers follow western teams, especially when it comes to football. The Barcelona football team playing against Real Madrid generates an even more heated debate on social media than politics.

The political situation in SEM countries remains one of the strongest segments of interest in the European countries surveyed. 28% of all respondents in European countries wanted to know about the political situation in SEM countries, compared to 24% of respondents in SEM countries who wanted to be informed about the political situation in Europe. For respondents in SEM countries, news stories about economic conditions in Europe come before those about the political situation (29% 'very interested' responses, compared to 23% in European countries).

When the Anna Lindh Foundation decides to conduct its 4th wave of the Survey, it would be interesting to see how 'environmental stories' would perform as an option because this type of story was not included in the current Survey. There seems to be a general misconception in the media industry that the environment is not high on the agenda of the Arabic-language audience. Videos shared on social media, however, show the opposite. To prove this point, one of the top videos shared in May 2017 on the BBC Arabic Facebook group was a video about German scientists producing artificial sun.

Chart 10.2 Interest in news and information about SEM/European countries





Chart 10.3
Media role in shaping perceptions about people in SEM/European countries, by country/region



The project is connected to research on the creation of climate-friendly fuel, according to news reports. By May 15th, the video was viewed 350,617 times and was shared 17,000 times, which shows that there is a high level of interest in environmental stories.


Media not always a positive role in shaping perceptions

The Anna Lindh/Ipsos Intercultural Trends Survey shows that people are interested in news stories from the other shores of the Mediterranean, but the question remains what impact these stories, or more broadly, what impact

media outlets in general, have on people's views. One of the most troubling findings of the Survey, for me as a journalist, is connected to the role of media in shaping public perception in both European and SEM countries about people from the other shores of the Mediterranean. The Survey finds that the media does not always play a positive role in shaping perceptions.

When asked whether the media caused a change in views about people from SEM countries, 18% of respondents in European countries replied 'Yes, in negative way' (in comparison to only 8% saying 'Yes, in a positive way'). In SEM countries, when being asked about the media's role in changing their views about people from European countries, 26% answered 'Yes, in a negative way' (in comparison to 21% saying 'Yes, in a positive way') (Chart 10.2). It is, however, also worth adding that in SEM countries, many respondents reported not having seen, read or heard anything in the media about European countries; in Europe, on the other hand, most respondents had been exposed to media coverage on SEM countries, but the largest share of respondents noted that the media had not had an impact on their views. However, in both regions, if there has been an impact of the media on people's

Chart 10.4
Social media as one of the most trusted media sources for information about SEM/European countries, by country



perceptions, it was more likely to be a negative impact. In both regions, respondents reporting a negative impact outnumbered those reporting a positive impact. The countries with the highest negative impact of media on public perception were: Algeria (31%) in the SEM region and the Netherlands (30%) in Europe.

Young people turning to social media for news

If media causes a change in perceptions about people from the other shores of the Mediterranean, it is an indication that these people from both shores are sometimes framed in negative light in media stories. It would be very interesting to find out what media outlets respondents have followed and analyse the content viewed. Such an analysis is not possible in the context of the Survey, but we can have a look at the Survey results with respect to the most trusted media sources for cross-cultural reporting.

In terms of the audience's trust in media, it seems that TV still has hegemony as the most trusted media source for cross-cultural reporting. In European countries, when asked: 'Which of the following sources do you trust most for information about countries bordering the southern and eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea', 45% of respondents selected TV, 40% mentioned print media, 32% films and documentaries, and 28% online media (such as news websites and online magazines).

In SEM countries the situation is different, although TV remains the dominant source. When asked which sources respondents trust most for information about European countries, 58% said TV, 32% online media (such as news websites and online magazines), 27% social media (such as Facebook, Twitter, and various blogs) and only 15% selected print media.

But when we look at the results for young people, TV loses dominance. In European countries, news websites and online magazines are a top choice for trustworthy news stories for 42% of young people (15-29 year olds), and then comes TV (40%) and print media (35%). The TV's hegemony is also slowly fading in SEM countries and although it remains at the top rank with 48% of young people trusting it as a source for news stories, social media is quickly gaining importance. Social media was one of the most trusted media sources for 37% of young people in SEM countries; this proportion was as high as the proportion trusting online media (37%). In European countries, on the other hand, even among young people, online media were clearly still trusted more than social media (Chart 10.3).

In the era of 'fake news', this choice of social media as a trusted media source for cross-cultural reporting for many young people both in SEM and European countries might come as a surprise. For me, as a Syrian,

this choice absolutely makes sense, not only for cross-cultural reporting, but also for various news updates. Social media is an important platform for many Syrians, not only to distribute news, but also to verify information since the main Syrian media outlets have failed to gain the audience's trust to report on events in the country in an independent and reliable way. Many Syrians and, as the Survey shows, also many Jordanians, Israeli, Palestinians and Tunisians turn to social media for news. The Survey finds that roughly one in two 15-29 year-olds in Jordan, Tunisia and Israel selected social media as one of their most trusted sources for news stories about European countries. In Palestine and Algeria social media were trusted by roughly one on three young people.

Social media is not only used to distribute news and content but is often used to verify it. In my work, I often follow a Facebook group called Instant Reporting Team (now called neoIRT). The group consists of journalists, activists, filmmakers and people interested in developments in Syria (but there are also updates on international news). The way the group works is that a member posts information as a status (for example, updates on fighting in Tabaqa, near Raqqa) and other members who have additional information on the topic post more information as comments. If there is someone close to the location or someone with contacts at the location, s/he is often tagged in the post to verify it or provide more information.

neoIRT is just one example of a Syrian Facebook group where people share and try to verify information. It is an organic effort to provide reliable information when there are no mainstream outlets doing the job. There are more groups like neoIRT across the Arab world as there is a hunger for reliable information. These groups make me hopeful, as do the findings of the Anna Lindh Foundation's 2016 Intercultural Trends Survey. People's interest in various news stories, especially about lifestyle and culture, from all shores of the Mediterranean, gives me hope that the endemic curiosity of the human kind in the life of others is safe and sound. But the negative role of media in shaping people's perception observed in the Survey is troubling. As journalists, we need to ask ourselves what are the stories we choose to report on, how we report on them, and what impact they may have on people's perceptions.

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Towards a common deconstruction of gender stereotypes

Inès SAFI

In the Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey, three questions were asked about the role of women in the surveyed societies, in political, economic, and social arenas, and whether these roles should increase, decrease, or stay the same. Inès Safi, analysing the responses to these questions both in Europe and in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries, draws some interesting insights on the perceived role of women in these societies and what could represent the deep and direct causes behind such perceptions.

It cannot be denied that the way the status and role of women is perceived is not a fixed ideological given; it is modelled by the context and the mechanisms involved. In turn, these perceptions contribute in reinforcing or weakening these mechanisms, and they could also, depending on their nature, constitute either a hindrance or an advantage in the empowerment of women. Hence, vicious or virtuous circles will occur – a woman appearing vulnerable or empowered will reinforce the perception we have of her, be it negative or positive, and thus she will have more or less resources.

How can these different perceptions be analysed or interpreted? How can they be improved and orientated in order to promote mutual confidence and the empowerment of women and the rest of humanity?

Different perceptions in the countries in the region

Through the Anna Lindh/ Ipsos Survey we have detailed results available depending on gender, age groups, and countries, as well as their distribution into two geographical groups: Europe and the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM). Three questions have


been asked, with the choice of three possible replies to each question. Should the role of women be greater, stay the same, or be reduced in three areas, whose content and scope have not been specified: making political decisions; the field of economy and business; and social and cultural life.

When comparing European findings with those of SEM countries, two prominent and contradictory facts appear when concentrating on two results: those in favour of a greater role for women, and those choosing that their role be reduced.

In favour of a greater role, the percentages of Euro/SEM countries are the following: in the political field 53/40, in the economic one 54/53, and in the social and cultural ones 47/65. It is surprising that these results are nearly identical in the field of economy, and even more so, that those of the SEM countries are distinctly higher than the European results in the social and cultural fields (Chart 11.1).

When studying more closely, country by country, and concentrating on the rates amongst men in favour of a greater role for women, it can be seen that it is almost impossible to group together, at the top of the list, the

Chart 11.1 Perceptions about women's roles in society, by country group



European countries before those of the SEM region in any of the fields.

Let us move on to the results in favour of reducing the role of women. Here, the gaps between Europe and the SEM region increase as follows: in the field of politics 4/27, in the field of economy 2/14 and in the social and cultural fields 2/7. However, we still notice a clear preference for the role of women in socio-cultural fields in the SEM region (Chart 11.2).

The rate of women in favour of greater roles is generally higher than that of men, but in a very variable way. Surprisingly, in the field of politics, it is double the rate of men in Finland and Europe on average, while it remains very similar to the rate of men in France, Jordan and Palestine. The rate of women in favour of reducing participation is small compared to that of men, but sometimes it is unexpectedly close. In Palestine and Israel, in the economic and socio-cultural fields these rates become almost the same as those of men.

So for this data it is difficult to highlight a common trend for Europe on the one hand and for the SEM countries on the other. The variations in their averages, depending on the countries and the fields, is so great that in the end it is important to point out the specificity of each country and each field.

The most striking example is Tunisia, which in the three fields stands out through the level of men in favour of a greater role for women and is relatively high compared to the SEM countries, as well as the majority of the European countries. This is surprising when taking

into account that the economic situation there is still fragile and that there has been a marked development in extremist movement since the revolution. Women represent 31% of the members of parliament in 2016. Yet, in opposition to the high level of men in favour of a greater role of women in politics, 22% of men prefer women to have a reduced role in that field. It is difficult to detect a sole reason for this. Do they consider that women are already too present, or is it the messages conveyed by extremists that have shaped this opinion? Did women in politics really 'succeed', or is it the level of their 'success' that has been conveyed to the public that is misleading? The fact that 12% of women prefer a lower participation in politics is surprising. It could reveal either religious convictions or a negative perception of the political arena and its conflicts (Chart 11.3).

It should be remembered that according to the 2015 World Bank indicators, the rate of unemployed female/male citizens in Tunisia is 38/35% within the majority age group 15-25 year-olds, and 21.1/12.5% of the total age groups; this shows a very precarious situation, even amongst the highly qualified. Such a large proportion of unemployed young people is a fact that extends beyond Tunisia and could explain the somewhat surprising trend that the youth are generally less favourable towards women's participation. It could be expected that men perceive women as competitors in the labour market, persuaded that men should have priority because, more than women, they need to support their families. However, the rate of Tunisian men reluctant for women's participation in the economy is 12%, comparable to that in Israel (11%), where the women/men unemployment

Chart 11.2
Perceptions about women's roles in society, by country





Chart 11.3 Perceptions about women's roles in society, by gender and country



rate in 2015 was 5.5/5.8% in total, and was 10.5/8.9% among youth. Reasons other than the economic situation could be sought to explain this, including the influence of religious orthodoxy in these countries.

Rethinking individual people's personal ambitions for true empowerment

The Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey has the merit of illustrating complex variations, in contrast to a simplistic interpretation, which attributes the perception of the role of women to purely ethnic or religious origins. Such an interpretation is in itself a biased perception, which reduces the complexity of the way these perceptions appear and are sustained. It hides the profane or material causes that strongly interact with dominant ideologies and influence their development.

As an example, it must be taken into account that domestic violence is still trivialised, and women are often expected to put up with it, even in the SEM countries where men are in favour of the participation and education of women, and where the number of female university students is often greater than that of males.

Moreover, women's social power should not necessarily be characterised by the terms proposed in the survey.

Under the banner of universalism, the tendency is to make simplistic extrapolations stemming from Western references, adopted beyond its borders, or more precisely, a form of universalist feminism. Any 'local' views opposing, moderating, or putting into context these 'global' views, is accused of being regressive – egalitarianism becomes dogmatism, and even becomes an ally of racial prejudice.

So, this focus on the way women's roles are perceived, which should be equal to those of men, becomes the only indicator of the way their importance in society is perceived. Now, the world has been invaded by the model of capitalism based on a supra-rational economy, which has eliminated a way of life where nature, handicraft (inherently linked to the arts), literature and poetry are valued, and have often an important spiritual scope, as was the case in Islam. One has to stress that unknown Muslim women have been queens; others have greatly influenced rulers or the course of history, have been important patrons or reputed spiritual leaders. At the same time, home life can also play a rich and central role, offering an environment which is favourable for primary and essential apprenticeship, where love and the feeling of security are important foundations for the transmission of knowledge (including various skills and know-

how), and where women can enjoy sizeable authority. However, this centre of gravity is shifting – as if the sign of progress is that women and children should not stay at home. Working in a factory has a more positive value than being a weaver at home, and maternity becomes a rival of feminine empowerment.

Therefore, it has to be understood what is meant by empowerment. It is better not to try and define it in an absolute way, and to leave for each woman the possibility of choosing freely the path that corresponds the best to her deepest aspirations. This necessitates an ability to break free from ideological, political or religious systems, which either dominate or manipulate her. But it also requires that at the same time a man who is not only at the heart of those systems, but also a victim of them, who reproduces their patterns of domination, and even sometimes of persecution, must also break free.

In particular two ideological systems confine the women and men from the SEM countries. On one hand, the ultraliberal rationalism and all its environmental and geopolitical impacts generate poverty not only on the material level but also when it is a question of the value and respect of the human being. In order to encourage a mother to go out, it is important that the economic system makes the external environment less dangerous and more conducive to her happiness and that it takes maternity, but also paternity, systematically into account, so that men share the same responsibility. This entails finding solutions for the laws of the jungle that govern the industrial environment, as well as the mechanisation of jobs and the standardisation of objects and mentalities.

On the other hand, the system of religious rationalism also leads to the impoverishment of spirituality, beauty and inspiration, at the expense of reductive literalism. Concerning Islam, I would encourage the promotion of female role models, both historical and current – women rulers, scientists or poets, patrons or illustrious spiritual leaders of great learned men. Having contributed to the history of mankind as a whole, they should be better known as an antidote to the stereotypes conveyed by collective imaginaries, both in SEM countries, where they are articulated around frozen definition of what should be an 'exemplary' Muslim woman, and in Europe, where the image of an alienated one prevails. These stereotypes create additional barriers to the fulfilment of women in the SEM countries, undermining their self-confidence and the trust in their own cultural and civilizational resources. We could also evoke women's own views on men, whom they may consider rivals, and the SEM countries views on Europe, which all impede any dialogue and mutual trust. Even if Europe, because of its position of strength, is lesser dependent and sensitive to them, such negative perceptions may prevent peaceful intercultural dialogue, and lead, for example, to the rejection of constructive criticism or bona fide projects put forward by Europe.

Finally, in the Anna Lindh/Ipsos survey, we could detect the effects of social injustice and extremism that come with consumerism, and that we hope to counterbalance. But we could also pay attention to the aspirations expressed in the Survey, without stopping at their value judgements. The number of those aiming at the participation of the women in the social and cultural fields is particularly high in the SEM countries. The role of culture, including sciences, arts, literature and tales, amongst others, cannot be underestimated in relation to economic and political roles. In this area, women's power could expand and act deeply, and transform in a more efficient way societies and mentalities, leading them to free themselves from oppressive ideological and economic systems.

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Youth as a smart investment towards a stable Mediterranean region

Abdelrahman ALDAQQAH

Analysing the stances and perspectives of the Euro-Mediterranean youth on intercultural interactions, barriers to intercultural communication, youth migration, and cultural and religious diversity, Abdelrahman Aldaqqah advocates investing in youth and dialogue as a long-term solution in challenging radicalisation. The author proposes youth empowerment, education, debate initiatives, youth exchanges, and intercultural activities as effective instruments in overcoming the misunderstandings and stereotypes, and hence, prevention of radicalisation at its root level.

Youth represent a major constituent in the Mediterranean region. The Arab Spring was supposed to be the start of a new era of hope, freedom and democracy and yet the region's youth still face social exclusion, migration, unemployment and radicalism.


However, the results of the newly conducted Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey reflect optimism towards the future. This paper adopts a perspective oriented to the idea of social engagement and empowerment of youth as the future guardians of peace. It also puts emphasis on the importance of intercultural dialogue and cooperation,

youth-led initiatives and education as areas to prevent conflict and radicalization as well as the expected advantages from the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation.

Religious and cultural diversity: a challenge or an opportunity?

The principles of coexistence and tolerance are of high value to build mutually acceptable relationships between highly diverse communities. The mismanagement of religious diversity in the region has alternated between fragile integration and disputes. Many ethnic groups in

Chart 12.1 Perceptions about religious and cultural diversity in European countries, by age group



the Middle East have not been able to positively benefit from diversity. The continuous damage and devastation caused by the religious and ethnic conflicts in the Middle East was clearly reflected in the Survey when 55 % of SEM (Southern and Eastern Mediterranean) youth described cultural and religious diversity as a threat to the stability of society compared to 33% of European youth (Chart 12.1).

Nevertheless, although more than 70% of the Survey respondents from both sides of the Mediterranean strongly or somewhat associate the Mediterranean region with concepts of instability and insecurity, this perception was lower among younger European respondents compared to older ones (64% vs 72%) (Chart 12.2).

The vast majority of European youth think that people from different cultural and religious backgrounds should have the same rights and opportunities (95%), while a lower percentage shared the same view among SEM young (82%). Overall, youth on both sides consider cultural and religious diversity an asset for their societies (76% and 75% in Europe and SEM respectively). One can argue that diversity can be a viable instrument of conflict resolution in the region if peace education and exchange programmes become a feature of educational processes.

Long-term solutions through youth empowerment and quality education

Working with young people is the most important factor in the prevention of radicalisation since this group is considered to be the most vulnerable to extremism. Education is a factor of change that allows youth to realise their potential. The EU's child education rate in 2012 was 93.9 % (European Union, 2016). In the Middle East, while the average level of enrolment in education has quadrupled since 1960, it has also contributed to a tremendous increase in the number of unemployed graduates or people with inadequate skills (World Bank, 2014). The mean years of schooling reflect

the cumulative impact of education development but do not directly reflect the quality of education. Surprisingly, previous data shows that 69% of the so called Islamic State's recruits reported at least a secondary education with the average age of recruitment being 27.4 years old (Devarajan and Mottaghi, 2016). Referring to the Survey, the majority from both sides of the Mediterranean think that education, youth programmes, youth participation in public life, inter-religious dialogue, exchange programmes and cultural/artistic initiatives are efficient measures in tackling radicalisation, with the majority (81% of Europeans and 86% of SEM respondents) believing that education and youth-led dialogue initiatives would be very efficient or somewhat efficient (Chart 12.3).

More SEM youth believe that education and youth programmes are 'very efficient' compared to European youth (64% and 43% respectively). Similarly, the support of youth participation in public life seen as 'very efficient' was higher among SEM youth compared to European youth (62% and 39% respectively). These results coincide with the priorities of the 'UN Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism 2016' that emphasises the role of empowering youth, investing in education, skills development and dialogue in conflict prevention. The Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) study (Pratchett et al., 2010) found that the two most successful interventions with young people are 'capacity building or empowering young people'. This evidence, together with the Survey results, provide a concrete approach to prevent radicalisation and provide better stability for the region

The regional examples are of high value in promoting Mediterranean cooperation to prevent radicalism. Besides, expanding youth horizons through initiatives such as debating, youth exchange, and intercultural activities is critical in overcoming misunderstandings and the reinforcement of stereotypes.

Chart 12.2 Perceptions about the Mediterranean region in European countries, by age group





Chart 12.3 Perceptions about mechanisms to prevent and deal with conflicts and radicalisation, by age group



Deradicalisation and youth-led initiatives

Intercultural interaction and peacebuilding are at the centre of many public debates across the Mediterranean. The ‘Slotervaart Project’ is a community-based project aiming to build resilience to radicalisation in the Netherlands. The project included organised debates and interaction among Muslims and non-Muslims, examining topics in Islam as well as political issues. The key factors in the success of the outreach approach adopted by the project were the mode of interaction and engagement with the wider community.

The ‘Young Arab Voices’ is another successful regional programme jointly launched in 2011 by the Anna Lindh Foundation and the British Council aiming at developing skills and opportunities for youth-led debate across the Arab region. The programme involved hundreds of youth and was aimed at enriching democratic dialogue through training, youth participation and exchange of views. The programme was expanded and strengthened in 2017 into the ‘Young Mediterranean Voices’ to upgrade the level of exchange between European and Arab youth and the youth advocacy component.

In response to the worldwide call to engage and empower young people, the UNDP’s first Youth Strategy 2014-2017 (UNDP, 2014) underlines youth potential to build bridges of dialogue across cultures. It also addresses youth challenges and recommendations for empowerment around the world. The strategy outcomes include: economic empowerment of youth, engagement of young people as a positive force for transformational change and enhancement of youth civic engagement and participation in decision-making process. Furthermore, in 2015 the UN Security Council unanimously adopted the Resolution 2250 calling on Member States to increase representation of youth in decision-making at all levels and to set up mechanisms to enable young people to meaningfully participate in peacebuilding and conflict resolution.

Of course, many other countries and organizations have taken far-reaching and exemplary action, but we are not able to cite them all here. A piece of research entitled ‘A comparison of youth-driven and adult-driven youth programs’ revealed the importance of giving youth the opportunity to lead initiatives in which youth experienced a higher degree of ownership and empowerment reporting more development of leadership and planning skills than adult-driven programmes (Reed L. et al, 2005).

Openness and dialogue as basis for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation

The countries in the Euro-Mediterranean region are bound by history, geography and culture. The apparent curiosity and mutual interest amongst both SEM and EU individuals represented in the Survey characterise a foundation for more efficient cooperation across the Mediterranean region. Interactions with people from different countries is registered as 53% among European youth with those who have a high interest in information and news from SEM countries representing 69% and those who have high level of tolerance 57% whereas 40% of SEM youth reported interaction with a person from Europe. When asked about methods of interaction, particularly noticeable is the relatively smaller proportion of European youth who used the internet and social media to get in contact with people from SEM countries (7% compared to 32% of youth in SEM countries). For 30% of European youth, school is the main area of intercultural interaction while only 7% of youth from SEM referred to it.

Lower levels of interaction are most frequently attributed to language differences and stereotyping. Indeed, despite modern communication methods, language differences remain a barrier when meeting or talking with someone from the other side of the Mediterranean – particularly among European youth (75%), compared to relatively fewer in the SEM countries (41%). Cultural barriers and stereotypes are quite relevant for young Europeans (37%), and less for under 29 year-olds from SEM countries (25% and 17% respectively). In all of the countries where the question was asked, no more than one-in-four expressed worries about difficulties in obtaining a visa or travel warnings from the country of origin (18% and 14% in SEM and EU countries, respectively).

In relation to the potential benefits of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, the majority of both sides of the Mediterranean agreed that cultural diversity and extremism prevention is a promising outcome (80% and 79% in EU and SEM respectively). Other agreed areas of cooperation include: promoting education and training, gender equality, youth empowerment through entrepreneurship and innovation, implementation of human rights such as rule of law and freedom, engagement and support for civil society organizations. Compared to older people, youth showed a greater belief in the potential gains in terms of more education, training, employment and innovation opportunities.

In the context of regional cooperation and integration it is worth noting the tendency of people to move within the region. The Survey, contrary to expectations, shows that when asked 'If you could start a new life, in which country of the world would you start it?' only 36% of Europeans chose their own country of residence compared to 60% of SEM people. However, in SEM countries youth were more inclined

than older people to start in another country (50% vs 35%). When SEM young respondents were asked to identify their preferred new destination, 44% of them indicated Europe, followed by other SEM countries, 17%, North America was represented by 14% and Gulf countries 12%. On the other hand, only 16.5% of young Europeans would stay in their country of origin whilst 36% would go to another European country and 22.5% would go to North America.

The results among respondents from both shores indicated a positive relationship between the educational level and inclination to emigrate. Furthermore, youth constituted the largest proportion of respondents who chose to start a new life in another country (80% in EU and 49% in SEM countries respectively). Among European youth, where countries have various economic growth rates, looking for opportunities in education and employment might be the leading causes for migration whereas in SEM countries employment consideration might be combined with political outlook while choosing to relocate in another country.

The Survey also shows the social links currently existing between people of the two shores with 72% of the respondents in SEM countries stating that they have relatives and friends in European countries versus a lower, but still significant, rate of 27% of Europeans having family or friends in SEM countries. These linkages can probably strengthen cooperation around the Mediterranean.

A call to action

Current regional policies focus on security and defence rather than dealing with root-causes of radicalisation. Thus, governments, youth organizations and civil society in the Middle East should be an integrated part of a comprehensive policy that targets the international, regional and local levels to promote regional dialogue and cultural understanding. Several initiatives from the UN and EU focused on actions in that direction. One of the brightest examples is the Anna Lindh Foundation, which runs the largest and most diverse civil society network in the Euro-Mediterranean region with over 4000 organizations, representing a unique platform of exchange in the region (ALF, 2015). The Euro-Mediterranean collaboration framework should promote engagement between states and civil societies on both sides and thereby aim to create a zone of peace and stability founded on the principles of respect for the promotion of democracy and human rights. Youth should be an integral part of this approach – they are currently reforming the world, building communities, developing technology and sustaining economies.

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Does travel shape young people?

Bernard ABRIGNANI

Bernard Abrignani questions whether travels and exchanges are still relevant in a world where it is simpler and safer to virtually travel via one's computer. He argues that yet without direct encounters it is almost impossible to get to know the other. He discusses how ALF/Ipsos Survey respondents think of cultural differences and stereotypes as barriers towards cross-cultural encounters and how they believe in dialogue measures focusing on young people as an efficient way to live better in a multi-cultural society.

Why a question mark for an affirmative quote from the 16th century? This proverb is often attributed to Montaigne in 'From the Institution of Children' in Book I of the Essais (written between 1572 and 1592). Montaigne recommends for children to visit foreign countries (chapter XXV) and expresses the utility of such travel in the following way: 'to relate chiefly the humours of these nations and their manners, and to rub and bind our brains against that of others.'


Glancing at the statistics, exchanges between the two sides of the Mediterranean Sea have never been more important – every year, more than 3,500 young people and youth leaders are the beneficiaries of the existing EU exchange programmes. This would tend to prove that there is a need for such exchange programmes and

this is supported by a strong motivation, 'you can move mountains, or at least build bridges'. In this article, I review the findings of the Anna Lindh/Ipsos Intercultural Trends Survey to support my claim that there is a need for exchange programmes, and although the questions in the Survey do not refer specifically to EU exchange programmes in the narrower sense, the findings are particularly relevant where they are based on questions about modes of interaction between individuals from European and SEM countries, barriers to cross-cultural encounters, and dialogue measures to fight extremism.

The Mediterranean region as a region characterised by hospitality

Today too many young people, especially from the southern shore of Mediterranean, travel by obligation

Chart 13.1 Characteristics of the Mediterranean region – positive associations



due to wars, dictatorships or loss of vision – and they do not travel for pleasure. According to the Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey, with fieldwork conducted in the second half of 2016, 38% of respondents in SEM countries answered that the Mediterranean region was strongly characterised by instability and insecurity, 39% said that the region was a source of conflict and 36% saw the region as being strongly characterised by a resistance to change. In the European countries, fewer respondents answered that the Mediterranean region was strongly characterised by a resistance to change, as a source of conflict, or by issues of instability and insecurity (between 22% and 26%).


Although the Survey findings suggest that, in many countries, negative associations were regularly made when respondents were asked to think about the Mediterranean region, far more respondents associated the region with positive ideas and images. For example, the largest share of respondents in SEM countries thought that the region was strongly characterised by hospitality (65%), followed by a common cultural heritage and history (59%) (Chart 13.1). Young people who have benefited from the opportunities offered by the EU youth programmes experienced this hospitality first hand and have returned transformed. They have learned to know, discover, appreciate, and no longer fear what is unknown, which can often lead to hate.

Importance of mutual and intercultural understanding

During the Age of Enlightenment intellectuals questioned the educational value of travel. As a response, in the article 'Voyage' of the *Jaucourt Encyclopedia* (1765), the author expresses the experimental function of travel and insists on the usefulness of personal contact with the 'world's great book'. But is travel still relevant in a world where virtuality has invaded reality, where it is simpler and safer to travel via one's computer?

The Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey shows that, in the European countries, 40% of young people (15-29 year-olds) who had talked to or met someone from a SEM country in the past 12 months, said they had met these people in the street or in a public place, and an additional 22% answered that people from SEM countries lived in their neighbourhood. In the SEM countries, on the other hand, more casual encounters in the street or neighbourhood occurred less frequently, while the main methods of interaction for young people were using social media and chatting on the internet (mentioned by 32% of 15-29 year-olds who had talked to or met someone from a European country) (Chart 13.2). As in the previous wave of the Survey on Intercultural Trends (conducted in 2012), the study confirms the importance of the internet in the SEM countries as a means of communication.

Chart 13.2
Method of interaction for cross-cultural encounters, by age group



Maybe I am naïve, but I am convinced that without a 'meeting of the 3rd type', meaning direct contact, it is difficult, almost impossible, to get to know the other while learning to know oneself. Youth exchanges and visits have demonstrated themselves to be a tool and an important mechanism for European and cultural integration; mobility programmes such as Youth in Action, Erasmus, Tempus or Leonardo da Vinci have seen the enthusiastic participation of young people, academics and students, coming from Europe and its neighbouring countries. The positive effects of these programmes are visible: alongside mutual and intercultural understanding, participants not only learned new languages, but also had the chance to develop lasting contacts and further connections with their host countries. The European Commission carried out a survey in 2011 to assess the impact of Youth in Action projects; the findings of the survey confirm that the exchange experience not only increased participants' foreign language proficiency but almost all participants also stressed that it made them more at ease with multi-culturalism and increased their appreciation of cultural diversity.

The findings of the Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey, however, present a less rosy picture of mutual and intercultural understanding. In the Survey, respondents were asked what the main barriers would be when meeting with or talking to people in or from countries on the other side of the Mediterranean Sea. Understandably, language was considered to be the most significant barrier to cross-cultural encounters. However, when combining the figures for cultural differences and stereotypes, it quickly becomes clear that the latter type of barriers cannot be ignored (Chart 13.3). In fact, it should also be noted that many respondents had not had any encounters in the past year with people from the other side of the Mediterranean Sea, therefore answering a question about barriers for cross-cultural encounters might have been difficult for them. When focussing only on the responses of those who have friends or relatives who live in a country on the other side of the Mediterranean Sea (in other words, respondents who will have thought about their past encounters and the barriers they were confronted with), a drop is observed in the number who referred to language barriers, while a considerably larger number were concerned about stereotypes – especially in European countries.

Young people as the driving force for change in the region


The Southern Mediterranean region is characterised by a high proportion of young people who have become one of the driving forces in their countries mainly due to the recent changes in the political and social landscape as a consequence of the so called ‘Arab Spring’ and its aftermath. Young people have been seeking to obtain more dignity, greater social justice and improved

economic conditions that enable them to achieve a better quality of life.

The Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey shows that respondents across all countries surveyed would like to see young people as a primary target group of measures to prevent and deal with conflict and radicalisation. When asked to evaluate the efficiency of various mechanisms to prevent and deal with conflict and radicalisation in the Euro-Mediterranean region, about 80% of respondents in both country groups believed that education and youth programmes that foster youth-led dialogue initiatives and supporting youth participation in public life would be an effective measure to deal with conflict and radicalisation. Also interesting to observe is that 73% of respondents in European countries and 81% of respondents in SEM countries answered that exchange programmes involving people across the Mediterranean would be an efficient mechanism to prevent and deal with conflict and radicalisation.

Indeed, young people represent a great potential for their region; this is exactly what the EuroMed Youth Programme has been promoting through its activities and initiatives, and this is what should continue to be stressed in the Erasmus+ programme. The EuroMed Youth Programme was established in 1999, based on the experience acquired with youth exchanges in Europe, while taking into account the needs of the Mediterranean partners. Organised within the framework of the Barcelona Process and the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Youth in Action Programme had four phases, of which the last one ended in 2016. The general aims of EuroMed Youth programmes, as specified

Chart 13.3 Barriers to cross-cultural encounters - Impact of having friends/relatives in SEM/European countries



in the programming document, were to facilitate the integration of young people into social and professional life and stimulate the democratisation of the civil society of the Mediterranean partners by encouraging active citizenship within local communities, promoting active participation of young people, and by developing the employability of those involved. By recognising the fundamental influence of youth within societies, a special focus on young people in the Mediterranean area has been provided and has thus been institutionalised starting from the framework of the Barcelona Process (1995). Not surprisingly, the Barcelona Declaration itself stresses that 'youth exchanges should be the means to prepare future generation for a closer cooperation between the Euro-Mediterranean partners'.

Bringing the shores of the Mediterranean closer together

Youth exchange requires the active participation of all groups of young people in the preparation and implementation of the activities, and it should support projects and activities in which young people from different cultural, religious and ethnic backgrounds can work together. The following keys are essential in supporting youth exchange projects:

Youth participation. Providing unique opportunities for young people to become active and responsible citizens in their societies through participation.

Intercultural dialogue and intercultural learning. The richness of European and Mediterranean societies lies in cultural diversity expressed by the variety of religious, ethnic and cultural groups and communities which have been present across the region for many centuries. In this context, intercultural dialogue and intercultural learning are essential to counter and overcome mutual prejudices and the clash of civilizations.

Democracy. Starting from the premise that democracy is also a form of teaching (in the etymological sense of 'bringing about'), we must accept that the components of democracy are diverse and that young people should be involved. Decision makers must be prepared to move beyond the trap of merely 'showcasing' and instead become vehicles for the expression of representative democracy, preparing the ground for a move to a real participatory democracy.

In the Euro-Mediterranean youth programmes, what caught the eye is that young people across different countries share similar problems and challenges. The Euro-Mediterranean youth programmes are proof that young people in most of the countries in the Euro-Mediterranean region are faced with many, often similar, challenges in their local realities. By sharing experiences, you can start tackling these challenges

and the Euro-Mediterranean community has tried to do this. After all, 'there are millions of young people in the world who have one thing in common: they are in the process of preparing for adult life, seeking to ensure economic independence and to become productive members of their societies. For that to succeed, young people require the support and the help of their families, the conditions to live in peace, access to educational and health facilities, and productive, enjoyable leisure time' (European Union Programme Agency).

The Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey highlighted some challenges for future exchanges between young people from both sides of the Mediterranean, but also showed us opportunities for such exchanges. A large share of respondents in the Survey thought that cross-cultural encounters are hampered by cultural differences and stereotypes, and these barriers would also be detrimental to youth exchanges. On the other hand, respondents across both sides of the Mediterranean believe in dialogue measures focusing on young people as an efficient way to help us live better together in a multi-cultural society and fight extremism. I would like to conclude with a thought that exchanges between young people from both sides of the Mediterranean make it possible to bring our two shores closer together and thus try to avoid what an illustrious 12th century Andalusian said and which unfortunately is the reality today: 'Ignorance leads to fear, fear leads to hate and hate leads to violence. That's the equation.' (Averroès: Lawyer, Mathematician, Physician, Philosopher, Scientist, Theologian (CE1126 - 1198).

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The social dimension of migration in Euro-Mediterranean countries

Ayman ZOHRY

Despite the dominance of migration discourse in the Euro-Mediterranean region, the social dimension of migration is still under-researched and less focussed on compared to the political and economic dimensions. In this article, Ayman Zohry analyses the ALF/Ipsos Survey findings on the attractiveness of Europe and the SEM region as places to live. Included in his commentary are the topics of living together in multi-cultural societies, individuals' acceptance of people with a different cultural background, and the impact of cross-cultural encounters on individuals' views.

With the increasing pace and volume of mobility due to political instability in the Mediterranean basin, as well as economic disparities between Europe and its southern neighbours, migration issues are at the heart of regional political and public discourse. Media reports and news coverage concerning migration issues may lead to a picture of the Mediterranean region as one characterised by tenacious migration issues. Although different people have different thoughts about what the Mediterranean region represents, many people do indeed associate the region with migration issues. Respondents in the Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey were asked to respond to seven ideas and images and whether they characterised the Mediterranean region strongly, somewhat or not at all. One of these ideas and images was 'migration issues'. The proportion of respondents who regarded the Mediterranean region as strongly characterised by migration issues was 44% in the European countries and 60% in the SEM countries. As for the country responses, this proportion ranges from 30% in France to 70% in Tunisia. Italy, 59%, and Algeria, 66%.

Despite this discourse about migration, the social dimension of migration for emigration countries/communities, on the one hand, and the arrival of immigrants and refugees in host countries on the other hand, is still under-researched and less focussed on compared to the political and economic dimensions of migration. Moreover, cross-cultural encounters, their mode and socio-cultural correlates are not explored enough to inform policy makers and allow them to incorporate such aspects in planning for more coherent migration policies in the region. The Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey provides valuable insight and the opportunity to explore the social dimension of migration. In the first part of this chapter an analysis is presented of the attractiveness of Europe and the SEM region as places to live, the remainder of the chapter moves on to the topic of living together in multi-

cultural societies and discusses the Survey's findings with respect to individuals' acceptance of people with a different cultural background and the impact of cross-cultural encounters on individuals' views.


The attractiveness of Europe and the SEM countries as places to live

In the second edition of the Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey, one author observed that a persistent misconception about the Mediterranean region is that a large proportion of citizens would like to leave their country in order to live somewhere else. In 2012, 58% of respondents in the SEM countries surveyed said that their country of residence would be their preferred place to start a new life; this figure was lower in the European countries surveyed, where 40% said that they would start a new life in their own country. Also in the current Survey, respondents in the SEM countries are more likely to want to start a new life in their own country (60%) than respondents in European countries (36%). Digging down to the individual country level shows that two of the SEM countries have the highest proportion of respondents who name their current country as their preferred country to start a new life: Israel (66%) and Algeria (65%). As for the European countries, Portugal has the highest proportion of respondents who would start a new life in their own country (48%), while the Netherlands reports the lowest proportion (12%) (Chart 14.1).

The proportion of respondents who would start a new life in their own country tells us something about the attractiveness of the surveyed countries as places to live – from the perspective of the residents of the countries. The Survey also allows us to analyse the attractiveness of European and SEM countries from the perspective of those who would prefer to leave their country and live somewhere else – this analysis consists of looking at the proportions of respondents who would start their life in another country and who name either a European or SEM

Chart 14.1

Country of residence as preferred place to start a new life, by country



country as their preferred place to start a new life (Chart 14.1). However, before proceeding with this analysis, it is worth examining the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents who would leave their country if given the possibility to start a new life.

Overall, the proportion of respondents who indicate that they would start a new life in another country was 39% in the SEM countries and 61% in the European countries. As for the variations by sex, one can notice that in both regions men are more likely than women to want to start a new life in another country. The relation between age and the desire to start a new life in another country is negative for both regions; the older one is, the less likely one is to wish to start a new life in another country. In both regions, education increases the aspiration to start a new life in another country. Lastly, with respect to employment status, the highest proportion that would start a new life in another country is found among students. In European countries, no difference is observed between employed, self-employed and unemployed respondents, while in SEM countries the

proportion who would start a new life in another country was higher for unemployed respondents, followed by employed respondents, and was lower for the self-employed.

Focussing solely on respondents who would leave their country if given the possibility to start a new life, Europe comes out as the most attractive place to start a new life. In the SEM countries, 38% of respondents who would prefer to start a new life in another country say that their country of choice would be a European one; at the individual country level, this proportion ranges from 26% in Jordan to 56% in Tunisia. The popularity of Europe is highest among young people in the SEM region, while older respondents would more frequently prefer to stay in the SEM region (or move to a Gulf country). The highest proportions of SEM respondents who would prefer to stay in the SEM region (although not in their current country) are found in Jordan (26%), Algeria (23%) and Palestine (21%).

Openness towards people from other cultural backgrounds and cross-cultural encounters

Migration is driven and motivated by migration networks, which help the (potential) migrants in setting their expectations about life in the host country. Countries can be very different in their openness to receive people from other cultural backgrounds, as the Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey illustrates. Tolerance towards people with a different cultural background was measured using four statements. For each following statement respondents were asked to state whether they would 'mind a lot,' 'mind a little,' or whether they would 'not mind too much,' or 'not mind at all': (I) Having a person from a different cultural background as a work colleague; (II) Having a person from a different cultural background as a neighbour; (III) If one of your close relatives were to marry someone from a different cultural background; (IV) If your children were to go to school with children from a different cultural background.

At first sight, the Survey findings show a high level of tolerance in both regions with the average proportion of 'not mind at all' responses ranging between 65% and 82% in Europe and between 60% and 75% in the SEM region. These average findings, however, hide a very large variation in the findings at the individual country level. For example, as for 'having a person from a different cultural background as a neighbour', the highest proportion of respondents who would 'not mind at all' was found in France (90%), followed by Portugal (89%) and Tunisia (80%), while Palestine ranks the lowest with 38% of respondents who would not mind at all having a neighbour with a different cultural background. Similarly, with respect to intercultural marriages, the highest proportion of respondents who would 'not mind at all' was found in Finland (82%), followed again by Portugal (78%) and Tunisia (76%), while Israel ranks the lowest (19% 'not mind at all' responses) (Chart 14.2).

Chart 14.2 Not minding at all cross-cultural interaction, by country



Survey question: I am now going to read out a number of scenarios. For each of them, please tell me whether you would mind a lot, mind a little, or whether you would not mind too much, or not mind at all. **Base:** all respondents (% 'would not mind at all'), by country (©Anna Lindh/Ipsos 2016).


Respondents in each region were also asked if they have talked to or met someone from the other region in the 12 months prior to the Survey. The results of the Anne Lindh/Ipsos Survey indicate that respondents in European countries are more likely to have cross-cultural encounters with 53% reporting having talked to or met someone from a SEM country in the past 12 months; in SEM countries, 35% of respondents have talked to or met someone from a European country. Among the European countries, Austria has the highest proportion of respondents who have talked to or met someone from an SEM country (66%) and Portugal the lowest (18%), while

among the SEM countries, Israel reports the highest proportion (46%) and Palestine the lowest (26%).

In the European countries, men are more likely to have talked to or met someone from a SEM country (58% versus 48% for women), while the age group with the most cross-cultural encounters is 30-49 year-olds (59% compared to, for example, 47% for 65+ year-olds). Cross-cultural encounters also increase with level of education; from 38% for poorly-educated respondents to 61% for respondents with university-level qualifications. Despite the lower level of cross-cultural encounters

Chart 14.3

Impact of cross-cultural encounters on perceptions about people from SEM/European countries



in SEM countries, differences in the likelihood of such encounters between socio-demographic groups follow the same pattern as in European countries.

A more important question in the context of this chapter, however, is whether meeting people from the other region has changed one's views – and if yes, was it in a positive or negative direction? Some 55% of respondents in the European countries indicate that their views remained unchanged after meeting people from SEM countries; 29% say that their views have changed positively, 12% report both positive and negative changes and only 3% answer that their views have changed in a negative way. As for respondents in the SEM countries, 48% indicate that their views have changed in a positive direction after meeting people from European countries and 12% say that some encounters with Europeans led to a positive change and others to a negative change, 33% have not changed their views, and 6% indicate that their views have changed negatively (Chart 14.3).

At the country level, Tunisia and Palestine report the highest proportion of respondents who say that meeting Europeans has changed their views about them in a positive way; countries with the lowest proportions are Poland and France (23% and 22% respectively). At the same time, France reports the highest proportion of respondents who indicate that their views remained unchanged (68%), while Poland is characterised by a higher number who report a negative change in views (15% 'both negative and positive' and 5% 'only negative'). Negative changes are also more frequently observed in Palestine, Jordan, Israel and Portugal.

Lessons learned from the Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey

In this chapter, an attempt was made to discuss findings from the Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey on Intercultural Trends that provide insight into the social dimension of

migration, which is usually under-researched compared to the political and economic dimensions of migration. The analysis can be summarised as follows:

First, migration issues have become central to public discourse in the region, and large proportions of respondents regard the Mediterranean region as being strongly characterised by migration issues. Second, it is a misconception that a large number of citizens in the Mediterranean region would like to leave their country in order to live somewhere else. In the SEM region, the popularity of Europe as a place to start a new life is highest among young people, while older respondents more frequently would stay in the SEM region (or move to a Gulf country). Third, the countries included in the Survey are very different in their openness towards people from other cultural backgrounds. The level of tolerance towards people from different cultural backgrounds was highest in countries such as Portugal and France, but was considerably lower in Poland, Jordan, Israel and Palestine. Fourth, respondents in European countries are more likely to have encounters with people from SEM countries – encounters with Europeans were less frequent in SEM countries. Cross-cultural encounters in European countries tend to have no impact on respondents' views, while such encounters in SEM countries were more likely to have a positive impact. In Palestine, Jordan, Israel, Poland and Portugal more respondents report that their encounters with people from the other region changed their views in a negative way.

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Narratives old and new: the role of translation in intercultural dialogue today

Alexandra BUCHLER

Translation was identified by the Anna Lindh Foundation as being central to intercultural dialogue. Analysing the trends of mutual interest across the region, the patterns of intercultural encounters, and the mounting centrality of digital media in the cultural realm, Alexandra Büchler highlights the need to diversify translation policy in the region, putting youth and new media at the centre of the process, and devising new tools and narratives that can elicit empathy and provide a better understanding of the question of co-existence.

The Anna Lindh Foundation/Ipsos Intercultural Trends Survey has, with its third edition, turned into a longitudinal study tracing the development of mutual perceptions of people living on both sides of the Mediterranean over the past eight years; a period characterised by tumultuous transformations following the financial crash and economic recession, regime changes across the Arab world, the refugee crisis, and the rise of religious fundamentalism on the one hand and right-wing populism on the other.

Looking back at how perceptions of the Mediterranean and regional cooperation have developed over time, among the most encouraging findings is the belief, expressed across the region, that the Union for the Mediterranean and the Neighbourhood Policy would generally bring benefits. The region continues to be associated with positive notions, such as hospitality, but it is also perceived as a source of conflict and a site of turmoil and insecurity. Not surprisingly, association of

the Mediterranean with migration issues became one of the leading characteristics in the most recent poll.

While these perceptions reflect the troubled reality of recent years, one of the most significant findings is that the media are seen as contributing to a negative, rather than positive image of the region, and that their impact on changing views and perceptions is at best limited. At the same time, the high number of Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) respondents reporting not having 'seen, read or heard anything in the media' about Europe is disconcerting and raises questions about the reliability of mainstream media as a source of balanced information.

Continued interest in the opposite side of the Mediterranean

While none of the questions in the 2016 Survey refer specifically to cultural activities in the narrower sense,

Chart 15.1

Interest in news and information about cultural life and lifestyle in SEM/European countries





Chart 15.2

Most trusted media sources for cross-cultural reporting, by age group



the findings are relevant to the fields of art, culture and translation, particularly where they are based on questions about interest in cultural life, sources of news and information, cross-cultural encounters, and modes of interaction between individuals from European and SEM countries.

Encouragingly, a high proportion of European respondents reported being ‘very interested’ or ‘somewhat interested’ in cultural life and lifestyle of SEM countries, and, while interest in the opposite direction somewhat trails behind, mutual interest is clearly high and shows an increase across the region since the first Poll (Chart 15.1).


The question to ask therefore is whether direct cultural experience and involvement could contribute to a positive change in mutual perceptions and a deeper mutual understanding where media reporting fails to do so. As the earlier reports confirm, there is a growing ‘appetite for mutual knowledge’ and ‘demand for exchanges, mobility and personal contact’. While cultural relations have historically played a role as a soft power tool, what will help meet this demand is not a ‘top-down vision’, but a sense of ownership of the common space and of the policies affecting it. In other words, a meaningful, sustainable engagement driven by civil society is what is called for in situations of rapid political change that may occasionally fuel distrust in state-structures and require equally rapid responses from the ground bypassing the slow-moving wheels of state bureaucracy. And this is precisely where the Anna Lindh Foundation can continue playing a role by mobilising and connecting civil society networks to communicate, reflect and collaborate on culture-powered social change.

Translation as a pivotal activity for dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean region

In its previous programme cycle, the Anna Lindh Foundation identified translation as being central to intercultural dialogue when, in the 2010 Report, Thierry Fabre advocated the circulation of ‘thoughts and literature’ that would be best achieved by a ‘vast and thoughtful translation initiative, built on reciprocity and in the framework of multilateral perspective’ and stated that a ‘policy of inter-knowledge, based on translation, is a strategic priority’. In the same year, the Anna Lindh Foundation commissioned a large study of translation flows in the region. The study, launched in 2012, mapped translation between 57 language pairs, taking into account not only statistics, but, importantly, the ‘various aspects and actors of translation, including authors, translators, publishers, book sellers, librarians, critics and funding donors’. It also paid attention to transversal questions such as translation of various genres from fiction and non-fiction, to books for children and theatre, shedding light on the ‘challenges of translation from economic, cultural and political perspective’.

The study was intended to provide a basis for future research and continued debates on the subject, with the ultimate aim of formulating a Euro-Mediterranean Translation Programme. The individual studies resulting from the mapping can be found on the website of the project coordinator, Transeuropéennnes, while the summary can be downloaded from the Anna Lindh Foundation website. Conferences, projects and meetings organised by the key partners in the project (Transeuropéennnes, Literature Across Frontiers and the Next Page Foundation) contributed not only to continued in-depth reflection on how to best foster translation in the region but, crucially, to the networking necessary for the building of future contacts and initiatives.

Chart 15.3 Cross-cultural encounters: method of interaction



In June 2016, the Translation4Dialogue Conference was held in the Slovenian coastal town of Piran, heralding the next phase in the process of formulating a future programme. While the mapping placed an emphasis on translation of human sciences as a conduit for the transfer of knowledge, often reflecting the academic orientation of the researchers and project leaders, the 2016 conference was attended by organisations and individuals involved in writing, translation, publishing and projects on the ground. Numerous issues ranging from the need to bring people together in face-to-face encounters to the importance of targeting children and youth were highlighted, as were matters of skill development and training of the next generation of writers, translators, publishers, editors, and cultural operators — the key actors who would in turn make interventions at different levels. The Manifesto for Translation issued by the conference highlighted the role of translators as ‘irreplaceable conveyors of works and knowledge, the messengers vital to our cultures’, and called for an ambitious Euro-Mediterranean policy to support translation. However, in the absence of dedicated funding, how feasible is such a policy and what should it prioritise?

Acknowledging the digital shift


One of the significant findings of the most recent Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey is that it confirms the rise in the importance of the internet both as a source of news and information and as a medium for interaction between individuals in Europe and SEM countries, particularly among the younger generation, with print media and books ranking relatively low (Chart 15.2).

When it comes to the method of interaction in cross-cultural encounters reported by the Survey, we see a dramatic variation with the highest level of encounters in public spaces reported by Europeans, followed by encounters in business, neighbourhood and schools. Contact on the internet and social media, followed by tourism, ranked highest on the part of SEM countries with the highest incidence of encounters reported by the younger age group (Chart 15.3 and 15.4). The internet is clearly of immense importance, particularly for the youth in SEM countries, who now have less opportunities for direct contact with the increase in travel restrictions in both directions amid security concerns and rigid visa procedures.

The impact of personal contact on views about the other group of countries again varies with almost half of SEM respondents reporting a positive change, while the same percentage of Europeans report no change as they do also in response to the impact of media. Understandably, language is considered to be the most significant barrier to cross-cultural encounters, followed by cultural differences, but the level of tolerance, particularly on the part of European residents, is encouraging and contradicts the picture often painted by popular media. On the whole, respondents from SEM countries come across as more conservative but also curious about Europe and open to the positive impact of personal encounters. There are also some constructive inferences to be gleaned from responses to questions about levels of tolerance towards other cultures and, in particular, responses suggesting that ‘schools are places where children can learn to live in diversity’.

Chart 15.4

Contact on internet and social media as method of interaction in cross-cultural encounters, by region and socio-demographic groups



Survey question: Thinking of this/these person(s) you have interacted with, was this mainly through: **Base:** respondents who have talked to or met someone from a SEM/European country in the past 12 months (% 'Chatting on the internet, social media, twitter, etc.'). by region and socio-demographic groups. (©Anna Lindh/Ipsos Poll 2016).

Strategy for translation in Euro-Mediterranean region: a multi-faceted approach to diversity

The conclusions we can draw from the Anna Lindh/Ipsos Intercultural Trends Survey is that a translation policy for a region as diverse as the Euro-Mediterranean clearly cannot be a blanket one and it cannot privilege one medium alone. The vision of a 'vast translation initiative', advanced in earlier reflections on the subject, does not take into consideration the variety on the ground, whether in terms of cultural and linguistic milieus and markets, or barriers to communication, dissemination and interaction. Nor does its focus on translation of books reflect the need for a broader intercultural dialogue and the implications of the digital shift.

In planning a strategy for translation in the Euro-Mediterranean region, a number of examples of good practice could be elaborated into case studies and analysed to isolate the building blocks of a possible future policy. Successful initiatives in Europe, for instance, include the following: showcasing contemporary culture and literature from the Arab world by the biennial Shubbak Festival in London with an audience of 50,000; the work

of Al Fanar Foundation for Arab Knowledge in Spain with its focus on comics and graphic novels generated by youth and reflecting the multi-cultural nature of today's Spanish society; the short term training models for literary translators developed by Literature Across Frontiers and the Sofia-based Next Page Foundation. Methodologies could be inspired by various documented schools outreach projects operating in a flexible, ad hoc manner, as opposed to attempts to influence an entire curriculum. Facilitating networking and encounters between independent cultural operators to generate new collaborative projects and embedding funding allocations within existing grant programmes, rather than hoping for the unlikely emergence of new funding streams, are the kinds of realistic approaches that would meet the needs of a rapidly shifting cultural, social and political terrain, and are likely to succeed by virtue of their inherent adaptability.

Youth is undoubtedly the central and most urgent target of any initiatives aiming to spark conversations that could eventually combine into a dialogue across the Euro-Mediterranean region. Shifting the focus from the translation of books and printed texts to a broader engagement encompassing a wide use of digital and audio-visual media and interaction with communities and audiences is the way forward if we want the written and spoken word to inspire the younger generation.

Finally, acknowledging the power of creative writing to elicit empathy and understanding, and taking into consideration the growing presence of literary creators and artists from SEM countries in Europe, must become another item on the agenda of a translation policy aiming to foster dialogue. Not only do they tell stories that are of immediate importance to perceptions of their culture of origin but they offer insight into the causes of the refugee crisis and into the migrant experience itself, devising new narratives for our time that can provide an imaginative blueprint for a better understanding of questions surrounding co-existence with immigrant communities and reversing stereotypes.

Alexandra BUCHLER is Director of Literature Across Frontiers.

Creative social entrepreneurship for cohesion and development

Teresa BEAN

Through this article Teresa Bean draws on examples of good practice and data from the ALF/IPSOS Survey and aims to illustrate how creative social enterprises can provide an arena for intercultural dialogue. The author outlines how creative social enterprises can provide innovative solutions to social issues and concludes by making a series of recommendations to encourage the development of creative social enterprise in the Euro-Mediterranean region.

The paper seeks to provide an overview of social enterprise in the Euro-Mediterranean region with a focus on social enterprise in the creative sector. This brief aims to illustrate how creative social enterprise can provide an arena for intercultural dialogue. Drawing on examples of good practice and data from the ALF/Ipsos Survey on Intercultural Trends in the Euro-Mediterranean region, the paper will review the current landscape. The paper will conclude by making recommendations for supporting the creative social enterprise ecosystem in the Euro-Mediterranean region. In doing so this paper hopes to provoke reflection and debate on the potential of creative social enterprise as a pathway for intercultural dialogue, collaborative action and youth participation in the Euro-Mediterranean region.

What is social enterprise? And creative social enterprise?

Social enterprises encompass a number of business entities operating across sectors, accorded diverse legal status and presenting with diverse organizational structures. There are a number of definitions utilised in Europe, the US and beyond. Therefore, for the purposes of simplification social enterprise will be defined in this paper as an entity that is primarily driven by the pursuit of social innovation and social change in various sectors. However, it is important to stress that social enterprises engage in trading and commercial activities to generate revenue to realise these social objectives.

The European Commission applies the term 'social enterprise' to cover the following types of businesses: those for whom the social or societal objective of the common good is the reason for the commercial activity, often in the form of a high level of social innovation; those where profits are mainly reinvested with a view to achieving this social objective; those where the method of organisation or ownership system reflects the enterprise's mission, using democratic or participatory

principles or focusing on social justice (European Commission, Social Enterprise, 2017). Therefore social enterprise is an umbrella term to describe entities that are driven by a social mission. Thus, co-operatives, fair trade organizations and community enterprises are examples of social enterprises.

Whilst social enterprises operate across all economic sectors, this paper is focused on social enterprises in the creative and cultural sectors. Creative social enterprises are entities whose activities are situated in the creative industries and whose mission is to provide innovative solutions to social issues. Whilst there are several definitions of what constitutes the 'creative industries' (sometimes referred to as the cultural industries), there is broad agreement that the sector encompasses a wide range of creative disciplines. These include, but are not limited to fashion, music, theatre, film, literature, design, media, digital sectors, architecture, radio and television.

Approaches and results

Creative expression is a natural arena to facilitate dialogue and debate as it enables people to communicate ideas, express emotions or share experiences in a safe space or in a way that may not be possible with words. It can also provoke reflection on how people think, act and internalise their reality and understand the reality of others (Helguera, 2011, Kester, 2004, Kester, 2011, Kester, 2012, Koh, 2015 and Thompson, 2012). As UNESCO's 2015 report on cultural policy states, 'creative arts are a powerful mechanism to facilitate sustainable development at a societal level. In particular, creative art can promote integration, break down social barriers and facilitate intercultural dialogue among diverse groups' (UNESCO, 2015, 157).

A social enterprise as an entity is primarily driven by the achievement of social or environmental objectives. Thus, combining creativity with a desire to drive social

innovation through enterprise provide a suitable model for intercultural dialogue in the region. Creative social enterprises can serve as an effective pathway to promote intercultural dialogue, shared values and cultural awareness. It is important to stress the value of creative arts beyond the economic and consider creativity as a vehicle for cultural and social development.

A number of creative social enterprises in the Euro-Mediterranean region serve as a representative case in point. They highlight the value of creative social enterprise in promoting intercultural dialogue, social cohesion and civic participation.

Creative Space Beirut is a fashion design school in Lebanon that promotes economic participation for the most marginalised sectors of society. The school provides a free three-year programme to students who are not able to gain an education due to their financial circumstances. In providing free education, Creative Space Beirut seeks to break the cycles of poverty for its students by providing them with the necessary skills to make a living from fashion for themselves and their families. In this way, the school hopes that the education the students receive will positively impact not only on themselves, but also their families and the wider communities. The school seeks to break down economic and social barriers by facilitating the integration of marginalised groups through their education programmes. Several of the school's alumni have gained employment in the fashion industry, set up their own businesses or pursued Masters programmes in the Middle East and Europe.

Drop Earrings Not Bombs is a creative social enterprise that promotes the integration of Syrian refugees living in Turkey. The refugees produce handmade earrings which are sold online and the profits go back into supporting refugee communities in Istanbul. The project not only provides refugee families with an income but also provides training and employment opportunities to enable refugees to rebuild their lives in Turkey.

In Place Of War is a social enterprise based at the University of Manchester, UK. The organisation supports creative communities in sites of conflict, post conflict and marginalised communities through training, networking, collaborative projects and mobilization opportunities.

Voices, an international music project that brings together artists from Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and Asia, perform and take part in panel discussions in the UK. These performances and public discussions promote intercultural dialogue and cultural awareness for both the artists involved and the general public. Feedback from artists involved in the project in 2016 stated that the project had enabled them to learn about different cultures and gain a greater understanding of issues facing communities in other parts of the world. The importance of mobility and collaboration of artists is also supported by UNESCO's report on cultural policy which considers artist mobility to be 'crucial to maintaining a heterogeneous world of ideas, values and world views' (UNESCO, 2015, 14).

Multi-cultural events as the way forward for social cohesion

Citizens in Europe and the Southern Mediterranean also share the assertion that entrepreneurship and cultural expression can provide a pathway to promote diversity and multi-culturalism, as the results of a recent survey demonstrate. The Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey was conducted in eight European countries (Austria, Croatia, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands Poland and Portugal) and five SEM (Sothern and Eastern Mediterranean) countries (Algeria, Israel, Jordan, Palestine and Tunisia). The Survey involved a thousand participants per country who were invited to undertake a survey via telephone (except in Israel and Palestine whereby face-to-face interviews were conducted). From the data, it is apparent that citizens over 15 years old are in broad agreement that cultural and religious diversity is important for the prosperity of society. Amongst the

Chart 16.1 Living better together in multicultural environments: enabling cultural expression in public spaces and organising multicultural events





Chart 16.2

Efficiency of mechanisms to prevent and deal with conflicts and radicalisation: cultural and artistic initiatives



European respondents, 71% and 72% of participants from the Southern Mediterranean strongly agreed with this statement.

In terms of promoting diversity and multi-cultural societies, a majority of participants from both Europe (82%) and Southern Mediterranean (82%) countries considered that the promotion of multi-cultural events is an efficient way of facilitating social cohesion. Equally, the promotion of cultural diversity in public spaces was regarded as an effective tool in fomenting multiculturalism, with respondents in Europe (67%) and Southern Mediterranean (80%) in agreement (Chart 16.1). Given these results, it is apparent that the creative arts as a vehicle for the promotion of intercultural awareness align with citizens' attitudes towards multiculturalism and social cohesion.

In the same vein, on the question of tackling radicalisation, the Survey results also support the case for the promotion of creative social entrepreneurship in the region. 82% of respondents from the Southern Mediterranean and 74% of participants from Europe agreed that cultural and artistic initiatives were effective in dealing with radicalisation. Equally, over 80% of respondents considered that education and youth programmes were efficient in fostering youth-led dialogue (Chart 16.2 and 16.3). The Survey data clearly illustrates the public's support for creative arts initiatives and training for youth as tool for intercultural dialogue. Thus, it could be assumed that the general public would broadly support the development of youth-led creative social enterprise.

Concrete steps for development in the field

Drawing on the Survey data, examples of good practice and current literature, it is apparent that

creative social enterprise could play a pivotal role in promoting intercultural dialogue and tackling shared social and environmental challenges faced across the Euro-Mediterranean region. Whilst there are some key indicators of an enabling environment for the development of creative social enterprises (such as public support evidenced by the Survey data and institutional buy-in illustrated by the policies and strategies, including EU Creative Europe, the social businesses initiatives and UNESCO Cultural Policy), significant challenges remain. Given this, the paper will conclude by making a series of recommendations to encourage the development of creative social enterprise in the Euro-Mediterranean region.


Drafting a working definition of creative social enterprise. Firstly, it is apparent the term 'creative social enterprise' is not well understood given the diverse definitions and interpretations of the terms 'social enterprise' and 'creative or cultural industries'. This lack of clarity has contributed to a limiting environment in some countries that has hindered the development of creative social enterprises.

It is therefore necessary to draft a working definition that is accessible in a range of languages and for diverse stakeholders (governments, intergovernmental institutions, civic society organizations, the general public, young people and artists). Coining a universally understood term will facilitate the development of creative social enterprise and promote visibility.

Improving access to finance for creative social enterprises. Co-operation with private sectors, government stakeholders and intergovernmental entities is required to improve new forms of finance that respond to the needs of creative social enterprises, such as long term social investment or start-up funding.

Chart 16.3

Preventing and dealing with conflicts and radicalisation via cultural and artistic initiatives, by country



Survey question: Many countries, in Europe and in the countries on the southern and eastern Mediterranean shores, are facing challenges, such as conflicts and radicalisation. How efficient do you think that each of the following mechanisms will be in preventing and dealing with these challenges?
Base: all respondents (%), by country. (©Anna Lindh/Ipsos Poll 2016).

Increasing awareness of creative social enterprises as a tool for intercultural dialogue to secure stakeholder buy-in. In order to attract private and public investment and improved legal conditions for creative social enterprises, greater visibility and awareness is required. Equally, an ability to effectively communicate, not only the economic but also the benefits of creative social enterprise to promote intercultural dialogue and cultural awareness, is paramount in encouraging creative social entrepreneurship in the region.


Enhancing local capacity and IT infrastructure. Collaborating with educational institutions and civic organizations to embed a culture of creative social enterprise and develop entrepreneurial skills is key to

supporting the development of social enterprise amongst youth. Courses such as In Place of War’s Creative and Social Entrepreneur Programme provide a suitable introduction to creative social enterprise. Equally, engagement with the private sector is also essential in providing support, access to markets, knowledge and mentoring for creative social enterprises. Furthermore, ensuring youth have access to the appropriate digital tools is paramount to developing creative social enterprises.

Improved financial, legal and regulatory environments. Advocacy strategies are required to tackle the constraints of regulation. This is particularly pressing in the Southern Mediterranean where creative social enterprises do not enjoy special legal status and business start-up is often complex, time consuming and costly.

Development of diverse networks. Establishing cross sector regional networks is crucial to the development of creative social enterprises. These networks can provide a space for intercultural dialogue between youth in the Southern Mediterranean and their counterparts in Europe. Furthermore, engagement with the private sector is also vital in facilitating support, access to markets, knowledge and mentoring for creative social enterprises.

Teresa BEAN is Head of Research and Education at In Place of War.



TRENDS IN FOCUS

France's renewed interest in the Euro-Mediterranean region

Taynja ABDEL BAGHY

Taynja Abdel Baghy explains that the third wave of the Anna Lindh Report was commissioned amid a challenging context in France and analyses how the French perceive the Mediterranean region, the intercultural relations in their own society and across the Mediterranean, and the roles they expect the European Neighborhood Policy to play. She concludes that the French survey respondents retain beliefs in the notions of living together 'vivre ensemble', tolerance and meritocracy, and place hope in youth, education, and regional cooperation.

In the eight years since the last opinion poll on Intercultural Trends was conducted in France, several events have influenced the political debate. At the European level, populist movements have gained influence, including most notably the European elections of 2014 with France's Front National leading the Eurosceptic surge. The decision of the UK to leave the European Union (EU) following its June 2016 referendum has also had an impact on French citizens' perceptions of the EU. At the Mediterranean level, the involvement of France in the international coalition against the organisation of the so called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the phenomenon of foreign fighters of French origin have been widely covered in the media. And since 2015, no less than three major terrorist attacks have occurred on French soil. It is in this rather troubled context that the third wave of the Anna Lindh /Ipsos Intercultural Trends Survey was commissioned and carried out during the period from September to November 2016.

How do French citizens perceive the Mediterranean region?

The French characterisation of the Mediterranean region has evolved, but preserves key features, as compared to the 2009 results. Compared to citizens in other European and SEM countries, the French are less likely to perceive the Mediterranean as a region characterised by instability and insecurity (40% of the sample selected the 'not characterise at all' response) or as a source of conflict (41%). The first responses that come to French citizens' minds are a shared way of life and food, their common cultural heritage and a sense of hospitality. If we compare these 2016 perceptions to those of 2009, the French have evolved throughout the years into perceiving the region less in terms of a source of conflict (41% of respondents in 2016 selected the 'not characterise at all' response, compared to 27% in 2009) or as a region resistant to change (respectively, 35% in

Chart 17.1 Perceptions about religious and cultural diversity in France





Chart 17.2

Key values when raising children in France



2016 and 25% in 2009). This shift in perceptions may perhaps be due to the Arab Spring that has shaken many SEM countries since 2011.

Key changes in the perceptions of intercultural relations

Since 2009, France has seen a reinforcement of the French concept of *vivre-ensemble* (living-together) and of the concept of 'integration' as opposed to 'multi-culturalism'. The French's perceptions about religious and cultural diversity are a first indicator of the reinforcement of these concepts. Roughly 9 out of 10 respondents in France think that religious and cultural diversity should not restrict people to have the same rights and opportunities. One in two French strongly object to the statement that cultural and religious diversity constitutes a threat to the stability of society and 69% believe that cultural and religious diversity is important for the prosperity of the society (Chart 17.1). An event at a Southern France public beach in the summer of 2016 when a middle-aged woman was forced by police agents to remove her headscarf (burkini), caused vivid emotions across France (and beyond) and revealed the French ambivalent political management of this respect of religious and cultural diversity.

An overwhelming majority of French respondents also reply that they would not mind at all to have someone from a different cultural background as work colleague or neighbour, or that their children would go to school with children from a different cultural background (between 82% and 92% would 'not mind at all'). But when considering the possibility of a family member marrying someone from a different cultural background, 19% of respondents admit that they would be troubled by this possibility. This number represents an important feature of the French society's approach to intercultural

exchanges, but nonetheless should be placed in the right context; one should keep in mind that the French's response is similar to the response observed in other European countries (19% would mind 'a little' or even 'a lot') and is better than the response observed in SEM countries (27% on average across all SEM countries surveyed).

With regard to values transmitted when raising children, a key value for respondents in France is a respect for other cultures (mentioned by 66% of respondents as first or second most important value), while religious beliefs and practices are not a key value (selected by just 6%). This value of tolerance is not only central to the French way of parenting, but also to the values of independence and curiosity. Although a sense of family solidarity remains important, fewer respondents select this value in 2012 than in 2009 (a drop of 9 percentage points); a similar decrease is also observed for the value of obedience, while the value of curiosity gains importance (from 18% in 2009 to 34% in 2012) (Chart 17.2).

French cultivate a sustained and careful interest in today's Euro-Mediterranean region

In today's Euro-Mediterranean region, the French show a rather high level of interest (superior to the level observed in 2009) in the cultural life and lifestyle, political situation and economic conditions in SEM countries (between 71% and 77% of respondents indicate being at least somewhat interested). They are nevertheless less prone to cultivate an interest in the religious beliefs and practices of SEM countries. The Survey findings show the French's interest in religious beliefs does not follow the trend of an increased interest in various other aspects of the lives of people in SEM countries, and this lack of interest can certainly be explained by the strong secularist culture of France.

As for whether it can be expected that media coverage causes a change in French views about people from SEM countries, the Survey results show that, in fact, a slim majority (53%) of French respondents report that their views about people in SEM countries have not been influenced by the media. One must keep in mind that the most trusted media sources of the French are, in order of importance: print media, TV, films and documentaries, and then radio and books. Online and social media are trusted by fewer respondents in France (just 18% and 14%, of respondents, respectively, select these as 'most trusted sources'); moreover, trust in online and social media seems to be lower in France than in other European countries and SEM countries. If respondents report that their views about SEM people have been influenced by something they have seen, read or heard in the media, this change in views is more likely to have been in a negative (15%) than in a positive direction (7%). Indeed, the media coverage of the Arab Spring and its aftermath, including various deadly episodes, has left its mark on French perceptions. Adding the multiple terrorist attacks that have been widely covered in the media, the French seem to show more distrust towards online-shared information.

The French's sustained interest in the Euro-Mediterranean region also materialises through their views of cooperation in the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). In a context of a crisis of trust in the EU, with only 38% of respondents in a 2016 Euractiv survey saying they had confidence in the EU, one may expect that the French also expect few gains from the ENP. Nonetheless, the French believe that


their society will definitely gain from cooperation in the framework of ENP in the areas of entrepreneurship, innovation and youth employment (44%), education and training (50%), support for NGOs and civil society organisations (48%) and prevention of extremism (52%).

Regarding the possibilities to improve the response to refugee crisis, only few gains are expected through the ENP (with even 28% of respondents expecting no gain at all). Additionally, the country has been challenged, especially in border areas such as the Northern border with the UK, where the so-called 'Calais jungle' is located. On the topic of environmental sustainability, which was high on the French agenda in 2015 with the organisation of the Paris climate change conference (COP 21), the level of skepticism (20%) as to whether gains can be expected from cooperation in the framework of the ENP is in fact higher than the average levels observed in European countries (17%) and SEM countries (12%).

The youth, an instrumental and trusted resource for the Euro-Mediterranean

An interesting trend that can be observed throughout the Survey is the hope that the French place in the youth and this is in several domains. This can principally be explained by the fact that education is seen as the main resource to foster change, nurtured by the French cardinal belief in the republican school (l'école républicaine) and in the 'meritocracy'. When asked about the types of action that can help people live better together in a multicultural environment, more than 8 out of 10 respondents in France believe in the opportunity

Chart 17.3 French views about actions that can help people live better together in multicultural environments



of making schools places where children learn how to live in diversity. The French seem to believe first and foremost in the power of education, whose mission is perceived as to enable people, regardless of their social, cultural and religious background, to get access to better economic opportunities as well as to help people live better together. An important finding of the Survey is also that an investment in youth appears as the first solution that the French respondents select to prevent and deal with conflicts and radicalisation (Chart 17.3). This finding is an indicator of the level of hope that French citizens still place in the youth, even in a context where thousands of young French people have become foreign fighters for ISIS. The fact that several national 'deradicalisation' programmes have been implemented with mixed results may have reaffirmed the idea in many respondents' minds that prevention may be the most efficient approach to deal with these complex and sensitive issues.

To sum up, in a Western Europe undergoing a crisis of political confidence and liberal values, and in an atmosphere of distrust towards the European Union, French respondents seem to draw a portrait of France in the Euro-Mediterranean region as a country that is still interested in this region. Citizens in France appear as keen to engage in intercultural relations with countries of the Euro-Mediterranean region as they did eight years ago, although they do seem to demonstrate a certain number of key features of their identity in a much more affirmed way now. Their belief in the key notions of living together (*vivre-ensemble*), tolerance and meritocracy have sharpened over the years, withstanding several brutal episodes disrupting the grounds of those beliefs. The impact of the Arab Spring and its aftermath have not contributed to a more negative perception of the SEM countries as one could have expected. France does seem to be much more challenged, however, by the impacts of the migration and refugee crisis, which have shaken visions of integration in France.

While the rate of youth unemployment in France is still high (25% of young people aged 18-25 are unemployed, source: INSEE), French citizens still hold a high degree of hope for the future and see youth as the most instrumental resource to overcome the challenges facing the Euro-Mediterranean region, in socio-economic areas but also in terms of intercultural understanding. To do so, the French cultivate values of educational development, curiosity and independence. This is a field in which the European Neighbourhood Policy still seems to be a reliable tool, and the French distrust towards the EU is contrasted by their pragmatic interest in Euro-Mediterranean policies in the field of economic, social and educational affairs. Although the southern and eastern Mediterranean region may not represent the Eldorado for French respondents (few respondents in France state that, if given a choice, they would start a

new life in a SEM country), the region is also not viewed as a source of discontentment or fear. Instead, in the past eight years, French citizens have grown a revived positive relation with the Mediterranean countries and their culture and share more features than before with other European countries and with SEM countries in intercultural understanding.

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Italian hospitality in the face of rising migratory flows

Khalid CHAOUKI

Khalid Chaouki notices the increase in the percentage of Italian respondents who think that the Mediterranean region is strongly characterised by instability and conflict compared to 2012 and to the rest of the surveyed European countries. Nevertheless, the author also explains that Italian respondents are more prone to accept diversity, recognise the potential gains of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and emphasises the role of schools as spaces to stimulate dialogue and knowledge especially in light of the increased migratory waves.


The Romans called the Mediterranean ‘Mare Nostrum’ — they defined it in this way to reaffirm their imperialistic will and their desire to extend their empire further southward and across the Mediterranean Sea. After two thousand years this scenario has changed profoundly and instead of a unique political unity, we see how the two shores of the Mediterranean are no longer united under one power, but have fallen apart in a series of independent states. In recent years, the two shores of the Mediterranean are going through complex times – tough for different reasons – and the solution does not seem to be at hand. The Mediterranean region undergoes new conflicts that require, more than ever, more effective and coordinated responses by the international community to work on the restoration of peace and socio-economic development in the whole region.

Italians are more aware than ever of this reality, and the Anna Lindh/Ipsos Intercultural Trends Survey shows

an increase, compared to 2012, in the percentage of respondents in Italy who think that the Mediterranean region is strongly characterised by instability and turmoil (from 23% in 2012 to 35% in 2016, and compared to 26% on average across the EU countries surveyed in 2016) and should be seen as a source of conflict (from 24% in 2012 to 33% in 2016, and compared to 25% on average across the EU countries surveyed) (Chart 18.1).

It is the job of everyone to find solutions to this crisis that is now ongoing for several years and to keep the channels of dialogue and communication open between the southern and northern shores of the Mediterranean. Compared to other European people interviewed in the Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey, Italians are more inclined to be convinced of the potential gains of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation especially in relation to the promotion of more gender equality, education opportunities and respect for cultural diversity and prevention of extremism. Between


Chart 18.1 Italians' views about what characterises the Mediterranean region



Survey question: Different people have different thoughts about what the Mediterranean region represents. I will read out a set of ideas and images; please tell me if you think these characterise the Mediterranean region strongly, somewhat or not at all. **Base:** all respondents (%), European countries, by age group (©Anna Lindh/Ipsos 2016).

Chart 18.2

Italians' views about the efficiency of mechanisms to prevent and deal with conflicts and radicalisation



the data gathered in 2012 and 2016, we also observe an important increase among Italians in the belief that the Euro-Mediterranean project can bring gains to the populations in the region.

Peace in the Mediterranean region is the safest foundation for building a society based on respect for diversity and for guaranteeing a culture and education that focus on childhood and children's needs. Education is indeed the most powerful weapon against any kind of radicalisation but also against Islamophobia, because it promotes a sense of cohesion and collective growth within a horizon of shared values. The Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey finds that 64% of respondents in Italy, compared to a European average of 44%, consider education and youth-led initiatives an efficient way to tackle and prevent radicalisation. Respondents in Italy also believe in the value of youth participation in public life (60% think this is an efficient tool) and in the value of cultural and artistic initiatives (50%) when fighting radicalisation (Chart 18.2).

It is clear now that violent radicalisation is the result of ignorance and poverty; two factors that prevent us from imagining a future and that favour a spiral of violence and fear that we now have to interrupt. Poverty, unemployment (especially youth unemployment), corruption, social exclusion and inequality are the root causes of violent radicalisation. These phenomena concern us because we see that they are gaining ground and especially

affect younger generations, posing a serious threat to the security of people and the stability of countries.

For this reason, I think it is necessary to develop shared strategies to prevent violent radicalisation. The strategy we have to develop must be global but also specific, because it will have to take into account the particular conditions of each country. In this regard, I believe that cooperation between the states to the south and the north of the Mediterranean plays a central role. Economically, the two sides of the Mediterranean have long been more interconnected than most people might think (it is enough to think of the many European companies – and above all Italian ones – operating in North Africa, building infrastructure, schools and hospitals, and creating employment in the field). This may also be an explanation of high level of interest that Italians have, compared to their European counterparts, in news and information about cultural life and lifestyle in southern and eastern Mediterranean countries (35% vs. an average across the EU countries surveyed of 28%), about the political situation in these countries (31% vs. 28% respectively) and their economic conditions (26% vs. 23% respectively).

In this context, cooperation means building bridges of dialogue and exchanges of know-how, sharing common values of respect for human rights and cultural differences, and finally, establishing the foundation for

a healthy Mediterranean economy that considers youth employment as a value and an asset to preserve. This is because a satisfied and accomplished young person is someone that we have managed to keep away from desperation, which often leads to radicalisation. I believe that it is from young people that the future of Mediterranean societies will start again. They are structurally more open to the understanding of other cultures, they are more interconnected, and able to confront serenely with peers from other countries by putting aside prejudice. It is therefore a task of the younger generations to build an integrated society, capable of ending wars and conflicts, enhancing work and guaranteeing workers' rights.

But all of this this can only be accomplished by overcoming fears and ideological flaws, and by practicing a constant and conscious dialogue. The conflicts we have witnessed in recent years, from the Arab Uprisings to the Syria Civil War (that unfortunately still creates victims), have caused a massive exodus of people to Europe. We are talking about a serious humanitarian crisis of enormous proportions, an emergency that has mainly affected countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea that are already burdened by the migratory consequences of previous conflicts, and that have to deal with these situations nearing collapse, often without receiving adequate economic and logistical support.


Since 18 October 2013, Italy has been at the forefront with the 'Mare Nostrum operation'; this has been the largest humanitarian rescue operation ever carried out by a government and continued until 31 October 2014. The operation included personnel as well as sea and air assets of the Navy, Air Force, Carabinieri, Financial Police, Harbour Masters Corps, Coast Guard, personnel of the Italian Red Cross military corps and of the Ministry of the Interior and State Police. The Italian Navy conducted 558 interventions in one year, rescuing 100,250 refugees and immigrants, seizing six ships and

arresting 728 human traffickers. Respondents in Italy associated the Mediterranean region first and foremost with migration issues, and this association was far more commonly made by Italians than by other Europeans respondents (59% vs. 44%).

Many of the rescued people applied for political asylum in Italy and we are now gambling on their integration into the Italian civil fabric. As a result of the higher number of migrants arriving in Italy, there is an increase in the number of Italians who have interacted with people from the southern or eastern shore of the Mediterranean (SEM) in the past 12 months compared to 2012 (65% in 2016 vs. 44% in 2012). These encounters happen mainly in public places (55%), in the neighbourhood (27%) and through business (26%). Although 29% of respondents who talked or met someone from a SEM country say their views about these people have not changed as a consequence of this encounter, 23% report a change into a positive direction and only 3% into a negative direction. According to the respondents interviewed, the main barriers to cross-cultural encounters are cultural and linguistic, and relate to embedded stereotypes. To overcome these barriers, structured and effective integration policies are needed. These people first need to feel secure and then learn the Italian language as the first and most important vehicle for integration.

The Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey provides a positive picture of the propensity of Italians to accept diversity in society and in their personal sphere. Indeed, we register that the primary value that Italian parents wish to pass on to their children is the respect for people from other cultures (69% of respondents in Italy select this value out of the six values presented to them; an increase of 4% points in the importance of this value compared to 2012). Furthermore, a large majority of respondents in Italy agree that cultural and religious minorities should have the same rights and that cultural diversity is a source of

Chart 18.3
Perceptions about religious and cultural diversity in Italy



prosperity for the Italian society (Chart 18.3). Although one in three Italians thinks diversity can be a threat to the stability of their society, a larger share (42%) strongly objects to this view. Even when looking at the personal sphere, Italians show a high level of acceptance of other cultures whether it is at the workplace, in their neighbourhood, in the classrooms of their children or in their family when someone marries a person with another cultural background.

Italy still has to work hard to encourage coexistence of different cultures. At the moment, schools are the main place where children, born in Italy by foreign parents, learn our language and the rules of living together while studying subjects such as mathematics, geography and grammar. It is in schools that children learn to be citizens capable of respecting the differences and specificities of each and every one; it is teachers who give them the tools necessary to overcome stereotypes and prejudice in the name of real equality. The vast majority of Italians consider that ensuring that schools are places where children learn how to live in diversity is an effective way to help people better live together in a multi-cultural environment. Our country must increasingly support and invest in schools that teach children to recognise diversity and to respect each other's cultural identity by considering it as a resource.

The Mediterranean as a region characterised by its hospitality

It is clear from the Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey that there is widespread consensus that the Mediterranean region is strongly characterised by its lifestyle and food. This is not only an element that unites us but makes us unique in the world. The importance we attach to the choice of fresh ingredients in the preparation of meals is an integral part of our being Mediterranean. Olive oil, for example, is the basis of both the Italian and Arabic culinary traditions and is a very strong element of the Mediterranean identity. The olive tree is a Mediterranean tree that grows well in Italy as in Greece, Spain, Tunisia and Palestine; the quality of the oil that the Mediterranean region produces is recognised all over the world, and our oil is one of the most important export products. It is also fully embodies the Mediterranean tradition of welcoming the other: this is a golden rule, not a written rule, but very important in the culture and tradition of the countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean – a rule that the European countries are rediscovering, especially in recent years due to recent migratory waves (47% of European respondents see hospitality as a strong characteristic of the region as opposed to just 5% who state that the region is not at all characterised by its hospitality). Welcoming a stranger at your home, making it a place for a traveller, offering shelter to those who are passing through are part of a distinctive trait of what we can call Mediterranean. It is

a great virtue that relies on trust and openness to the other, passed on from generation to generation.

These are elements of hope, because the Mediterranean identity is a mosaic of stories, habits, religions and different colours, but also the fruit of common roots. Strong roots that allow us to recognise we are alike even in diversity, strong roots that we have to tell and share as much as possible because they are an antidote to extremism and the temptation to want to be right at all times and impose our own reasons. The Mediterranean is strong in diversity, we teach young people the value of pluralism to build solid and peaceful communities, united in the common values of respect and appreciation of differences.

Khalid Chaouki is the President of the President of the Cultural Islamic Centre of Italy and a professional journalist

Maintaining social cohesion in a growing and diverse population in Jordan

Mustapha TABBA and Nedal ALMASRI

With the challenges many of the SEM countries faced during the past few years, more people sought shelter in Jordan resulting in greater contact between local residents and the cultures and norms of the new residents. In this article Mustapha Tabba and Nedal Masri assess how the Jordanians have dealt with this wave of cultural exposure. Through the lens of the ALF/Ipsos Survey they discuss how both the state and people of Jordan perceive the newcomers and how they handle their own diversity.

To better understand how Jordan associates itself with other countries bordering the Mediterranean, it is important to take a step back and refer to the events that have taken place recently in the region and most particularly in the Arab world. Political reform in Tunisia and Egypt ignited by the Arab Spring were succeeded by outbreaks of instability in the Middle East and North Africa region, primarily in neighbouring countries such as Libya, Yemen and Syria. Of course, prior to these events was the Iraq War that also left a deep mark on the current situation in the region. While maintaining

stability and solidarity during these challenging periods, Jordan has been on the forefront of extending support to displaced people of neighbouring countries that have, or are, currently experiencing political changes of their own.

Since the eruption of the Syrian Civil War, almost six years ago, the region has witnessed one of the largest displacement of refugees in years, with over 4.8 million Syrian refugees now being hosted in neighbouring communities, as registered by the UNHCR. Jordan alone hosts nearly 1.3 million registered and non-registered

Chart 19.1 Jordanians' views about what Characterises the Mediterranean region





Chart 19.2
Jordanians' attitude to cultural and religious diversity



Syrian refugees. This accounts to close to 15% of the Jordanian population (Census, 2015). In addition to other migrant groups residing in the kingdom, Jordan has become a safe-haven in a region that is undergoing change. As more refugees seek shelter in the kingdom, Jordan has become more exposed to the new cultures and norms of these residents, hence highlighting direct cultural exchange between Jordan and its neighbouring Arab, as well as Mediterranean, communities.

A new definition for hospitality

As Jordanians are more in contact with neighbouring Arab countries, their sentiments toward the Mediterranean is influenced by these interactions. To Jordanians, the Mediterranean is more than just an ideal vacation hub glamorised for its way of life and exotic cuisine. According to the Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey conducted in 2016, countries south of the Mediterranean were almost twice more likely to strongly characterise the Mediterranean for the lifestyle it evokes than Jordanians would. Although it cannot be argued that Mediterranean countries can certainly deliver a picture of the perfect vacation and a tourist destination that most people dream of visiting one day, Jordanians are more keen to praise the region for its hospitality. In fact, compared to the 2012 poll carried out by the Anna Lindh Foundation, hospitality as an attribute that strongly defines the Mediterranean, as perceived by Jordanians, has increased nearly 7 points (57% in 2012 versus 64% in 2016) (Chart 19.1). This is not surprising as Jordanians themselves take pride in being hospitable — a virtue that is deeply rooted within the very definition of being Jordanian. Such a sentiment is also mirrored in other Arab countries bordering the Mediterranean, such as Algeria and Tunisia. Yet for Jordan, the natural need to be hospitable is not just expressed on a familial and/or individual level, it is also quite profound on a national level which is evident by Jordan's global position on refugees and its acceptance of migrant groups whether it

be Syrians, Palestinians, Iraqi, Yeminis, or Libyans. 'We can't ignore them and just keep refugees isolated. So you've just got to be smart and you've got to think with the heart', as said by King Abdullah II of Jordan during an interview with CNN and is just another example of the Jordanian people's drive to showcase solidarity and hospitality in its most humanitarian form.

Limited opportunities in a growing population

However, the current infrastructure within the kingdom has set limits to this hospitality. As per this wave of the Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey, many Jordanians have become slightly more reserved when it comes to the accessibility of equal rights and opportunities to people of different cultures and religions (Chart 19.2). Interestingly, such sentiments were more common amongst the youth (15 – 29 age group) who are facing hardships of their own due to limited opportunities. It should be noted that the youth account for a sizable chunk of the Jordanian population and have been a critical topic of almost all national strategic agendas. They are the movers and shakers of the country and play an important role in ensuring that cultural and social cohesion is sustained.

Despite the noticeable 8 point drop on this metric when compared to the previous wave, Jordanians are still more open to the idea of equality for people of diverse backgrounds than other South and Eastern Mediterranean countries that have participated in this survey. One of the main barriers for advocacy of equal opportunities and rights to all residents of Jordan may be attributed to the increasing demand of resources the country requires to accommodate the needs of its own citizens as well as those of the growing refugee population, particularly displaced Syrians. As such, the very fabric of Jordanian economy, legislation and security has been moulded by the unrest seen in the region as well as the influx of refugees.

A clear example of this has been seen in the worsening employment conditions affecting the kingdom, with the youth being at the very centre of this national issue. In fact, competition for jobs has been on the rise between Jordanian and Syrian labourers, whether through formal or informal means. This in turn has drawn a lot of attention from international organisations who are sent out to improve employment infrastructure in the kingdom with an emphasis on vocational training. Yet, who benefits from these programmes may be an underlying issue that will halt the wider acceptance as well as integration of new residents starting a new life in Jordan.

Attitudes toward domestic social cohesion

Nevertheless, Jordanians are proud of the way they have persevered during these pressing times and the policies that have been adopted by the kingdom to cope with the refugee crisis within the region. The public is quite open to cultural and religious diversity as has been cited in the Anna Lindh /Ipsos Survey with almost 9 in 10 Jordanians agreeing that cultural and religious diversity is important to the prosperity of society (Chart 19.2). Jordanians reported the highest score for this metric when compared to other countries that participated in the survey and was considerably higher than scores cited for countries south of the Mediterranean. To further reinforce the country's stand on this matter, Jordanians who strongly agree that cultural and religious diversity is linked to the prosperity of society has increased from 54% in the 2012 poll to 64% in this wave of the study, hence indicating growing acceptance toward people of different backgrounds.

While the public appears to be quite accepting of people of differing backgrounds and tolerant of others on various fronts – whether having people of other cultures as neighbours or perhaps colleagues in the workplace, which goes hand in hand with the hospitality virtue acknowledged earlier — there does seem to be something holding Jordanians back when it comes to the inclusion of individuals of different cultures in schools.

In fact, tolerance on this aspect was substantially lower than what was recorded by European countries and was almost on par with its neighbour Palestine. The rise of refugee groups, particularly Syrians, and their access to both public and private schools in Jordan may contribute to culture clashes, which parents may be unable to control. This may create a conflict of interest for parents and/or potential parents, who are determined to instil Jordanian traditional values. For Jordanians, the values they pass on to their children are key in ensuring that the Jordanian identity is maintained. Like the country's overall direction toward openness, Jordanian values, when it comes to raising their young, have evolved and are no longer fixated on reinforcing religious beliefs – a practice

that has witnessed a 24% drop since the 2012 wave of this survey in terms of being the most important youth upraising virtue. Nevertheless, a lack of control in cultural exchanges that exists between Jordanian children and their non-Jordanian classmates is still worrisome and it may weaken family solidarity for which Jordanians feel is among their most important values when raising their young.

Fostering systems in schools that teach children to live with diversity was viewed by many as being a potentially effective tool for helping people integrate and cultivate a society that is accepting of these cultural differentiations. Yet, implementing such a system would require the intervention of the Ministry of Education, which is already overwhelmed with infrastructure and resource constraints as it is. This in turn calls for collaboration from the international community and operating non-governmental organisations in the kingdom.

Such organisations have taken an active role in helping Jordan relieve the pressures associated with hosting displaced individuals. However, the focus of their initiative is primarily centred on assisting the government and policy makers in meeting the basic needs of refugees and Jordan's neediest segments. Programmes focusing on addressing the cultural exchanges domestically may help build confidence in the public's fear of societal instability that may arise because of cultural and religious diversification.


Progression through economic and educational cooperation

The Jordanian people have seen first-hand the importance of collaborating with its neighbouring countries in order to cope with the unrest and instability that have notoriously been the key identifiers of the Middle East and North Africa region for many years. As such, Jordanians have fixated their views about the Mediterranean from an Arab perspective that is quite open-minded for the region, and yet it conforms with the traditional aspects of Jordanian society. Based on this openness, Jordan has embraced a growing population driven by those seeking relief. However, its ability to cope with the domestic cultural exchanges needs further development, which in turn has welcomed more international intervention.

As assistance during these pressing times is seen by Jordanians as an international initiative, it is not surprising that 36% of the population believe that a fair response to the refugee crisis is among the many definite benefits from cooperating in the conceptualised framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. As in other countries surveyed, the most important gains perceived by Jordanians in their participation with such a framework revolved around self-development, whereby the majority believed that 'opportunities for education

Chart 19.3

Jordanians' views about potential gains from Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation



and training' as well as 'entrepreneurship, innovation and youth employment' were definite wins for the country. This in turn highlights the need for Jordanians to equip themselves with the tools and skills they need to further adept to the changing economic, cultural and social climates occurring in the kingdom and the region (Chart 19.3). Jordanians' undeniable will to seek progression, even in the toughest of times, is admirable and has been a driving force behind the population's optimism – a virtue that could hopefully be carried on to other residents settling in Jordan and who are also undergoing hardship and a state of transition of their own.

Despite the noticeable 8 point drop on this metric when compared to the previous wave, Jordanians are still more open to the idea of equality for people of diverse backgrounds than other South and Eastern Mediterranean countries that have participated in this survey. One of the main barriers for advocacy of equal opportunities and rights to all residents of Jordan may be attributed to the increasing demand of resources the country requires to accommodate the needs of its own citizens as well as those of the growing refugee population, particularly displaced Syrians. As such, the

very fabric of Jordanian economy, legislation and security has been moulded by the unrest seen in the region as well as the influx of refugees.

A clear example of this has been seen in the worsening employment conditions affecting the kingdom, with the youth being at the very centre of this national issue. In fact, competition for jobs has been on the rise between Jordanian and Syrian labourers, whether through formal or informal means. This in turn has drawn a lot of attention from international organisations who are sent out to improve employment infrastructure in the kingdom with an emphasis on vocational training. Yet, who benefits from these programmes may be an underlying issue that will halt the wider acceptance as well as integration of new residents starting a new life in Jordan.

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Intercultural Trends and Social Changes in Poland

Konrad PEDZIWIATR


Konrad Pędziwiatr offers a sweeping shot of Polish society with the background of the findings of the Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey and the societal transformations in Poland since the collapse of communism. Through his presentation the author explores the changes and consistencies in the values of the Polish people, their perception and interest in the Euro-Mediterranean space, and the extent of their cross-cultural encounters with people from different backgrounds.

Since the collapse of communism in 1989 and then accession to the European Union in 2004, Poland has been undergoing deep social, political and economic transformations. In spite of rapid modernisation that has resulted inter alia in a significant increase in the number of people entering institutions of tertiary education (Polish Gross Enrolment Index was below 10% in 1990 and increased to above 40% in 2016 - MNiSW, 2016), rising living standards and life expectancy (from 70 years in 1990 to almost 78 in 2016 - GUS, 2016b), Poland still remains quite a religious country where almost 43% of adults regularly participate in religious services (Czapiński & Panek, 2015). While the number of churchgoers has been steadily decreasing since the beginning of the systemic transformations, when around 50% of the population participated regularly in the religious services (Czapiński & Panek, 2015; ISKK, 2015), the pace of the secularisation processes has been rather slow (especially in comparison with Western European countries – Davie, 2002) and the latest research shows that it may be even reversing. One of the recent large scale quantitative studies actually showed that the number of regular churchgoers had increased from 41% in 2011 to almost 43% in 2015 (Czapiński & Panek, 2015). Thus, sociological predictions suggesting the decline of religion with the advance of modernity (e.g. Berger, 1967) have not been fulfilled in a country with a very ethnically and religiously homogenous population (especially in comparison to Poland before the Second World War), and where the Catholic Church plays an important role in the country's public sphere (Pędziwiatr, 2015).

Rapid modernisation has not been the only important process to have shaped Polish society over the last decades – the outflow of surplus manpower after the insurmountable barriers to mobility in Europe were dismantled with the collapse of the Berlin Wall (Okólski, 2007) has also been significant. The migration process noticeably accelerated when Poland joined the EU with

some countries (e.g. UK and Ireland) opening their labour market for the citizens of new member states. According to the last census carried out in 2011, over 2 million of 38 million Polish citizens had been living

Chart 20.1
Preferred countries to start a new life for respondents in Poland



abroad for at least 3 months (GUS, 2013). Although the pace of migration has been losing its dynamism in recent years, as the modernization of the economy has started to generate a steady demand for foreign labour, Poland is still a emigration rather than immigration country.

The Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey interestingly shows that while in 2012 35% of Polish interviewees saw their country as a preferred place to start a new life and 43% of them opted for Europe, in 2016 this situation changed. At present an equal number of people see Poland and Western European countries as a preferable birthplace (Chart 20.1). This trend has been clearly linked with the weakening labour market pressures pushing people out of the country (e.g. decreasing unemployment rates from over 20% in 2002 to around 8.5% at present - GUS, 2017b) and growth of the country's GDP (from 7,500 Euro per inhabitant in 2005 to 11,200 in 2016 – GUS, 2017c) that translates into a general improvement of the economic status of Polish families.

Key values and perception of gender equality

In spite of the dynamic transformations, the key values of Polish society remain quite stable. The European Value Survey shows that Poles continuously point to family, then work, then religion as the most important values (Jasińska-Kania, 2012). Although the majority of Poles accept the traditional model of family, recent studies suggest an increasing acceptance of divorces, couples living together without marriage, patchwork families, usage of contraception and sex before marriage (CBOS, 2013b; Slany, 2007). The Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey shows that family solidarity is one of the key values that Poles would like to imbed in their children. This value was pointed out as the most or second most important value by 59% of Poles in 2012 and 57% in 2016. Also highly valued are respect for other cultures and independence (47% and 33% interviewees respectively mentioned them as most or second most important values) (Chart 20.2).

The strength of the traditional model of the family in the country is also visible in the Survey's data on the perception of a women's role in the society. The majority of the citizens believe that women already play an important role in the economic and business life, cultural and social life and in political-decision making. In contrast to other European countries, only a minority of 38-39% claimed that women should be playing a greater role in the aforementioned spheres of life. The survey carried out in 2013 by the Polish research centre found that the majority of men and the minority of women believed that there was equality of rights between men and women in public life and labour market (CBOS, 2013a).

Perception and interest in the SEM region

The perception the Mediterranean region by Polish society has been quite stable and not too distant from the views of other European countries surveyed. Most commonly, the Poles see the region through the perspective of a Mediterranean way of life and food, hospitality and common cultural heritage and history. These are also the main characteristics pointed out by other European countries and respondents of SEM countries. Less widespread were perceptions of the region as being a source of conflict, instability and resistance to change. As far as the main changes over the course of the last 2 years in the perception of the region are concerned, in 2016 there were around 10% less Poles who claimed that a specific way of life and food as well as hospitality strongly characterised the region compared to 2012.

At the end of 2016 more people viewed the region through the prism of migration issues (a new category in the poll) than through the lens of hospitality. Although the migration crisis has not directly influence Poland – as the country has served neither as a transit space nor as destination for increased migratory mobility from MENA to Europe – more Poles than other

Chart 20.2 Key values when raising children in Poland





Chart 20.3 Most trusted media sources for cross-cultural reporting in Poland



European countries surveyed said that this feature strongly characterised the region. At the same time, it is worth recalling that in the last 2 decades Poland has significantly contributed to EU mobility with over 2 million of its own citizens searching for work and better living conditions outside of the country (GUS, 2016a). This kind of perception of the SEM region, as I argue elsewhere, has been strongly linked with the politicisation and mediatisation of the migration crisis during the Polish parliamentary elections in 2015 and in their aftermath (Pędziwiatr, 2016, 2017). The result of it has been inter alia a significant overestimation of the number of Muslims living in the country. While all the EU societies analysed in the Ipsos MORI study on Perils of Perceptions overestimate the number of Muslims in their countries (e.g. in Italy 6 times more than the actual size, in France almost 5 times more and Belgium 4 times more), it is the Poles who are the unquestionable champions of such overestimations in Europe believing that, at present, 7% of the total population is Muslim (whilst there are a maximum of 0.1% Muslims in the country) and, that by 2020, 13% of the Polish population will be Muslims (Ipsos MORI, 2016).


At the same time, the Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey shows that there is very limited interest amongst the Poles in news and information about the political and economic situation in the SEM region. Only every 4th or 5th interviewee respectively was very interested in news and information about the SEM region. Even less Polish citizens were very interested in cultural life, religious beliefs and practices and sport in the region. Here, one needs to point out that this disinterest is mutual and that on the other side of the Mediterranean the interest

of interviewees in European countries (except in their sport – most likely football) did not cross 30% either. Interestingly, the Survey also shows that the majority of Polish interviewees claim that the media have no impact on their views about people from the SEM. In the case of those whose views changed after exposure to media information about the region, 15% said it changed in a negative way and only 7% in a positive way. A quarter of the people interviewed, however, have not seen, read or heard anything in the Polish media about the SEM region. One may also see in the Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey an increasing importance of online media as a key source of cross-cultural reporting. In Poland, where 80% of households had access to the internet by the end of 2016 (GUS, 2017a), 40% of people treated online media as the most trusted source of information about the SEM region. This is significantly higher than in other European countries where, on average, 28% of the interviewees said online media was a source of information and in the SEM where 32% of the interviewees treated in such a way (Chart 20.3). TV still remains the main source of information for Poles about the SEM, however, its role has been diminishing – especially vis-à-vis growing importance of online and social media.

Limited cross-cultural encounters

As mentioned earlier, Poland – for the first time in over a millennium long state history – emerged from the Second World War with very small ethnic and religious minorities. Some anthropologist call this new reality in which almost 95% of the population are ethnic Poles and 88% are Roman Catholics (GUS, 2015) ‘superhomogeneous’ (Buchowski, 2016) to emphasise the uniqueness of this new social arrangement in which

Chart 20.4 Interactions with people from different countries in Poland



Catholicism is additionally very strongly intertwined with nationalism. The Anna Lindh/Ipsos Survey confirms the limitations of having cross-cultural encounters in such a society. While the majority of Europeans (53%) surveyed had talked to or met someone from SEM in the last 12 months, only 29% of Poles had any contact with SEM people over the last year. (Chart 20.4) If they did have any contact with people from the region it was mostly through tourism, meeting in the public sphere or in the business or work context. This is in line with other research carried out in Poland that showed that one Pole in every ten personally knows a Muslim (CBOS, 2015) and that the negative attitudes towards followers of Islam develop in the absence of any contact with Muslims or the Muslim world. Although the results of the cross-cultural encounters are mixed, the Survey confirms that the more intensive the contact, the more people point out that it has mainly a neutral or positive outcome. For almost three quarters of Poles the main barrier to cross-cultural encounters with people from the SEM is a linguistic one.

In comparison to 2012 a decreasing number of Poles believe that cultural and religious diversity is important for the prosperity of the society. Whilst in 2012 36% either strongly or 45% somewhat agreed that diversity was important, in 2016 only 18% strongly and 38% mildly agreed with this statement. In a relatively homogenous society, cultural diversity is somehow feared and hence one may find lower levels of tolerance towards it than in other parts of Europe. For example, if for 65% of European interviewees marriage of a close relative with someone from a different cultural background would not be problematic at all, in Poland the same answer gave only 38%. Poles did not also see substantial benefits from the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. If other European nations surveyed saw important gains from such cooperation either in educational, environmental, cultural or business domains, in Poland only every third person saw it as a clear gain. Whilst this reluctance to engage more dynamically in Euro-Mediterranean

cooperation can be partially explained by geography and geopolitical position, some of it also stems from the nationalistic/patriotic movement taking place over the last years in the Polish society and the political decisions to scale down some of the European and Euro-Mediterranean partnerships.

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Tunisians and their affiliation to the Mediterranean region

Dalenda LARGUECHE

Dalenda Largueche analyses the perceptions of the Tunisians to the Mediterranean space, the impact of cross-cultural encounters and the population's response to the measures and actions that enable people to live together in multi-cultural environments. She explores their perception of the expected outcomes of the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and investigates both the current perceptions and the evolution of these perceptions overtime since the Anna Lindh Report 2012. From the data, Tunisians register higher levels of openness than the majority of SEM and Europeans.

A principle of good neighbourhood relationships implies sharing a set of values. The main value is the one granted to this shared area, and in which the neighbourly relation takes place: the Mediterranean region. The cradle of a certain civilisation, the Mediterranean region has always been an area for sharing and meeting, divided by a border.


The symbolic importance accorded to this area by the inhabitants on both sides of the Mediterranean is an indicator of how a people can be open to trans-state citizenship and a citizenship of sharing. To what extent is the Tunisian open to multi-culturalism? The data from the Survey on Tunisian openness are significant.

The Mediterranean area is mainly perceived as a hospitable place: in 2016 85% of Tunisians see it

as such, a slight decline compared to 2012 (90%). This decline could stem from problems linked to illegal immigration and the expulsion of immigrants.

A decline can also be seen in the way the Mediterranean is perceived as a region with a common cultural and historical tradition (from 86% in 2012 to 79% in 2016), which could be explained by the rise of Islamism, and the attempt to reshape the basic Tunisian personality around the idea of a new form of Arab and Islamic consciousness. This is a point which is confirmed by answers to the question on the values of education, where 60% of Tunisians consider that religious beliefs and practices are fundamental in children's education compared to 9% in Europe. It should be pointed out that the Tunisian constituent assembly, in 2013 an Islamist

Chart 21.1 Preferred place to start a new life for Tunisians



majority, refused to include as a basic determining factor of Tunisia that it is an inherent part of the Mediterranean region. That ideological instruction goes against the historical and cultural Tunisian personality, which is profoundly Mediterranean.

There is also a significant change in attitude among Tunisians regarding the link between the Mediterranean region as a source of conflict (73% in 2012 vs 62% in 2016) on the one hand, and the resilience to change on the other (77% in 2012 vs 62% in 2016). This can be interpreted as a gain of confidence in the policy of the Northern Mediterranean countries towards Tunisia throughout the transitional period.

As a migratory people, Tunisians are more attached to their country of residence than are Europeans, 59% to 36% – a phenomenon which can be linked to the history of European mobility in the colonial empires, reinforced by the birth of the EU as an experience in de-territorialised citizenship (Chart 21.1). However, Tunisians, just as much as the SEM populations, immediately think of Europe when it comes to choosing another potential country of residence, rather than the Gulf States, notwithstanding the fact that they are Muslim countries associated with wealth, or North America, or any other region. This is further proof that the Mediterranean region is a unified through culture rather than religion.

The impact of multi-cultural encounters on how the Other is seen

Although 75 % of the Tunisian respondents have a relation or friend in Europe, only 37% of them have spoken to or met a European over the last 12 months.

This is a decline compared to 2012, which can be explained by the post-revolutionary situation, terrorist threats, less tourists and the reduction in European investments due to the context of crisis. Thus, business interactions have gone from 31% in 2012 to 15% in 2016, and encounters in streets and public spaces from 18% to 9% over the same period in the same way as interactions via social media from 32% to 23%. However, virtual interactions head the list of the way of encountering the other in 2016.

19% of Tunisians respondents said that encounters with Europeans led to a positive change of opinion compared to 15% of Europeans and 17% of SEM inhabitants. Not to remain trapped in preconceived ideas about others, changing opinions more positively, is a sign of open-mindedness, and Tunisians are more open-minded than Europeans and the inhabitants of the SEM countries. Moreover, only 1% of Tunisians interviewed said they were not interested in encounters, while 35% considered that there are no barriers to multi-culturalism. Cultural barriers hardly count for Tunisians (12%), whereas they count for 38% of Europeans and 25% for inhabitants from the SEM countries. Language barriers are important for 57% of Europeans, but are limited to 38% of Tunisians and 39% of participants from the SEM countries.

Nevertheless, attitudes towards diversity are more contradictory, since on the one hand, comparing the responses in 2016 to those of 2012, there is a rise in the number of those who consider cultural and religious diversity as a threat to social stability (54% of Tunisians participants, and as many from the SEM, compared to 39% in 2012). Also, 60% think that beliefs and religious practices are part of fundamental educational values and that religion is a factor of unity for society.

Chart 21.2 Perceptions about religious and cultural diversity in Tunisia





Chart 21.3 Tunisian tolerance towards people with a different cultural background



On the other hand, 77% of Tunisian participants, 72% of SEM participants and 82% of Europeans consider that diversity is important for the prosperity of society (Chart 21.2). It must be admitted that Tunisians have not yet solved the problem of the secularity of citizenship guaranteed by the constitution of 2014. And yet, beyond this general consideration, the way the level has progressed could be more linked to the openness of the media sector as well as freedom of speech because Tunisians have learned they can speak safely on any subject, including religion.

It must be noted that independently from the current state of affairs, on the strict question of religion, Tunisians remain strongly attached to the homogeneity of dogma, the absence of confessional divisions, within so-called Tunisian Islam. Paradoxically, this conviction which is firmly anchored in Tunisian psyche has served as an ideological bulwark against radicalisation of any kind. Homogeneity is seen as an absolute value to the point of considering that any infringement of that religious unity is a threat to its 'Tunisianity', and to the stability and cohesion of society in its entirety.

The rate of Tunisians linking cultural and religious diversity to threats to society is also contradictory with the rate of those who accept work colleagues or neighbours from a different cultural environment (92%), or who have no objection to their children mixing with, or even marrying people from a different environment (84% and 82%). These levels, nearer to those of the Europeans (92%, 92%, 79%) than those of SEM countries (87%, 74%, 71%) indicate that there are more similarities than differences between Tunisians and the inhabitants of the North and South Mediterranean (Chart 21.3).

When it comes to the system of values, there is an evolution in Tunisian society. Although it can be noticed that for an individual the place of independence is inversely proportional to that of obedience (39% for Tunisians compared to 43% for SEM countries and 20% for Europeans), and a minor place is granted to curiosity (4%) in educational values – more openness can be seen in that education in family solidarity has declined from 59% in 2012 to 46% in 2016, nearer to the European level (49%) and that teaching about others as an educational value has risen from 25% in 2012 to 34% in 2016, setting Tunisia apart from the other SEM countries.

Euro-Mediterranean cooperation should aim at reforms in school and include education about universal values and empowerment of each individual.

A Euro-Mediterranean consensus for successful living together

To the North, South and East of the Mediterranean region, the consensus is that it is necessary to found multi-culturalism through education and in schools, with 90% of Tunisians and 89% of Europeans agreeing on the matter.

Furthermore, promoting the organisation of multi-cultural events, enabling the expression of cultural diversity in public spaces, and incorporating cultural diversity in the work place, are methods Tunisians favour for making multi-cultural living together an easier process (87%, 85% and 81%). As a country open to culture and festivity, Tunisia ratifies its membership in the SEM cultural zone, while at the same time standing

out as being more tolerant than Europe or the SEM countries as far as using the expression of cultural diversity in public spaces is concerned (85% compared to 67% and 80%).

Equally exposed to the risks of radicalisation and conflicts, both Tunisians and the inhabitants of the SEM countries express substantially the same priorities and advocate the same solution: encouraging young people to take part in public life (89%); education and youth programmes (88%); cultural and artistic initiatives (87%); exchange programmes engaging young people from the Mediterranean zone (84%); multi-cultural dialogue training for the media (83%); interreligious dialogue (81%); and training in diversity management and the prevention of radicalisation (72%).

Advocating media training in multi-cultural dialogue (83% / 69%) and in interreligious dialogue (81% / 69%) as measures to be taken to prevent radicalisation and conflict, shows an awareness among SEM inhabitants in general and Tunisians in particular, of the role played by the media and by religious propaganda in what is known as the Arab Spring, and in the radicalisation of young people and conflicts. It gives an indication of a neighbourhood policy for peace and security around the Mediterranean basin.

The suspicion under which the media fall in Tunisia and the SEM countries must be emphasised: 44% and 38% do not use the media to form an opinion about what is happening around them or in the world. In the case of Tunisia, these results can be explained by decades of absence of freedom of speech and the press harnessed to the directives of the ruling power. 21% of Tunisians and 26% of SEM inhabitants think that the image they have of others has been changed negatively because of the media, while the proportion of Tunisians who believe that the media positively changed their image of the peoples of Europe and the Southern Mediterranean region is only 17%.

The advantages of inter-Mediterranean cooperation

What can a European neighbourhood policy do for the region on the Southern Mediterranean shore? First and foremost, entrepreneurship, innovation and youth employment for 91% of Tunisians. Education and training come in second place and a common approach to environmental problems in third. Following these advantages are expectations of respect for cultural diversity and the prevention of extremism, a policy of gender equality, individual freedoms and the rule of law. Although quite significant, the issue of responsiveness towards refugees comes next to the last for Tunisians and the SEM inhabitants, just before support for civil society and NGO's (73% and 69%).

Tunisian expectations from Euro-Mediterranean cooperation remain stable from 2012 to 2016, just a change in priorities can be seen. Thus, cultural diversity and the prevention of extremism, ranked in 2012 as the first expectation (90%), is relegated in 2016 to third place (84%), leaving the first place to entrepreneurship, innovation and youth employment (91%) – the fear of extremism having given way to the fear of an economic crisis which would overcome the State explains this desire for cooperation with Europe. In 2016, environmental sustainability also comes before cultural diversity and prevention of extremism, although it maintains the same level of priority as in 2012 (87%), while the issue of gender equality, individual freedoms, and the rule of law remains stable (82%, 83%). These expectations of Tunisians, recorded four years apart, show very little variation either in their expectations or in the other groups of questions treated in the Survey. This justifies a cultural affiliation which can serve as a basis for a common Euro-Mediterranean neighbourhood policy.

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ANNEXES

Annex I

Anna Lindh/Ipsos intercultural Trends Survey Questionnaire

The Intercultural Trends Survey, commissioned by the Anna Lindh Foundation and carried out by Ipsos, was conducted in eight European countries (Austria, Croatia, Finland, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal and the Netherlands) and five Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries/territories (Algeria, Israel, Jordan, Palestine and Tunisia).

The target population consisted of all individuals, aged 15 or older, resident in the country/territory. The questionnaire was translated into the major languages of each country. Fieldwork took place between 19 September 2016 and 8 November 2016; during that period, 1,000 interviews were completed in each of the countries/territories covered. In most countries, a CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing) methodology was implemented; in Israel and Palestine, on the other hand, face-to-face interviewing was applied.

The questionnaire started with the following introduction: 'Good morning/afternoon/evening, my name is [NAME], calling from [agency name], a research company. We are conducting a survey about people's perceptions of intercultural trends and social change. The survey is conducted in 13 countries, both European countries and countries on the southern and eastern shore of the Mediterranean, and is funded by the Anna Lindh Foundation. The questionnaire will take about 10 minutes to complete. All information you provide is strictly confidential and will be used for research purposes only.'

1. Representation of the Mediterranean and Mutual Interest

1.1 Different people have different thoughts about what the Mediterranean region represents. I will read out a set of ideas and images; please tell me if you think these characterise the Mediterranean region strongly, somewhat or not at all.

A. Mediterranean way of life and food	1 2 3 8 9
B. Source of conflict.....	1 2 3 8 9
C. Common cultural heritage and history.....	1 2 3 8 9
D. Hospitality	1 2 3 8 9
E. Resistance to change.....	1 2 3 8 9
F. Instability and insecurity.....	1 2 3 8 9
G. Migration issues	1 2 3 8 9

Would you say they:

Strongly characterise.....	1
Somewhat characterise.....	2
Not characterise at all.....	3
[Don't know]	8
[Refused]	9

1.2 If you could start a new life, in which country of the world would you start it?

- Open ended question
- Europe
- North America
- South America
- SEM countries
- Africa
- Asia
- Australia
- Etc. List of countries

1.3 Thinking about European/SEM countries, how much interest would you say you personally have in news and information about their:

A. Economic conditions	1 2 3 8 9
B. Cultural life and lifestyle	1 2 3 8 9
C. Religious beliefs and practices	1 2 3 8 9
D. Political situation	1 2 3 8 9
E. Sports activities	1 2 3 8 9

Would you say you are:

Very interested	1
Somewhat interested	2
Not interested	3
[Don't know]	8
[Refused]	9

1.4 Your country, with other European/SEM countries, has decided to reinforce closer cooperation with countries on the other shore of the Mediterranean in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Which of the following do you think your society can gain by reinforcing such cooperation?

A. Entrepreneurship, innovation and youth employment.....	1 2 3 8 9
B. Opportunities for education and training.....	1 2 3 8 9
C. Individual freedom and rule of law.....	1 2 3 8 9
D. Equality between men and women.....	1 2 3 8 9
E. Environmental sustainability	1 2 3 8 9
F. Fair response to refugee crisis.....	1 2 3 8 9
G. Recognition of cultural diversity and prevention of extremism	1 2 3 8 9
H. Support for NGOs and civil society organisations	1 2 3 8 9

Please state whether you think there will definitely be a gain, maybe a gain or no gain.

Definitely	1
Maybe	2
No	3
[Don't know]	8
[Refused]	9

2. Values and Mutual Perceptions

2.1 A. In bringing up their children, parents in different countries may place different emphasis on different values. Assuming that we limit ourselves to six values only, I'd like to know which one of these is most important, to you personally, when raising children?

Curiosity.....	1
Obedience.....	2
Religious beliefs /practices.....	3
Independence	4
Family solidarity	5
Respect for the other cultures	6
[Don't know]	8
[Refused]	9

B. And the second most important?

Curiosity.....	1
Obedience.....	2
Religious beliefs /practices.....	3
Independence ...	4
Family solidarity	5
Respect for the other cultures	6
[Don't know]	8
[Refused]	9

2.2 A. And which one of these six do you think is most important to parents raising children in Europe?

Curiosity.....	1
Obedience.....	2
Religious beliefs /practices.....	3
Independence ...	4
Family solidarity	5
Respect for the other cultures	6
[Don't know]	8
[Refused]	9

B. And the second most important?

Curiosity.....	1
Obedience.....	2
Religious beliefs /practices.....	3
Independence ...	4
Family solidarity	5
Respect for the other cultures	6
[Don't know]	8

2.3 A. And which one of these six do you think is most important to parents raising children in countries bordering the southern and eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea?

Curiosity.....	1
Obedience.....	2
Religious beliefs /practices.....	3
Independence ...	4
Family solidarity	5
Respect for the other cultures	6
[Don't know]	8
[Refused]	9

B. And the second most important?

Curiosity.....	1
Obedience.....	2
Religious beliefs /practices.....	3
Independence ...	4
Family solidarity	5
Respect for the other cultures	6
[Don't know]	8
[Refused]	9

2.4 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

A. Cultural and religious diversity constitutes a threat to the stability of society.....	1 2 3 4 5 8 9
B. People from different cultural and religious backgrounds should have the same rights and opportunities	1 2 3 4 5 8 9
C. Cultural and religious diversity is important for the prosperity of your society	1 2 3 4 5 8 9

You would say you:

Strongly agree.....	1
Somewhat agree	2
Somewhat disagree	3
Strongly disagree	4
[Don't know]	8
[Refused]	9

2.5 Compared to their present role in your country, do you think that women should be playing a greater, the same, or lesser role in each of the following domains:

A. Economic and business life.....	1 2 3 8 9
B. Political decision-making.....	1 2 3 8 9
C. Cultural and social life.....	1 2 3 8 9

You would say the should be playing:

Greater role.....	1
The same role	2
A lesser role	3
[Don't know]	8
[Refused]	9

2.6 During the past 12 months, have you seen, read or heard anything in the media that has influenced your view of people in European/SEM countries?

Yes, in a positive way.....	1
Yes, in a negative way	2
Yes, I have seen, read or heard something but my views remained unchanged ..	3
No, I have not seen, read or heard anything in the media about people from these countries	4
[Don't know]	8
[Refused]	9

2.7 Which of the following sources do you trust most for information about European/SEM countries? Please select up to three sources.

Films/documentaries.....	1
TV	2
Print media (newspapers, magazines etc.)	3
Online media (news websites, online magazines etc.)	4
Books.....	6
Social media (Facebook, Twitter, blogs etc.).....	7
Radio	8
Other.....	9
[Don't know]	88
[Refused]	99

3. Interaction and Dialogue

3.1 In the past 12 months, have you talked to or met someone from a European/SEM country?

[INTERVIEWER CLARIFY IF NEEDED: Please think of people you met recently, as well as those you've known for a long time; also think about meeting people in your own country or another country and consider any type of interaction.]

Yes.....	1
No.....	2
[Don't know]	8
[Refused]	9

[Ask if Yes in Q3.1]

3.2 Thinking of this/these person(s) you have interacted with, was this mainly through:

Business or work.....	1
School.....	2
Tourism	3
Chatting on the Internet, social media, Twitter	4
They live in my neighbourhood	5
Just met in the street/public space.....	6
Other.....	7
[Don't know].....	8
[Refused]	9

[ASK IF Q3.1=1]

3.3 Thinking of your encounter(s) with this/these person(s), did meeting or talking to them change or reinforce your view of people from European/SEM countries?

Yes, mainly in a positive way.....	1
Yes, mainly in a negative way	2
Yes, both positive and negative.....	3
No, my views remained unchanged	4
[Don't know].....	8
[Refused]	9

3.4 What do you think are the main barriers when meeting with or talking to people in or from European/SEM countries?

Language barriers.....	1
Cultural barriers	2
Stereotypes	3
Difficulties to get a visa/travel warnings from country of origin.....	4
Social media access restricted in some countries.....	5
Other.....	6
None of these.....	7
[I am not interested in meeting people from these countries].....	8
[Don't know]	88
[Refused]	99

3.5 I am now going to read out a number of scenarios. For each of them, please tell me whether you would mind a lot, mind a little, or whether you would not mind too much, or not mind at all.

A. Having a person from a different cultural background as a work colleague	1 2 3 8 9
B. Having a person from a different cultural background as a neighbour	1 2 3 8 9
C. If one of your close relatives were to marry someone from a different cultural background	1 2 3 8 9
D. If your children were to go to school with children from a different cultural background ...	1 2 3 8 9

You would:

Not mind at all.....	1
Not mind too much.....	2
Mind a little.....	3
Mind a lot.....	4
[Does not apply].....	7
[Don't know].....	8
[Refused].....	9

3.6 Many countries, in Europe and in the countries on the southern and eastern Mediterranean shores, are facing challenges, such as conflicts and radicalisation. How efficient do you think that each of the following mechanisms will be in preventing and dealing with these challenges?

A. Exchange programmes involving people across the Mediterranean.....	1 2 3 8 9
B. Inter-religious dialogue.....	1 2 3 8 9
C. Cultural and artistic initiatives.....	1 2 3 8 9
D. Media training for cross-cultural reporting.....	1 2 3 8 9
E. Trainings of governmental professionals and non-governmental actors in diversity management and radicalisation prevention.....	1 2 3 8 9
F. Education and youth programmes to foster youth-led dialogue initiatives.....	
G. Support of youth participation in public life.....	1 2 3 8 9

You would say:

Very efficient.....	1
Somewhat efficient.....	2
Not very efficient.....	3
Not at all efficient.....	4
[Don't know].....	8
[Refused].....	9

3.7 Today's societies are becoming more and more diverse, with people from different cultures and countries living together. How efficient do you think that each of the following actions would be in helping people live better together in a multi-cultural environment?

A. To ensure that schools are places where children learn how to live in diversity ...	1 2 3 8 9
B. To enable the expression of cultural diversity in public spaces.....	1 2 3 8 9
C. To incorporate the expression of cultural diversity at the work place.....	1 2 3 8 9
D. To promote the organisation of multi-cultural events.....	1 2 3 8 9
E. To restrict cultural practices to the private sphere.....	1 2 3 8 9

You would say:

Very efficient.....	1
Somewhat efficient.....	2
Not very efficient.....	3
Not at all efficient.....	4
[Don't know].....	8
[Refused].....	9

4. Demographics

D1. Are you ...

Male	1
Female	2
[Don't know]	8
[Refused]	9

D2. In what year were you born?

[Don't know]	8
[Refused]	9

D3. Were you or your parents born in a different country than [COUNTRY]?

Yes, I was.....	1
Yes, my parents were.....	2
Both me and my parents were	3
No	4
[Don't know]	8
[Refused]	9

[If D3=1, 2 or 3]

D3A. In which country/countries?

[Don't know]	8
[Refused]	9

D4. What is the highest level of education you have completed?

Never been in formal education/never completed primary education	1
Complete primary education	2
Complete secondary education.....	3
Technical/vocational education beyond secondary school level	4
University-level education	5
[Don't know]	8
[Refused]	9

D5. Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination? If yes, which one?

Does not belong to a denomination.....	1
Roman Catholic	2
Protestant	3
Orthodox (Russian/Greek/etc.)	4
Jew	5
Muslim	6
Hindu	7
Buddhist.....	8
Other	9
Lutheran.....	10
[Don't know]	88
[Refused]	99

D6. Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are? On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 stands for 'not at all religious' and 10 for 'very religious', where would you place yourself?

Not at all religious	0
.....	1
.....	2
.....	3
.....	4
.....	5
.....	6
.....	7
.....	8
.....	9
Very religious	10
[Don't know]	88
[Refused]	99

D8. Would you say you live in a rural area or village, in a small or middle-sized town, or in a large city or town?

Rural area or village.....	1
Small or middle-sized town	2
Suburbs of large town or city.....	3
Large town or city.....	4
Refugee camp.....	5
[Don't know]	8
[Refused]	9

D9. Which of the following best describes your household composition?

Single-person household	1
Married or cohabiting couple, no children or no children living at home	2
Single parent, one or more children living at home	3
Married or cohabiting couple, with one or more children living at home	4
Other.....	5
[Don't know]	8
[Refused]	9

D10 As far as your current occupation is concerned, would you say you are self-employed, an employee, a manual worker or would you say that you are without a professional activity?

Self-employed.....	1
Employee.....	2
Manual worker	3
Without a professional activity/without a paid job	4
[Don't know]	8
[Refused]	9

[Ask if D10=1]

D10a. Does it mean you are...

Farmer, forester, fisherman	11
Owner of a shop, craftsman	12
Professional (lawyer, medical practitioner, accountant, architect,...)13	

Manager of a company	14
Other.....	15
[Don't know]	88
[Refused]	99

[Ask if D10=2]

D10a. Does it mean you are ...

Professional (employed doctor, lawyer, accountant, architect).....	21
General management, director or top management.....	22
Middle management.....	23
Civil servant	24
Office clerk.....	25
Other employee (salesman, nurse, etc...)	26
Other.....	27
[Don't know]	88
[Refused]	99

[Ask if D10=3]

D10a. Does it mean you are ...

Supervisor / foreman (team manager, etc...).....	31
Skilled manual worker	32
Unskilled manual worker	33
Other.....	34
[Don't know]	88
[Refused]	99

[Ask if D10=4]

D10a. Does it mean you are...

Looking after the home	41
Student (full-time).....	42
Seeking a job	43
In military service	44
Retired	45
Other.....	46
[Don't know]	88
[Refused]	99

D12a. Do you happen to have a mobile phone or not?

Yes.....	1
No	2
[Don't know]	8
[Refused]	9

D12b. Is this mobile phone your only phone, or do you also have a landline telephone at home that is used to make and receive calls?

Has landline at home	1
Mobile is only phone	2
[Don't know]	8
[Refused]	9

D15. Do you have any relatives or friends who live in European/SEM countries?

Yes.....	1
No	2
[Don't know]	8
[Refused]	9

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WEB SOURCES

World Migration

International Organisation for Migration
<https://www.iom.int/world-migration>

Intercultural Cities:

ICC: Intercultural Cities Programme.
<https://www.coe.int/en/web/culture-and-heritage/intercultural-cities>

SSIIM: UNESCO Chair on the Social and Spatial Inclusion of International Migrants
 Urban Policies and Practices
<http://www.unescochair-iuav.it/en/>

URGENT: Urban Re-Generation: European Network of Towns
http://www.alda-europe.eu/newSite/project_dett.php?ID=89

ALDA: European Association for Local Democracy.
<http://www.alda-europe.eu/newSite/>

Creative Social Enterprises

Creative Space Beirut.
<https://www.creativespacebeirut.com/>

Drop earrings not bombs.
<http://www.dropearingsnotbombs.org/home/>

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Annex 4

Biographies

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Independent consultant in peace, development and security in Africa and MENA. Specialized in peace and development in MENA and Africa, Taynja Abdel Baghy has worked as consultant for the United Nations in Brussels and previously for the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris. Taynja Abdel Baghy co-authored the report 'Understanding African armies' for the EU Institute for Security Studies in 2016. Before that, she gained experiences at the International Crisis Group and the United Nations Development Programme.

Bernard ABRIGNANI

Deputy Director of the French National Erasmus+ Programme Agency. Coordinator of the European Resource Center, Salto-Youth EuroMed and good pedagogical practices. Project manager of the Technical and Strategic Assistance Center for the EuroMed Youth IV programme. He directs several collections of pedagogical and research books and practical guides. He has written a number of papers and articles including a project management manual, a training guide for youth and children's councils, articles on pedagogy and youth participation.

Abdelrahman ALDAQQAH

Board Member of Horizons International in Palestine and a member of the Committee for International and Cultural Relations. As a social activist and researcher, he works to empower young generations through promoting exchanges and cultural dialogues. His research projects focus on social engagement of youth in civil society. He participated in many global conferences and exchange programmes concerning Middle East youth. Abdelrahman has a diploma of Entrepreneurship from Indiana University in USA and MD degree from An-Najah University, Palestine.

Nedal ALMASRI

Senior Research Executive at Ipsos Jordan. Almasri has designed and managed local and regional research endeavors for government, non-profit, and private sector organizations across MENA. Being part of a leading global market research and opinion polling organization has provided him with a comprehensive understanding of how people think and behave as well anticipating any changes in their behavior. Almasri consults and leads on research efforts and opinion polls that explore the attitudes and practices of people in the MENA region.

Nabil AL-SHARIF

Executive Director of the Anna Lindh Foundation. As former Senator, Ambassador and Minister for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Dr Al-Sharif has extensive experience in international cooperation and was previously Jordan's ambassador to Morocco, Mauritania and Senegal. He has also worked across the domain of media and communication, from his role as Minister of Media Affairs to that of Editor-in-Chief of the Arabic daily newspaper "Ad-Dustour" and Chair of the Jordanian Media Institute (JMI).

Hatem ATALLAH

Executive Director of the Anna Lindh Foundation (2015-2017), has a rich diplomatic background as the Tunisian ambassador in several countries including US, UK, South Africa and Ethiopia. He was also the Permanent Representative to the African Union, the Economic Commission for Africa, UNEP and UN-Habitat, and was appointed as Diplomatic Advisor to the Head of the Tunisian Government until February 2015. He participated in numerous summits and ministerial meetings and organized many cultural activities and debates.

Teresa BEAN

Head of research and education at In Place of War, a social enterprise that supports creative communities in sites of conflict, post-conflict and developing

countries. Her research focuses on arts based community responses to conflict and peacebuilding and creative social entrepreneurship as a pathway to development. She has also written a short course, the Creative and Social Entrepreneur Programme which has been delivered in 14 countries. The programme was awarded the University of Manchester's Outstanding Contribution to Widening Participation, 2017.

Alexandra BUCHLER

Director of Literature Across Frontiers, European Platform for Literary Exchange, Translation and Policy Debate, and initiator of a number of Euro-Mediterranean literary projects for the past ten years. She has worked as cultural manager for over thirty years and is also a literary translator and editor. Her interest lies in the area of literary exchange and translation between Europe and other global regions and related policy and financing, and she frequently speaks on this subject at international gatherings.

Khalid CHAOUKI

Born in Casablanca and raised in Italy, his mother tongues are Italian and Arabic. He is a professional journalist and the President of the Cultural Islamic Centre of Italy. He was a Member of the Italian Chamber of Deputies. He has been devoting himself to a citizenship reform for the recognition of Italy's Second Generations as Italian citizens. Politics for him means passion and dedication, a way to make a difference and build the world he desires.

Shana COHEN

Director of TASC, an independent think tank based in Dublin, focusing on addressing inequality and sustaining democracy. Affiliated Lecturer and Associate Researcher with the Sociology Department at the University of Cambridge, she previously worked as the Deputy Director of the Woolf Institute, which specialises in the study of interfaith relations. She has a PhD in Sociology from the University of California, Berkeley and has worked extensively with community-based organisations in Morocco, the US, England, and India.

Femke DE KEULENAER

Research Director at Ipsos' International Social Research Institute with over 10 years of experience in conducting international social research and polling. As an expert in survey methodology, statistical modelling and data analysis, Femke worked on many large international projects, including projects for the European Commission, Eurofound and the OECD. Femke holds a PhD in Political and Social Sciences and, as a guest lecturer, teaches courses on statistics at the University of Leuven.

Nabil FAHMY

Foreign Minister of Egypt from July 2013 to June 2014. He served for over three decades in Egypt's Foreign Service including as Egypt's Ambassador to Japan from 1997-1999 and the United States from 1999-2008. After completing his diplomatic career, he became the founding Dean, and Professor of Practice of the School of Global Affairs and Public Policy (GAPP) at The American University in Cairo (AUC). During his distinguished diplomatic career Fahmy served in numerous government and international positions.

Paul GILLESPIE

Columnist and leader writer for The Irish Times and a Senior Research Fellow adjunct in the School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin. He is an active member of the EuroMed Media Network, a group of journalists from Europe, the Middle East and North Africa involved in media freedom and best practice issues. His research interests are in European integration and political identities, comparative regionalism, the EuroMed region, Irish-British relations, media and foreign policy.

Elisabeth Guigou

President of the Anna Lindh Foundation since 2015, was born in Marrakesh, Morocco. She served as French Minister of European Affairs (1990-1993), and was elected in 1994 as a Member of the European Parliament. In 1997, she became member of the French National Assembly and was appointed as the first woman Minister of Justice (1997-2000) before being Minister of Employment (2000-2002).

She has been Regional councilor of the region of Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur and Deputy-mayor of Noisy-le-Sec.

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